Hampton v. Hampton

12 S.E. 340, 87 Va. 148, 1890 Va. LEXIS 104
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedDecember 4, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 12 S.E. 340 (Hampton v. Hampton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hampton v. Hampton, 12 S.E. 340, 87 Va. 148, 1890 Va. LEXIS 104 (Va. 1890).

Opinion

Fauntleroy, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill charged adultery committed by the defendant^ Monemia F. Hampton, with J. Frank Hampton, the brother of the complainant, and the court made the decree appealed from, that the charge of adultery against the defendant, made [149]*149In the bill, was fully proved; and adjudged, ordered and decreed “that the marriage between the said Jonah N. Hampton and Monemia F. Hampton be dissolved and annulled; and that he is hereby forever divorced from his said wife, Monemia F. Hampton (nee Stocks), and all her right, title and interest In and to the property, real and personal, of said Jonah N. Hampton, shall henceforth cease and determine, and he shall retain and be entitled to the custody of his child.”

With the bill a letter, purporting to have admitted the fact of the adultery as charged in the bill, was filed as part of the bill, and the testimony of the complainant’s mother and others was taken to prove the admission of the defendant of her adultery with the brother of the complainant. The testimony and explanations of the defendant wife were excluded, ■and as the court expressed no opinion and alleged no reason specifically, the presumption is that the decision of the court was, in a great measure, influenced by the letter and alleged admissions. These should have been excluded under the law, section 2260, page 561, Code 1873. “Such suit shall be instituted and conducted as other suits in equity, except that the bill shall not be taken for confessed; and whether defendant answer or not, the cause shall be heard independently of the admissions of either party, in the pleadings or otherwise.” 1 Minor’s Inst., 256, says: “It is an established maxim that a divorce is never to be decreed for adultery (or, indeed, for any other cause) upon the confession of the parties merely without auxiliary proofs, experience having shown that such a practice is productive of collusion and other flagitious frauds.”

The defendant wife answered the bill, and, responding to its charges, utterly denied them, and most emphatically the charge of adultery. After narrating what did occur, and how her husband had deliberately and systematically practiced upon her hopes and her fears by persuasions, threats and promises to inveigle and drive her into the alleged confession, the answer says, “He was the stronger and she the weaker [150]*150party in distress, and without suspicion that the so-called admission, thus extorted from her, would be used against her to accomplish her ruin and disgrace. He first divested her of all her property rights and placed his own beyond reach, and then threatened separation and loss of her only child, which he executed by taking possession of him and sending her to her father’s, and throwing her out upon the world helpless, impoverished and disgraced. But one conclusion can be formed—that he has gone deliberately to work to defraud her of her property rights and to secure a divorce by false and fraudulent pretexts. Respondent asseverates her entire innocence of the charge of adultery with said J. Frank Hampton, or with any other person. She protests against the loose and indefinite expressions used by her in the letter filed, or before his mother, or her father being used as evidence against her to show her guilt as an adulteress, and she calls for strict proof of any act of adultery; and, if the brother is not an accomplice, he will respond and say whether such unnatural conduct as is ascribed to him be true or not, and to him she looks with confidence for complete exculpation and vindication.”

This answer, though not in itself evidence, or having the effect of an answer called for under oath, yet makes up the issue, and calls for full and strict proof of the charge made in the bill; and, by the nature of the cause, even if there were no denial in the answer, or no answer in the cause, or though it expressly and unqualifiedly admitted the charges of the bill, yet the complainant is under the obligation to establish, by full, clear and adequate evidence, the charges made in his bill, and not merely to create inference, suspicion or doubt, which we think is all that he has done, even by his own witnesses, and leaving out of yiew the testimony of the numerous, weighty and unimpeachable witnesses who prove the truth of the positive statements made in the defendant’s answer as to the conduct and motive of the complainant in procuring the alleged admissions from the defendant by threats of desertion [151]*151and disgrace and deprivation of her child if she would not confess, and by promises of condonement, forgiveness and happy reconciliation and the society and custody of her child and home if she would confess. “A confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it, and therefore it is rejected.” Greenleaf on Evidence, section 219.

“It is a principle, extending through all the departments of our law, that an act brought about by fraud or by duress, whoever the party may be, is void.” The principle is that, when the will is taken captive and so does not act freely, the thing apparently done by it, yet not really so, shall not bind the doer. Now, in the relation of marriage, the husband is recognized by the law as, in a certain sense, holding the wife in subjection. See Bishop on the Law of Married Women, section 478. “One form in which the marital influence is brought to bear improperly upon the wife occurs where the husband threatens to separate from her.” Idem, section 479. “Looking at the reason of things,if, as is well settled, a threat of injury to goods or other property, a threat of battery or of illegal imprisonment, are held sufficient to constitute duress, and to avoid a contract on the ground that they take away freedom of action and are calculated to overcome the mind of a person of ordinary firmness when believed in, it would seem too clear for argument that equal effect ought to be given to a threat by a husband to abandon his wife and turn her out upon the world to shift for herself, in the anomalous condition of a wife without a husband. If the degree of injury apprehended, and its almost remediless nature, are to be taken into account (and not to do so would be irrational), then certainly, in these respects, the abandonment of a wife by her husband is far in excess of a battery to the person or a trespass upon the goods, and stands upon stronger ground.” Tapley v. Tapley, [152]*15210 Minnesota. “The wife is deemed the weaker party, and, as a sort of general rule, is excused for what she does through the husband’s constraint.” Bishop on the La“w of Married Women; see section 479.

The bill charges no specific act of adultery—neither time, place, nor circumstance; and there is nothing in the testimony of the complainant’s own witnesses as to any act of adultery.

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Bluebook (online)
12 S.E. 340, 87 Va. 148, 1890 Va. LEXIS 104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hampton-v-hampton-va-1890.