Hamilton v. State

317 Ga. 337

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: September 19, 2023
• Docket: S23A0670
• Status: Published

Opinion

317 Ga. 337 FINAL COPY

S23A0670. HAMILTON v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

Nuwrulhaqq Hamilton was convicted of felony murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Antonio

Felton.1 On appeal, Hamilton contends that: (1) the trial court erred

by denying his motion for directed verdict as to the counts of felony

murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the

1 The crimes occurred on March 30, 2012. On April 2, 2013, a Bibb County grand jury jointly indicted Hamilton and Joseph Michael Williams for felony murder premised on the aggravated assault of Felton (Count 1), malice murder (Count 2), aggravated assault of Felton (Count 3), aggravated assault of Siedah Sanders (Count 4), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (the aggravated assault of Felton) (Count 5). At a joint trial with Williams held May 12 to 15, 2014, a Bibb County jury found Hamilton guilty of Counts 1 and 3-5, and the trial court directed a verdict of not guilty on Count 2. The court sentenced Hamilton to serve life in prison on Count 1, twenty years in prison on Count 4 to be served concurrently to Count 1, and five years in prison on Count 5 to be served consecutively to Count 4. The trial court merged Count 3 into Count 1. Williams was found guilty of all counts. This Court previously affirmed his convictions. See Williams v. State, 306 Ga. 674 (832 SE2d 843) (2019). Hamilton filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended twice through new counsel. Following a hearing on March 15, 2022, the trial court denied Hamilton’s amended motion on November 17, 2022. Hamilton filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case was docketed to the April 2023 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. commission of a felony; and (2) the trial court plainly erred by failing

to give, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to request, a jury charge on Hamilton’s good character. These

claims fail, and, therefore, we affirm Hamilton’s convictions.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts,2 the

evidence at trial showed that Felton and his cousin, Siedah Sanders,

stopped at a Bibb County convenience store on the night of March

30, 2012. Surveillance video taken from multiple vantage points

outside the convenience store3 captured the events that followed.

Felton parked next to the passenger-side of a vehicle driven by co-

defendant Joseph Williams, in which Hamilton, Katrina Burkes,

and Tanisha Burkes were passengers. After Felton parked, Williams

and Hamilton exited their vehicle and approached the convenience

store door while Katrina and Tanisha remained in the back seat.

2 Where an appellant is asking this Court to review a lower court’s “refusal to grant a motion for a directed verdict, this [C]ourt can only review the case under the standard espoused in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979) to determine if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supports the verdict.” Willis v. State, 263 Ga. 597, 598 (1) (436 SE2d 204) (1993). 3 This video surveillance footage was admitted into evidence and played

for the jury. 2 Felton exited his vehicle and began urinating on the ground

between the two vehicles. When Williams walked into the store,

Hamilton returned to the vehicle, noticed Felton, and confronted

him. After the confrontation, Felton entered the store. When

Williams returned to his vehicle, Hamilton began gesturing toward

the area where Felton had urinated. Surveillance footage showed

that the two men entered Williams’s vehicle, and Katrina testified

at trial that she observed Hamilton hand Williams a gun, though

the surveillance footage does not show what transpired inside the

vehicle. Williams then exited the vehicle and leaned against it;

Hamilton remained in the front passenger seat with the window

lowered.

When Felton exited the store, Williams and Hamilton again

confronted Felton about urinating between his vehicle and theirs.

Felton eventually entered his vehicle, where Sanders was waiting,

and began driving away. As Felton drove out of the parking lot, he

continued to argue with Williams and Hamilton through the

vehicle’s lowered window. Williams walked behind Felton’s car with

3 a firearm in his hand, at which point Hamilton, Katrina, and

Tanisha exited Williams’s vehicle. Katrina and Tanisha ran away,

but Hamilton joined Williams, standing beside him at the back of

the vehicle. Williams fired at Felton’s car, striking Felton in the back

of the head and killing him. Williams and Hamilton then fled the

scene in Williams’s vehicle.

At trial, a pawn shop owner testified that he sold Hamilton a

new .45-caliber Glock pistol in February 2012, less than two months

before the crimes, and a receipt reflecting the transaction and

showing the pistol’s serial number was entered into evidence. Shell

casings recovered from the scene were determined to have been fired

from a .45-caliber Glock pistol. And the bullet recovered from

Felton’s skull was a .45-caliber metal jacketed bullet that was

“consistent with being fired from a Glock 45 pistol.” Investigators

also recovered from Williams’s vehicle a Glock magazine and a box

of .45-caliber automatic bullets, as well as packaging and a receipt

for a Glock pistol. The serial number on the packaging matched the

serial number shown on the receipt from the pawn shop purchase.

4 2. Hamilton argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion for directed verdict as to the counts of felony murder,

aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony because the evidence established only his

“mere presence” at the scene.4 We disagree.

At trial, after the State finished presenting its case, the

defendants moved for directed verdicts of acquittal on all counts. As

to Hamilton, the trial court ultimately granted the motion as to the

malice murder count but denied the motion as to the other counts.

The court stated that its decision was based “largely” on Brown v.

State, 250 Ga. 862 (302 SE2d 347) (1983), which it reasoned was a

“very similar case.” According to the trial court:

[T]here was no direct evidence of any kind that the defendant in this case intended the outcome which occurred. The mere fact that he participated in the act of bringing the shotgun and shells along or may have pointed the gun at a separate victim does not constructively supply any intent to shoot the deceased in this case. There is no direct evidence of his participation

4 While Hamilton raises these arguments with respect to Counts 1 and

3-5, the court merged Count 3 (the aggravated assault of Felton) into Count 1 (the felony murder of Felton). Therefore, his challenge to Count 3 is moot. See Broxton v. State, 306 Ga. 127, 136 (4) n.6 (829 SE2d 333) (2019). 5 and no circumstantial evidence, aside from his presence. And I think that is exactly what we have here as far as Count 2 is concerned as to Mr. Hamilton.

Hamilton argues that this reasoning extends to the remaining

counts as well and, therefore, that the trial court erred by failing to

grant a directed verdict. We disagree.5

The test established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), is the proper test for us to use when a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence arises from the denial of a motion for directed verdict. See Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525, 527 (1) (314 SE2d 436) (1984). Under that test, we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B).

Holmes v. State, 307 Ga. 441, 443 (1) (b) (836 SE2d 97) (2019).

Under OCGA § 16-2-20 (a), “[e]very person concerned in the

commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with

and convicted of commission of the crime.” “While mere presence at

the scene of a crime is not sufficient evidence to convict one of being

5 We express no opinion as to whether the trial court’s ruling on Count 2

was correct. 6 a party to a crime, criminal intent may be inferred from presence,

companionship, and conduct before, during and after the offense.”

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Strozier v. State, 277 Ga. 78, 79

(2) (586 SE2d 309) (2003). See also Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 837

(1) (785 SE2d 285) (2016). And “criminal intent is a question for the

jury.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 314 Ga.

214, 231 (3) (875 SE2d 737) (2022).

In this case, a rational jury could conclude from the evidence

presented at trial and summarized above that, on the night of the

shooting, Hamilton was more than merely present and in fact was a

knowing participant when he initiated a dispute with Felton,

provoked Williams’s ire, handed his gun to Williams, who was angry,

stood by as Williams fired at the vehicle and fatally shot Felton, and

then fled the scene of the crime with Williams. See Williams v. State,

291 Ga. 501, 504 (1) (c) (732 SE2d 47) (2012) (concluding that the

evidence established that defendant was a party to the crime where

it showed that he was present when the crimes were committed and

the jury could infer from his conduct before and after the crimes that

7 he shared a common criminal intent with the actual perpetrators);

Burks v. State, 268 Ga. 504, 504 (491 SE2d 368) (1997) (concluding

that the jury could reasonably infer that defendant was a party to

the crimes of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of

a firearm during the commission of a crime where the defendant

loaded a gun while in the company of his cousin, initiated a fight,

and encouraged his cousin to shoot the victim). See also Holliman v.

State, 257 Ga. 209, 210 (1) (356 SE2d 886) (1987) (“The primary

difference between the offenses of malice murder and felony murder

is that felony murder does not require malice or the intent to kill.

Felony murder does, however, require that the defendant possess

the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony. For

the conviction in this case to stand, the jury must have found that

the defendant possessed the criminal intent to commit aggravated

assault.” (citation omitted)); Manzano v. State, 290 Ga. 892, 893 n.2

(725 SE2d 326) (2012) (“[A] jury is clearly authorized to find a

defendant guilty of felony murder even where it finds that a

defendant did not possess the requisite ‘malice’ to sustain a malice

8 murder conviction.”). Therefore, the trial court did not err by

denying Hamilton’s motion for directed verdict with respect to the

aggravated assault of Sanders, the felony murder of Felton, and the

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

3. As part of his defense at trial, Hamilton called three

character witnesses who each testified briefly to his character.

Pointing to their general testimony, Hamilton argues that he was

entitled to a jury instruction that evidence of good character may

establish reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Hobbs, 288 Ga. 551,

552 (705 SE2d 147) (2010) (“Good character is a substantive fact at

trial, and can by itself create reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s

guilt and lead to an acquittal.”). But Hamilton did not request, and

the trial court did not give, such an instruction. Thus, we review his

claim for plain error only.6 See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (authorizing

review of jury instructions for plain error). On appeal, Hamilton

argues that the trial court plainly erred by failing to charge the jury

6 Hamilton acknowledges that the plain error standard applies because

trial counsel did not object to the omission of this charge from the jury instructions. 9 on good character evidence and that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to request such a charge. On both points, we disagree.

(a) We turn first to Hamilton’s claim that the trial court plainly

erred by failing to charge the jury on good character evidence. To

establish plain error, Hamilton must show that “the instructional

error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious beyond reasonable

dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State,

307 Ga. 680, 687-688 (3) (838 SE2d 321) (2020). “[I]f an appellant

fails to establish any one of these elements, his plain error claim

fails.” Wright v. State, 315 Ga. 459, 462 (3) (883 SE2d 294) (2023).

Because we conclude that a good character instruction would

not have changed the outcome of Hamilton’s trial, we need not

decide whether it was obvious legal error for the trial court not to

instruct the jury sua sponte on Hamilton’s good character. See

Smith, 307 Ga. at 688 (3). Indeed, the evidence against Hamilton

was strong. The crimes were captured on video surveillance footage,

10 which was played for the jury at trial. The evidence from the

surveillance footage and witness testimony was that Hamilton

initiated the dispute with Felton, provided his gun to Williams,

stood next to Williams as Williams fired at the vehicle and fatally

shot Felton, and fled the scene of the crime with Williams. Further,

the jury here was instructed to “giv[e] consideration to all the facts

and circumstances of th[e] case” and to “determine the facts of the

case from all of the evidence presented.” See Smith, 307 Ga. at 688

(3). Given these circumstances, Hamilton has not demonstrated that

it is likely that the jury would have reached a different result if it

had been expressly told that it could consider evidence of Hamilton’s

good character, and this claim fails.

(b) Hamilton’s claim that trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on good character fares

no better. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, an

appellant must prove both that the attorney’s performance was

professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced by this

deficiency. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III)

11 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). An appellant must satisfy both

prongs of the Strickland test, and if the appellant’s showing fails as

to one prong, this Court need not examine the other. See id. at 697

(IV). Because we have “equated the prejudice step of the plain error

standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim,” even if we assume that trial counsel was deficient for

failing to request a good character instruction, Hamilton has not

shown prejudice for the reasons previously explained. Jackson v.

State, 306 Ga. 69, 84-85 (4) (b) (829 SE2d 142) (2019). Accordingly,

this claim also fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

12 Decided September 19, 2023.

Murder. Bibb Superior Court. Before Judge Simms.

Manning Peace, Holly Y. Peace, for appellant.

Anita R. Howard, District Attorney, Cynthia T. Adams, Daniel

P. Bibler, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.