Hamilton Appeal

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Hamilton Appeal

180 A.2d 782, 407 Pa. 366, 1962 Pa. LEXIS 594

CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedApril 24, 1962

DocketAppeal, 442

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 180 A.2d 782 (Hamilton Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hamilton Appeal, 180 A.2d 782, 407 Pa. 366, 1962 Pa. LEXIS 594 (Pa. 1962).

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Opinion by

Mr. Justice Eagen,

The appellants, as residents and taxpayers of the City of Philadelphia, petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County to convene a special grand jury to investigate alleged corruption in the city government. The court refused the request and dismissed the petitions. From that order, this appeal is prosecuted.

Following the entry of the appeal, a motion to quash was filed. Because of the nature of the proceedings and its serious public connotations, the Court decided to deny the motion to quash and hear the matter out. Counsel for all parties were granted the right to appear and argue thoroughly all of the issues involved. Now, after a more studied consideration of the matter, we are convinced that the appeal does not lie and that the motion to quash must prevail.

This is not an adversary proceeding. The appellants appeared before the court below to inform it of facts which, in their opinion, indicated the necessity for the investigation requested. The only function of the appellants was one of presenting facts and suggesting to the court that an investigation be ordered— nothing more. They claim and have no more than a public interest in the proceeding. The investigation they suggest would result in no direct benefit to them as individuals. Hence, no appealable interest is present. They are not “parties aggrieved” in the legal [368]*368sense. While members of the public may appear and express their convictions or objections in judicial hearings directed at matters of public concern, the right to so appear and be heard does not, in itself, confer the right to appeal an adverse order. In the absence of statutory authority, no one has the right to appeal in proceedings of such a character, unless he is authorized to act in matters relating to “the public welfare,” or has some personal right, necessary to be specially protected. This personal right, or beneficial interest, must be distinct from that of the general public and differ therefrom in kind and substance. See, Easton Transit Company’s Petition, 270 Pa. 136, 112 A. 917 (1921); Elliot Estate, 388 Pa. 321, 131 A. 2d 357 (1957); Ritter Finance Co., Inc. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 165 A. 2d 246 (1960); Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Commission, 405 Pa. 1, 173 A. 2d 97 (1961); Kensington Club Liquor License, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 401, 65 A. 2d 428 (1949); Arsenal Board of Trade v. Pa. P.U.C., 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 548, 72 A. 2d 612 (1950).

Appeal quashed.

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Opinion by

Mr. Justice Eagen,

The appellants, as residents and taxpayers of the City of Philadelphia, petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County to convene a special grand jury to investigate alleged corruption in the city government. The court refused the request and dismissed the petitions. From that order, this appeal is prosecuted.

Following the entry of the appeal, a motion to quash was filed. Because of the nature of the proceedings and its serious public connotations, the Court decided to deny the motion to quash and hear the matter out. Counsel for all parties were granted the right to appear and argue thoroughly all of the issues involved. Now, after a more studied consideration of the matter, we are convinced that the appeal does not lie and that the motion to quash must prevail.

This is not an adversary proceeding. The appellants appeared before the court below to inform it of facts which, in their opinion, indicated the necessity for the investigation requested. The only function of the appellants was one of presenting facts and suggesting to the court that an investigation be ordered— nothing more. They claim and have no more than a public interest in the proceeding. The investigation they suggest would result in no direct benefit to them as individuals. Hence, no appealable interest is present. They are not “parties aggrieved” in the legal [368]*368sense. While members of the public may appear and express their convictions or objections in judicial hearings directed at matters of public concern, the right to so appear and be heard does not, in itself, confer the right to appeal an adverse order. In the absence of statutory authority, no one has the right to appeal in proceedings of such a character, unless he is authorized to act in matters relating to “the public welfare,” or has some personal right, necessary to be specially protected. This personal right, or beneficial interest, must be distinct from that of the general public and differ therefrom in kind and substance. See, Easton Transit Company’s Petition, 270 Pa. 136, 112 A. 917 (1921); Elliot Estate, 388 Pa. 321, 131 A. 2d 357 (1957); Ritter Finance Co., Inc. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 165 A. 2d 246 (1960); Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Commission, 405 Pa. 1, 173 A. 2d 97 (1961); Kensington Club Liquor License, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 401, 65 A. 2d 428 (1949); Arsenal Board of Trade v. Pa. P.U.C., 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 548, 72 A. 2d 612 (1950).

Appeal quashed.

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180 A.2d 782, 407 Pa. 366, 1962 Pa. LEXIS 594, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hamilton-appeal-pa-1962.

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