Hamer v. Lehnhausen

328 N.E.2d 11, 60 Ill. 2d 400, 1975 Ill. LEXIS 215
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 16, 1975
Docket47353
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 328 N.E.2d 11 (Hamer v. Lehnhausen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hamer v. Lehnhausen, 328 N.E.2d 11, 60 Ill. 2d 400, 1975 Ill. LEXIS 215 (Ill. 1975).

Opinions

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is another in a succession of cases resulting from the failure of public officials, both State and local, to assess and equalize property for taxing purposes in the manner prescribed by law. E.g., People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones (1968), 39 Ill.2d 360; Hamer v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill.2d 252; Harte v. Lehnhausen (1975), No. 46533, filed May 19, 1975; People ex rel. Musso v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1965), 33 Ill.2d 88, and cases there cited.

Pursuant to our Rule 302(b) (50 Ill.2d R. 302(b)) we transferred here this appeal from an order of the circuit court of Lake County enjoining the Department of Local Government Affairs of this State and its director from certifying, without prior court approval, a final 1974 “multiplier” for any county in the State which would result in a level of property assessment after equalization of less than 42% of full value.

Illinois’ system of taxing real and personal property is established by the Revenue Act of 1939 as amended. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 120, pars. 501 — 811.) It provides for valuation of both types of property for purposes of taxation at “fair cash value” (pars. 501, 502), defined, except in counties with a population of more than 200,000 which classify real property for purposes of taxation, as 50% of actual value. (Par. 482(24).) Local boards are required to equalize intracounty assessments by local assessing officials among townships or assessment districts, or as between differing types of property. (Par. 589.1.) In order to insure the constitutionally required uniformity (Ill. Const. (1970), art. IX, sec. 4(a)), the State Department of Local Government Affairs is directed by statute to act as an equalizing authority to lower or raise the total assessed value of property in the several counties as certified to it by the county clerks, so that in counties throughout the State property will be assessed at the 50% level specified by law. (Par. 627.) The Act provides that the amount to be added to or deducted from the aggregate value of property as locally assessed is to be determined by the Department “[b] y means of a comparison of assessed valuations, as revised by boards of review or boards of appeals, as the case may be, and estimated full, fair cash values established through the analysis of property transfers, property appraisals, and such other means as it deems proper and reasonable ***.” (Par. 627.) Notice of the Department’s action is to be given by publication of the Department’s estimates of full, fair cash value of locally assessed property within each county, and for a public hearing following which the Department may either confirm or revise its estimate. (Par. 629(a).) Thereafter, the Department is directed to equalize assessments of all property among the several counties as certified by the county clerks “by adding to the aggregate assessed value thereof in every county in which the Department may find the valuation to be less than full, fair cash value, such rate per cent as will raise the same to its full, fair cash value *** and by' deducting from the aggregate assessed value thereof, in every county or township in which the Department may find the valuation to be more than the full, fair cash value, such rate per cent as will reduce the same to its full, fair cash value.” (Par. 630.) This equalization rate, which is more commonly referred to as the “multiplier,” is then certified by the Department to the respective county clerks who extend taxes on the basis of the equalized assessed valuation resulting from application of the multiplier. Par. 632.

Despite this statutory program designed to produce uniformity in assessed valuations, no real effort has been made by State or local officials to assess all property at its fair cash value as required by statute. There are disparities in the values which local assessors place on different types of real property within the same township or assessment district. There are also disparities in the valuations of similar property in separate townships or assessment districts. That this situation exists in Lake County is demonstrated by the record in this case. That it is duplicated in varying degrees in other counties throughout this State is a matter of common knowledge of which we may take judicial notice. As earlier noted, our legislature recognized the problem and sought to remedy it by requiring Boards of Review in the counties to equalize assessments as between various types of property, or as between the several townships or assessing districts. Boards of Review have, in large measure, ignored that requirement. Substantial disparities, documented by the record in this case, exist in the levels of assessed valuations as between the various counties. The Department of Local Government Affairs, charged by the legislature with the duty of equalizing those valuations at 50% of actual value has, as is apparent from this record, deliberately chosen not to do so. The net results of this are intracounty and intercounty disparities in assessed valuations which are neither fair to individual taxpayers nor in accordance with law.

Proceedings related to this case have been pending in the Illinois courts for the past decade. In 1965 Paul E. Hamer and June T. Hamer, his wife, brought a taxpayer’s suit seeking to compel local and State officials to perform their statutory duty to equalize and assess all taxable property at full, fair cash value. The trial court dismissed the complaint. In People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones (1968), 39 Ill.2d 360, we affirmed on the grounds that to grant the principal relief sought in the context of that case would create extreme expense, disorder, confusion and great hardship for taxpayers. We also noted that there was a likelihood of legislative action which militated against judicial change. However, we there indicated that while this court would defer to legislative action for a time, we could not indefinitely abdicate our responsibility to enforce the law. Shortly after that decision the same plaintiffs filed this suit, again seeking declaratory relief, injunction and relief by way of mandamus with respect to the asserted failure of the Director of Revenue (then charged with the duties now exercised by the Department) to equalize and assess all taxable property as provided by law. Two appeals preceded the one now before us. In Hamer v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill.2d 252, we reversed a judgment of the circuit court of Lake County dismissing the complaint and remanded the cause for further proceedings in accordance with law. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and on appeal, the appellate court m. Hamer v. Mahin (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 51, reversed and remanded for additional proceedings.

Plaintiffs thereafter supplemented their earlier pleadings by the filing of supplemental complaints seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for the then current tax years as to assessment and equalization of property within Lake County as well as statewide between the counties. The second supplemental complaint filed on April 4, 1974, also asked for a temporary order restraining and enjoining the Director of the Department of Local Government Affairs from certifying the multiplier for Lake County for the 1973 tax year during the pendency of the suit. That relief was denied by the trial court on the basis of representations by the Department that it would not certify any 1973 multipliers until a hearing had been held.

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Bluebook (online)
328 N.E.2d 11, 60 Ill. 2d 400, 1975 Ill. LEXIS 215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hamer-v-lehnhausen-ill-1975.