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Halstead v. Grinnan

152 U.S. 412, 14 S. Ct. 641, 38 L. Ed. 495, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2131
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 19, 1894
Docket128
StatusPublished
Cited by73 cases

This text of 152 U.S. 412 (Halstead v. Grinnan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U.S. 412, 14 S. Ct. 641, 38 L. Ed. 495, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2131 (1894).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Brewer,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, by this suit, invoked the aid of a court of equity to set aside a survey which had stood unchallenged for over twenty-five years. Such a long delay suggests laches, and a careful examination of the testimony satisfies us that the Circuit Court did not err in sustaining this defence. The defence itself is one -which, wisely administered, is of great public utility, in that it prevents the breaking up of relations and situations long acquiesced in, and thus induces confidence in the stability of what is, and a willingness to improve property in possession ; and at the same time it certainly works in furtherance of justice, for so strong is the desire of every man to have the full enjoyment of all that is his, that, when a party comes into court and asserts that he has been for many years the owner of certain rights, of whose existence he has had full knowledge and yet has never attempted to enforce them, there is a strong persuasion that, if all the facts- were known, it would be found that his alleged rights either never existed, or had long since ceased. We have had before us lately several cases in which this defence has been presented, and in which the rules determining it have been fully stated and its value clearly demonstrated. Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, and cases cited in the opinion; Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317; Foster v. Mansfield, Coldwater &c. Railroad, 146 U. S. 88; Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 148 U. S. 360. The length of time during which the party neglects the assertion of his rights, which must pass in order to show *417 laches, varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case, and is not, like the matter of limitations, subject to an arbitrary rule. It is an equitable defence, controlled by equitable considerations, and the lapse of time must be so. great, and the relations of the defendant to the rights such, that it would be inequitable to permit the plaintiff to now assert them. There must, of course, have been knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the existence of the rights, for there can be no laches in failing to assert rights of which a party is wholly ignorant, and whose existence he had no reason to apprehend. And yet, as said by Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the court in Foster, v. Mansfield, Coldwater &c. Railroad, 146 U. S. 88, 99, “ The defence of want of knowledge on the part of one charged with laches is one easily made, easy to prove by his own oath, and hard to disprove; and hence the tendency of courts in recent years has been to hold the plaintiff to a rigid compliance with the law which demands, not only that he should have been ignorant of the fraud, but that he should have used reasonable diligence to have informed himself of all the facts.”

In this case there is no question as to plaintiff's knowledge. In the deeds from G-rinnan and Smith to the Forest Hill Company, and from that company to the trustee, the description is of a piece, or parcel, of a certain tract “to be surveyed off the western side of said tract by a line running from the northerly to the southerly side of said tract.” And in the deed from the trustee to plaintiff, which was made on June 6, 1864, the description is of a lot, piece, or parcel of land containing 100 acres, more or less, “ as the same was ascertained and bounded by the survey made subsequently to the execution of the said deed, and in pursuance thereof,” so that in the deed made to the corporation, of which he was a stockholder, twenty-five years before the commencement of this suit, was a provision for a survey, and in the deed to himself, made more than twenty years before this suit, was a declaration that the survey called for by the previous deed had been made. When, therefore, he took title, he took it with notice that a survey had been made, and would not now be heard to *418 say that he had no knowledge of that fact. Further, the survey which was made by the county surveyor, Robson, was made in 1859. In 1861 the same surveyor made a plat showing the Forest Hill tract of 2000 acres, and the Huddleston tract, as surveyed, with the adjoining lands, which plat, or so much of it, at least, as is material, is inserted on the opposite page.

A mere glance at this plat shows that the Huddleston tract is so surveyed that the part set off to the Forest Hill Company at no point touches the 2000-acre tract, but is separated therefrom by a narrow strip—a part of the land reserved to Grin-nan and Smith. Now, in reference to this map, the plaintiff alleges, in his amended and supplemental complaint, as follows:

“ The map filed with the deposition of T. S. Robson, marked £ T. S. R. No. 2,’ was made from'a survey made by said Robson in 1861, and your orator believes that it shows correctly the location of the Forest Hill tract of 2000 acres and the Huddleston tract and the division made by him in 1859 anti their relations to each other. Tour orator avers that he saw this map for the first time in about 1867. It will be seen by this map, which is asked to be read and considered as a part of this bill, that the division of the Huddleston tract made by T. S. Robson in 1859 is so made that the part retained by Grinnan intercepts that part laid off to the Forest Hill Company from the Forest Hill tract of 2000 acres, so that they do not join each other.”

In other words, he admits that eighteen years before lie brings this suit he saw the map which discloses the survey, and it is apparent at a glance, as he himself alleges, that the-part set off to the Forest Hill Company does not at any point’ touch the 2000-acre tract.

But beyond this direct admission there is testimony tending to show that both he and his grantor had knowledge at a much earlier date. The Forest Hill Company was organized in the year 1859. The plaintiff was a stockholder in the company. Dr. Hale was its president, and, after the deed to plaintiff and up to the time of this suit, he continued to reside, as the agent of the plaintiff, on this 105 acres, set off to the *420 Forest Hill Company. The northern part of this Huddleston tract along the Kanawha River was comparatively level, and it is evident that the Forest Hill Company bought with a view of putting up buildings on this level ground near the river, and with the understanding that the grantors should immediately cause the survey to be made. The survey was in fact made that same fall, and the company entered into possession of the land surveyed off to it, and erected buildings thereon, in the course of its improvements placing some fences along the division line between the two parts of the tract as surveyed by the county surveyor. This is the testimony of the president of the company in respect to the matter:

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Bluebook (online)
152 U.S. 412, 14 S. Ct. 641, 38 L. Ed. 495, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/halstead-v-grinnan-scotus-1894.