Hammond v. Hopkins

143 U.S. 224, 12 S. Ct. 418, 36 L. Ed. 134, 1892 U.S. LEXIS 2021

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: February 29, 1892
• Docket: 62
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mb'. Chief Justice Fullee

delivered the opinion of the court.

This bill was filed April 8, 1884, and attacked the purchases through Chapman at the sale of May 10,1864, and the account stated and settled in the orphans’ court March 28, 1865; the settlement made in 1873 of the proceeds of the sales of lots 3, 4 and 5 in square 67; and also the deed- from William M. S. Hopkins and wife to John S. Hopkins of June 20, I860. The executors and trustees of John Hopkins; James Chapman, who purchased at the-sale; Isaac and George 'Washington Hopkins, two of the sons and devisees of John Hopkins, and who were present at the sale, were all dead; the affidavits and vouchers filed in the orphans’ court at the executors’ settlement could not be found; partition had been had by judicial proceedings between one of the trustees and the heirs at law of the other, and also between the latter; and great changes had taken place in the quarter of the city where the lots and squares were located, coupled with an enormous increase in their value, in the lapse of twenty years, and because of the improvements which had in the meantime been made in their vicinity.

No rule of law is better settled than that a court of equity will not aid a party whose application is destitute of conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence, but will discourage stale demands, for the peace of society, by refusing to interfere where there have been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or where long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights has occurred. The-rule is peculiarly applicable where the difficulty of doing entire justice arises through the death of the principal participants in the transactions complained of,- or of the witness or witnesses, or by reason of the original transactions having become so obscured by time as to render the ascertainment of the exact facts impossible. Each case must necessarily be governed by its own circumstances, since, though the lapse of a few years may be sufficient to defeat the action in one case, a longer period may be held requisite in another, dependent upon the situation of the parties, the extent of their knowledge or means of information, great changes in values, the want of probable grounds for the. imputation of intentional fraud, the destruction of specific testimony, the absence of any reasonable impediment or hindrance to the assertion of the alleged rights, and the like. Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178; Landsdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391; Norris v. Haggin, 136 U. S. 386; Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U. S. 556; Hanner v. Moulton, 138 U. S. 486.

The main contention here is that the sale of May 10, 1864, should be set aside as to the purchases- by the trustees through Chapman, on. the ground of constructive, coupled with actual, fraud.

Undoubtedly the doctrine is established that a, trustee cannot purchase or deal in the trust property for his wn benefit or on his own- behalf, directly or indirectly. But such a purchase is not absolutely void. It is only voidable, and as it may be confirmed by the parties interested, directly, so it may be by long acquiescence or the absence of an election to avoid the conveyance within -a reasonable- time after the facts come to the knowledge of- the cestui que trust.

The often cited case of Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, laid down the general rule that a person cannot purchase legally on his own account that which his duty or trust requires him to sell for another, nor purchase on account of another that which he sells on his own account, and that a purchase, per interposition personam, by a trustee or agent of the particular -property of which he has the sale,- or in which he represents another, whether he has an interest in it or not, carries fraud on the face of it; but there was actual fraud in that case, and the rule that within what time a constructive trust will be barred must depend upon the circumstances "was recognized. In Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 819, 829, Mr. Justice Grier, speaking for the court, said that a complainant, seeking the aid of a court of chancery under such circumstances of lapse of time as there existed, “must state in his bill distinctly the particular act of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment — must specify how, when, and in what manner it. was perpetrated. The charges must be definite and reasonably certain, capable of proof, and clearly proved. If a mistake is alleged, it must be stated with precision, and made apparent, so that the court may rectify it with a feeling of certainty that they are not committing another, and perhaps greater, mistake. And especially must there be distinct averments as to the time when the fraud, mistake, concealment or misrepresentation was discovered, and what the discovery is, so that the court may clearly see, whether, - by -the exercise of ordinary diligence, the discovery might not have been, before made. Every case must, of course, depend on its own peculiar circumstances, and there would be little profit in referring to the very numerous cases to be found in the books on this subject. In the case of Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, lately decided in this court, transactions were investigated after a lapse of more than twenty years; but the facts proving the fraud were all on record, and were not disputed. The false accounts made out against the estate of the deceased by the executors were on file, and their iniquity was apparent on their face. Moreover, the complainants resided in Europe and were kept in ignorance of their rights, and hindered from prosecuting them by the promises, threats and fraud of the guilty parties.”

And in Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 95, the same eminent judge observed that a party seeking to avoid laches “ £ should set forth in his bill specifically what were the impediments to an earlier prosecution of his claim; how he came to be so long ignorant of his flights, and the means used by the respondent to fraudulently keep him in ignorance; and .how'and when he first came tb a knowledge of the matters alleged in his bill; otherwise the chancellor may justly refuse to considér his case, on his own showing, without inquiring whether there is a demurrer or formal plea of the statute of limitations contained in the answer.’ ”

It is conceded .that the proposition that where a trustee or person, acting for others, sells the trust estate and becomes himself interested in the purchase, the 'cestuis que trust are entitled as of course to have the purchase set aside, is subject to the qualification that the application for such relief must be made within a reasonable time, and that laches and long acquiescence cannot be excused except by showing some actual hindrance or impediment caused by the fraud or concealment of the party in possession, which will appeal to the conscience of the chancellor. But it is argued that such fraud and concealment existed here, and in that connection assertions and insinuations of fraud in fact are made.

Appellees’ counsel contend that, although George W. Hopkins and John S. Hopkins were men of character and integrity, yet they were good business men, and that John S. was self-reliant, reticent and close in money matters, while the four daughters were unaccustomed to business, and of the other three sons, two were dissipated and one lacked busipess capacity ; that the family was a united one, and entire confidence was reposed in the uncle and brother, and hence the trustees might easily have cheated their cestuis que trust:

That the trustees had full knowledge of the future value of the property and desired to possess themselves of it at the lowest possible price, and, therefore, determined not to divide by partition, but to sell; -and purposely sold at a time when the real estate market was prostrated and the building busi-. ness so depressed that there was no demand for bricks, notwithstanding they had ample power to change the time of sale if circumstances rendered it necessary or desirable; and advertised and sold squares 95 and 96 as a brick yard as a means of reducing the price, although the property was worthless as a.brick yard and there was no demand for bricks, or for real estate in large quantities; and that these 'squares were sold as an entirety in order .to enable the trustees to buy at a less price than a sale by subdivision would have produced, and in this way a loss occurred of not less than $15,930.87; that square 111 was sold as an entirety, when it should have been sold in lots, and this resulted in a loss of $6061.98; that the difference between what these squares actually realized and what.they should have, was not less than $22,092.85, or a loss to the eight heirs of John Hopkins of $11,046.42^-:

That “these were frauds prepetrated secretly under such circumstances of confidence inspired by the trustees, as to prevent these owners from discovering them,” and this is alleged to be established; (a) By the employment of Chapman to make the purchase; (5) by the deed to Chapman reciting a consideration of one dollar, and the deed of Chapman to George W. Hopkins, “having the false recital” that Chapman had sold him square 111 for $9093.42, and that to George "W". and John S., “having the false recital” that Chapman -had sold to them squares 95 and 96, and parts of 94 and 110, for $10,842.24; (e) by the fact that the deeds were not recorded until November 16, 1864:

That in order to “give a semblance of judicial sanction to their acts and further deceive appellees,” the trustees went into the orphans’ court, and by ex parte proceedings had their account passed upon, although the court had no jurisdiction:

And further, that appellees were ignorant of the purchase of the property by the trustees until 'so informed by their attorney a few days before the institution of this suit; that it had been represented to them that a bricklayer had bought it, of whom their uncle and brother had subsequently purchased; and that it was represented to them by the trustees that the sale was bona fide, and that the property had brought all it was worth at the time. It is insisted that the evidence discloses an actual hindrance and impediment to the appellees’ discovering their rights, caused by the fraudulent' assertions of the trustees that the property brought its full price, and that the sale was particularly conducted for the interest of the heirs. .And it is earnestly urged that when the confidential relation of trusteeship and kinship exists, if the trustees and kinsmen inform those for whom they act that their administration has been honest and faithful, when- that is not the fact, that constitutes such fraudulent concealment as excuses laches.

It will be perceived that the main charge of fraud in fact consists in an alleged conspiracy to obtain the property for less than it was worth. The claims that the sale was fixed at an unpropitious time and that the squares should have been subdivided and sold in lots, go to the adequacy of the price. If there were no such, conspiracy, the specific charge falls to the ground, and if all the circumstances relied on tó'sustain it were actually known or the appellees were chargeable with. such knowledge, then it comes too late. And if they were fully informed that the trustees purchased, and the latter made no false representations in relation to the sale, which misled them, the attempted explanation of the lapse of time as bearing on the purchase by the trustees themselves also fails.

"We can hardly see how appellees ean now be permitted to plead ignorance as to the time and manner of the sale, the prices brought, the deeds to and from Chapman, and the settlement of the account. And if they are held to knowledge on these points, the question in either aspect becomes reduced to the inquiry whether they knew or might have known that the trustees purchased the property, or were kept in ignorance by any false representations. But in answering this inquiry it is perhaps desirable to look somewhat into the basis of these charges.

We do not understand it to be contended that the trustees were bound to carry the John Hopkins half, or attend to the support of his children, or any of them, out of the brick business or'otherwise, indefinitely.

By his will, after certain bequests, John Hopkins had devised his property to his brother and son in trust, “ to carry on the brick-making business as now conducted by my said brother George W. Hopkins and myself in Washington City,-I). C., said business to be under the direction of my said brother, George W. Hopkins, assisted by my said son, John S.. Hopkins, as clerk, for which he is to receive a regular stated sal- ‘ ary;” and further, to receive the income of the estate, and business or the testator’s portion, and apply the same to the payment of his debts and funeral expenses; of' a reasonable salary to John S. Hopkins, as clerk ;• and the reasonable expenses and support of the testator’s family and the education of the younger members thereof. “ And upon further trust, that my said trustees shall (where, in their judgment a sale of the real property owned by me and my'said brother, George W. Hopkins, or any part thereof, or of the brick-kilns and the materials or implements thereunto belonging, or of said business, is essential or necessary for any cause whatever or would be advantageous) sell and dispose of at public or private sale, at such time or times after such notice and upon such terms'us they may deem most for the interest of my estate, and by-proper conveyances convey the same to the purchasers, who, having, paid his or her purchase money to my said executors, shall be under no obligation to see to the application thereof under the trust of this, my will, nor- answerable for the misapplication. of the same.” Surplus income and proceeds of sales were to be reinvested, or advanced to such of the children as might need .or deserve the same. And the will further pro vided “ that upon the arrival of my daughter Alice to the age of eighteen years, which will occur on or about the first day of May, 1864, my estate of every kind shall be divided by my said trustees and executors among my children.”.

' But the trustees were invested with power to make an earlier disposition in their discretion, as above shown, and by the further clause: ■

“I greatly desire, as already stated, that my family shall remain as it now is, without change or modification or sale or valuation of the furniture or slaves until the said division of my estate, and that it shall until then be supported by the brick-kiln business as though I were living, and as I believe the squares and lots of ground owned by my brother George and myself, is now and will continue to increase in value, I desire, if possible, that said land may be kept unsold and undivided until- as above stated, as it will thus be greatly to the advantage of my family ; but as circumstances, now unforeseen, may make a change necessary or desirable, I cheerfully trust in the prudence and discretion of .my said trustees, and I give them full power as above to exercise their judgment as circumstances may arise, making it proper to dispose of said land and business, or to change and alter the same,' believing that they will have the comfort' and welfare of my family and their relatives much at heart.”

. It is unnecessary to consider the rights and powers of George ~W.. Hopkins as surviving partner. The trust was accepted, the business carried on, the children assistéd and supported, and the land kept unsold and undivided, (except certain -lots ‘in square 110, which were disposed of in 1859,)“ until as above stated,” that is, until Alice attained the age of eighteen, which was April 13, 1864, when it became the duty of the trustees to divide the testator’s estate of every kind among his children.

To divide this real estate required a partition as between George "W. and the estate, and thereupon a partition of their half as between the testator’s children. To sell an undivided half would probably prove disadvantageous, but if - George W allowed his half to be sold with the other- so that complete title could be given without subsequent legal proceedings, the trustees apparently concluded a sale would be the'best mode of arriving at a division.. It is impossible to say that there was anything unreasonable in such a, conclusion.

There is nothing, then, in the trustees dividing at the time specified by the testator, and-resolving to do this by the ordinary method of a sale, which gives color to the charge of conspiracy.

Squares 95, 96 and part of 94 were used in the brick business, and George W. Hopkins lived on square 111. He owned one-half of these squares, and it was natural that he should desire to-own the whole of his homestead, and that he and his nephew should wish to own all that portion used in the business in which they were engaged. But it is not, therefore, to be assumed that in the gratification of their wishes in this regard they would commit deliberate fraud upon the brothers and sisters of the one and the nephews and nieces of the other. It is not denied that George W. and John S.' Hopkins .were honest and reliable and sustained a high reputation for integrity ; and if fraud or breach of trust ought not lightly to be imputed to the living, the evidence of fraud should be convincing before the sanctity of the grave is ■ disturbed. Yet here the stress of the argument that the deceased were guilty is thrown upon the alleged inadequacy of price claimed to have been the result of selling squares 95 and 96 as an entirety and square 111 in the same way. That they brought full prices as squares is satisfactorily established by .the evidence, and 'scarcely .disputed.

The condition of the squares in that part of the city, including squares 94, 95, 96, 110, and 111, in May, 1864, is described'by one of appellees’ witnesses as just laid out “in old .fields, as it were; you could hardly tell one street from another. Yery rarely you would see any improvement on any of them, unless it were some old shanty which had been built there probably thirty or forty years. . ... All these squares were pretty much set out in nurseries, you will remember, but I do not think any nurseries were on these squares at that time. I think they laid out in a common. ,Q. "Were the streets graded? -A. I think not; I do not think there were any streets gradéd there. Q. How many houses can you recollect in the neighborhood of what is(.now known as Dupont Circle ? A. There were very few houses in that neighborhood; I want to state that there were very few. George Hopkins’s house was there at the time, but houses were very scarce, I tell you. There may have been some old. landmarks torn away that may have escaped my memory, but the whole place laid out in old fields and commons. I cannot recall any houses,, but farther out, near the boundary, there were some houses. I remember a house right at the head of Twentieth Street. It is there still. Well, they were- scattered' around; probably you would have to walk two or three squares to find houses. Q.’ Were there any pathways to get..to the houses'? A. I think there was a road which led to Holmead’s burying ground, a kind of highway known as the burying-ground road. I" went out that road when I was in that part of the city ; but, as for squares, I do not think anybody could tell. one square from another by going there, so far as distinguishing them by roads or anything of that .kind is concerned.”

Other evidence is to the effect that in 1866 and 1867 there were no streets open running north of K and west of Fourteenth Streets except Twentieth Street; that no street had been brought, to anything like an established grade at that time, though Twentieth Street was graded a portion of, and perhaps all, the way; that none of the streets running east and west were opened in that locality west of Seventeenth or Eighteenth Streets except a portion of L Street; that no streets north of L Street were opened on any established grade across Twentieth Street; that M Street was very nearly on the grade about Twentieth Street, but not at Twenty-first Street; that there were scarcely any blocks or any of the streets opened north of L and west of Fourteenth Streets in that portion of the city in 1867, and- Massachusetts Avenue had not been opened, nor P, .nor O Streets; that the property in that section of the city west of Dupont Circle, “ a good deal of it, or some of it, was enclosed and used for cultivation, for pasturage; a portion of it was used for the manufacture of brick, and other portions were laid out in pasturage for hogs and cows and .goats, etc. . . . A person could tell about where the streets were, but not by any defined lines. There were roads passing here and there up Massachusetts Avenue, which was barely passable. There was no bridge over Slash Run at Massachusetts Avenue.” There were no water mains nor sewers. Brick kilns were on square 95, and sheds and yards for drying bricks Avere on square 96. The surface of the squares Avas rough and irregular and full of holes made in digging for brick clay. One witness said that in the middle of those squares “ you might have buried ‘ Jumbo,’ and you could not see him.” How far the squares might be above grade when the streets were opened seems to have been regarded as in doubt, notwithstanding the books of the surveyor’s office gave the future grades.

It was in proof that the manufacture of brick was carried on there “ until 1872 or 1873 ; ” and that square 96 was “ used for digging clay for the manufacture of brick, in 1867, 1868, and 1869, along about that time.” The principal witnesses concur that the business of brick making was carried on after the sale as it had been before.

Evidence was adduced on behalf of appellees tending to show that there was but little brick clay on these squares after 1864; that the concern gathered it from the streets; that the two kilns on square 95 were old and out of shape; and that the brick the Hopkins made Avas too soft for pavements. But the fact remains that the brick business was carried on-upon these squares for years after the sale. They were thus advertised as a “ brick yard, believed to be one of the best located in the District, having both Washington and Georgetown for a market, an abundance of fine clay, brick and tempering sheds, kilns, offices and all necessary outfit for a first-class brick yard.”

There is evidence of probable ground for the belief that the squares would in any view bring better prices by being sold in blocks; but apart from that, we think the inference of bad faith because they were sold as .a brick yard, a strained one. Conceding that' the judgment of the trustees was influenced by their own intention to continue the business, that is not enough to sustain the assumption of actual fraud in the matter of the prices. And the knowledge of the parties now complaining, of the continuance of the business, is admitted. So, as to .square- 111, that was advertised as “ improved by a large brick dwelling-house and back buildings, carriage-houses, stabling, etc., the whole enclosed and beautified with fruit and ornamental trees and shrubbery.”

The reason is thus given for selling it as an entirety, and it was an obvious one. As we have said, it was George W. Hopkins’s home, and most of the children of his brother John were living there with him. He naturally desired to own it, not for subdivision, but for a residence. The house is shown not' to have materially enhanced the' value; and the price • of nine cents per square foot was a full price. Several years after he did subdivide a part of this square, and sold the lots constituting the north half for eleven cents per square foot. This was nearly five years after the sale. The first subdivision of ■ six of the original lots was August 6, 1868, and the second, of the remaining six, was November 7, 18Y0.

The Board of Public Works created by the act of Congress of February 21, 1871, thereafterwards opened up and reclaimed the territory in this quarter 'of the city, and many thousands of dollars were imposed in special assessments upon 1 all this property and paid by the owners. The property had increased in value between its original purchase and the sale to a considerable extent, as the prices at the sale showed, but twenty years thereafter these values had increased. several thousand per cent. Square 96 was not subdivided until October 20, 1877, more than thirteen years after the sale.

Undoubtedly the argument is ingenious and forcible, that squares 94, 95 and 96 were of -about the same value, and that if the lots in square 94 brought a higher price per square foot, the lots in the other squares, if subdivided, would have done so also; but considerable differences between square 94 and the others are shown, and it appears that the five lots in 94, purchased at the .sale by August Miller, were then occupied by him as a garden;. and upon the issue of fraud in fact an inténtiona-l attempt to acquire the property at an inadequate price cannot safely be inferred upon equivocal and conflicting theories as to why one piece sold at a better price than another. Taking all the evidence together, even if.it were now seen that if the brick business had-been abandoned and the property subdivided, more might have been realized, fraud is not to be imputed because this was not done.

No exception seems to be taken for want of publicity in the sale. The advertisement was published' in the National Intelligencer, the Evening Star and the Daily Chronicle-from April 20, 1864, to May 10, 1864, daily. The sale was conducted by J. C. McGuire & Co., an established firm in the conduct of such sales in 1864, and apparently by Thomas J. Eisher, then a member of the firm, who, however, by reason of the lapse of time and through the distractions of a large business, testified that he did not have the slightest recollection of making it. The proofs indicate that there were many persons present and more than one bid, perhaps three. An account of the sale to Chapman and others and the prices realized appeared in the Star the next evening.

The deeds to Chapman were for a nominal consideration, while the consideration in each of the deeds from Chapman to George "W. and John S. jointly, and to George W., was the aggregate amount for which Chapman had bid in the property described in the deeds respectively. They were all simultaneously recorded on the 16th of November following, and spoke for themselves, .carrying upon their face the evidence of the transaction as being a purchase by the trustees through Chapman. Thus viewed, their recitals were not false. If the consideration in the deed to Chapman had been the amount of his bids there would have been more ground for such a suggestion. It was the trustees who paid, and the deeds showed it according to the fact. The delay in recording the deeds is of no moment. If the evidence shows, as we think it does, that the purchase was openly announced- in the family of George W. and John, it would be unreasonable to ascribe to them the motive of concealment in neglecting to record the deeds before they did. The argument as to confidence reposed is inconsistent with such an idea, and meditated fraud would have put the conveyances on record at once.

It is said that the accounting in the orphans’ court was had in order to “further deceive appellees.” We find that on the 12th of July, 1864, citation Was issued against the executors to settle an account, and that dn the 23d of August the court appointed the 13th of the succeeding September for the final settlement and distribution of the personal estate of the deceased, and issued the requisite legal order for publication to be inserted once a week' for three weeks in the National Intel-ligencer prior' to said day, which was accordingly done. No proceedings took place, on September 13,1864, and on January 7, 1865, another citation was ordered to be issued against George W. Hopkins, which was, however, as was the first one, returned without service. On March 28 the accounting was had, as hereinbefore stated. Perhaps there was undue delay in this accounting, but the proceedings in court were regularly conducted and the shares of the' devisees ascertained and duly receipted' for by them. The account shows that the proceeds of the business and of the sales prior to May 10, 1864, were included, though not itemized; and it is certainly too late to open up that account as such, and especially in the -absence of evidence of ány fraudulent charges or omissions. Indeed, the account can hardly be said to be attacked on any ground inherent in itself, but simply in order to obviate its operation as a settlement, precluding any further investigation of the matters complained of. The executors accounted for half the proceeds from the sale as personalty, treating the real estate as having, been acquired and used for partnership purposes and as being partnership property. We are at a loss to conceive how the conspiracy charged is sustained in any degree by the mere fact that the executors.accounted.

It appears also that after the conveyance by Chapman to George' W. and John S. Hopkins as individuals, they conveyed, 'between July 26, 1865, and March 4, 1871, by four separate deeds, lots 16, 19, 39 and 17, in square 110, to different purchasers, and that the first,- second and fourth of these purported to be given by them as executors, while the third did not. These deeds were drawn by the same scrivener who had been in the habit of preparing deeds for George W. and John S. Hopkins, as executors, before the sale. Between the dates of the first and last of these four deeds, George W. Hopkins, as an individual, conveyed a number of lots in square •111, in which John S. Hopkins did not join,- and between the date of the fourth deed and April 30, 1875, George W. and John S. Hopkins, as individuals, conveyed by four separate deeds,,at different times, four lots in square 110 to different purchasers, while George W. Hopkins between the same dates conveyed a number of lots in.square 111. We think the form-of the three deeds was obviously a blunder of the conveyancer, and that it cannot rightly be- laid hold of as showing that the deeds were intentionally so drawn to conceal the fact that George W. and John S. Hopkins owned the property therein named as individuals, or that they purposely, for that reason, continued to deal with portions of the real estate they had purchased, as if they still held it as executors and trustees.

We are brought, then, to consider whether appellees were ignorant of the' purchase of the property by the trustees, and whether there were any false representations on their part which misled them.

' George Washington Hopkins and Isaac H. Hopkins were at the sale, and Mrs. Lilburn, Mrs. Wailes, Mrs. .Early and Alice were at the house of George W. at the time it took place, Mrs: Lilburn having been sent for to come up. The National Intelligencer was taken at the. "house, and the advertisement had been read, certainly, by .Mrs. Early, some time before. George'Washington said to ¶. witness, while Chapman was bidding: “He is buying for Uncle George;” and Isaac H. was “the first to come in from the sale; and he said that Chapman • had bought the /property for Uncle George W. Hopkins and John, and hé sai& they had paid as much for it as the property was worth:” The subject of the sale, and that George W. and John ¡¡8. would purchase, was, frequently talked over as well before as after the sale,- and the evidence demonstrates that there was no secrecy or concealment ■about it.

The interesting fact is testified to by appellees’ solicitor that he brought to the attention of his clients the case of Landsdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391, and that he “ read to them the rule of law that, in order to excuse long delay in the prosecution of a suit, it must be shown by the plaintiif that the delay was caused by some hindrance, iinpediment or concealment of a party in possession. I think I read it over tb thqm half a dozen, times and tried to explain it to them.” In that case it is stated: “It has been a recognized doctrine of courts in equity, from the very beginning of their jurisdiction, to withhold relief from those who have delayed for an unreasonable length of time in asserting their claims. In Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 234, 258, it .was said that ‘ long acquiescence and laches by parties out of possession are productive of much hardship and injustice to others, and cannot be excused but by showing some actual hindrance or impediment, caused by the fraud or concealment of the party in possession, which will appeal to the conscience of the chancellor.’ ” .

Nevertheless, although thus admonished, the testimony of the four sisters, Mrs. Early,' Mrs. Lilburn, Mrs. Wailes, and Mrs. Hall, (who appeared to be intelligent and well educated,) if treated as competent, falls far short of overthrowing the evidence on the part of the defendants that they were acquainted with the fact that the purchase was made for the trustees. No one ca,n carefully peruse their evidence without being impressed with the belief that they were aware of that fact. Three of them testified that they knew their uncle and brother . had become purchasers of the property from a bricklayer, or Chapman, who bought at the sale, not that they did not know or hear that he bought for the trustees. Mrs. Hall, who was but just eighteen at the time, denied that she knew who bought the property until March, 1884, but said that she had no doubt that if she had applied to her uncle or brother for information in regard to the estate they would have given it. Mr. Luttrell testifies that in 1876 she told him that Chapman bought for George W. and John S., and in 1867 and 1868 she, or her hus.band for her, received and receipted for the full amount of her share, (which under the will was not to be paid over until she reached twenty-one,) on an account rendered. Nil these complainants saw the brick yard being carried on as before, and ■ George 'W. and John S. continuing to exercise acts of ownership over the property. They all had no doubt that either of the trustees would have given them any information they desired, and they all evidently had no'objection to the trustees’becoming the purchasers in and of itself.

The following is from the testimony of Mrs. Early:

“ Q. I understand you now to Say that you would not haye objected to George W. and John S. Hopkins buying the property had they given a fair price for it? A. No, sir; I would not have objected to it. Q. And your whole complaint is that you were told they did not give a fair price for it ? A. That justice was not done us. Q. I understand your complaint now is that George W. and John S. Hopkins did not give a fair price.for what they bought? A. 'Well, I think they got as much as they could for. the sale at the time. Q.' You had no objection, as you stated yesterday, to George W. and John' S. Hopkins buying it ? A. No, sir. Q. And you did not care who bought the property so that you got a fair price for it ? A. No, sir.”

The force of this admission is attempted to be broken by a letter to Mrs. Early from her attorneys, calling her attention to her answer as to the trustees getting as much as they could at the time, and among other things notifying her “that unless this statement • was a mistake, honestly made, and as . honestly-corrected, we shall feel obliged to ask the court when ■ the case shall be called for hearing, to consider us as no longer counsel for your interest; ” and her reply that she meant “ what I thought the day of the sale, but since then I do not think they got as much as they could for the property,” etc. This correspondence may have soothed the susceptibilities of counsel, but it is not evidence, and if it were, it fails to remove the impression that Mrs. Early believed that a full price was realized.

It will subserve no useful purpose to go more minutely into the evidence. We regard the conclusion as irresistible, that the fact that, the purchase'was made for and by the trustees' was known to all of these children at or about the time of the sale;

The excuses for want of diligence in the premises set fotth in the bill amount only to this — that in February, 1884, an attorney undertaking the investigation of William’s case, which had been in hand since 1873, “ discovered for the first time that Chapman had never paid one dollar of consideration for said land, but had bought the same for and. on account of. said trustees, and that the sale was fraudulent and void;” and that thereupon the plaintiffs’ attention was called to this. so-called discovery.. The point' seems to be that complainants’ counsel concluded from the conveyances, as he very wéll might, that the trustees had bought at -their own.sale. This was true, and was an obvious deduction from the deeds, but it did not therefore follow that'those conveyances were absolutely void, nor that they could be held so nineteen years after . they were executed, if the complainants had known or should have known that fact during the intervening time, or a large part of it.

Whether appellees were informed, before 1884, of the rule in relation to trustees purchasing at their own' sale, is immaterial. Probably George W. and John S. Hopkins were unacquainted with- it, and made the purchase through Chapman because obliged to in order to pass the legal title. The vital question is, Did appellees actually know, or were they chargeable with knowledge of, the- fact of the purchase itself? What we have said in effect disposes of the suggestion that by false representations appellees were misled into-believing that the sale was fairly conducted when it was not, and that this constitutes a sufficient explanation of the lapse of time.

The bill averred that George W. Hopkins assured Mrs. Lilburn, when she expressed surprise that the property .had. brought so -low a price, that the sales .were “ each and all bona fide.” But the testimony of Mrs. Lilburn vras not quite that. She testified that when her uncle came in from the sale, she remarked to him: “ ‘ Uncle George, is the land all sold ? ’ He said : ‘Tes.’ I said: ‘You did not get but very little for it.’ He said: ‘No ; it was a bona-fide sale.’ ” In addition to this, counsel refer to the evidence of Mrs. Dashiell on cross-examination, where she said that she understood the property brought its full value, and a great many people thought it brought more, and was asked: “ Q. It was looked upon, then, as a sale particularly conducted for the interests of the- heirs ? A. Yes, sir; it was;” and of the widow of John S. Hopkins, that, “ My uncle, George W. Hopkins, and my husband, John S. Hopkins, told the family that they were going to buy the brick-yard property; that they would give as much for it as any one else; and none of them objected at all; ” and that of other witnesses; that there -was no dissatisfaction expressed and no suspicion entertained.

Upon testimony of this kind, we cannot hold that either of these deceased trustees made statements with the view to induce their cestuis que trust to act upon them, or that appellees were lulled into repose by any affirmative conduct on their part. Still less does this class of evidence tend to show an effort to conceal from appellees that the trustees had purchased at their own sale.

By the amendment'made in June, 1885, these trustees were charged with fraudulently appropriating one-half of the proceeds of lots 3, 4 and 5 of square 67, known as the Mix lots, to the benefit of one of them. The evidence showed that John and George W. Hopkins carried on the business of brick-making ón square 67, using the clay derived therefrom, bé-fore they occupied squares 94, 95 and 96, and that the brick business had been carried on on that square, before their occupancy, by a firm, one of whom was named Mix. It further appeared that John Hopkins had been engaged in business on his individual account and had failed, and that he had had transactions in which George W. was not interested. And one of his daughters, Mrs. Early, testified, under objection, to a conversation between her father, John Hopkins, shortly before his death, and Mr. Mix; in which Mix told Hopkins that he would give him a deed for some lots. On October 27, 1869, Charles E. Mix and wife, for the nominal consideration of- $5, conveyed to George W: and John S. lots 3, 4 and 5 in square 67 in fee simple, “in trust, nevertheless, to have and to hold the same for the benefit of the estate of the late John Hopkins, upon like trusts and con ditions, and with all the rights and powers contained and vested in the said parties of the second part under and by virtue of the l&st will and testament of the late John Hopkins.”

On June 18, 1872, George W. and John S. as executors of the estate of John Hopkins, deceased, and also as trustees under the deed from Mix and wife, conveyed to James’M. Latta said lot's.3, 4 and 5 for $6784. On July 1, 1873,-John S. gave to Mrs. Early a paper written by himself, containing a statement by the trustees of the sale .of thése lots. This paper was as follows;

“ Sales of lots 3, 4, & 5, square 61.■. $6783 99

“ Balance in interest, rents, &c..... 262 ■ 10

$7046 09

“ One-half to Geo. W. Hopkins — $3523 04}

“ Do. J. Hopkins 7)3523.04} 3523 04}

“July 1st, 1873. 503,29”

7046 09

Prior to tics date, two’ of the nine children" of John Hopkins, namely, Levin and Isaac, had died intestate and without issue, and the other seven children were the beneficiaries under the will. - According to this account rendered, one-half of the sum for which the lots had been sold to Latta went to George W. and the other half to-John Hopkins’s estate ; and the half of John Hopkins was divided by seven, giving the share of each of the children as $503.29. October 11, 1873, Mrs. Early was paid her share and on the same day signed the following receipt:

' “Eec’d of Geo. W. & J. S. Hopkins, executors and administrators of Jno. Hopkins’ estate, five hundred & three ^ dolls, in full of all demands due me’from the said estate to date.

“ $503^. Washington, Oct. 11th, 1873.”

November 29, 1873, Mrs. Lilburn, arid December 24, Mrs. Hall and-Mrs. Wailes, respectively, signed similar receipts for the sum of $503.29 each. George- Washington Hopkins had died intestate, and July 9, 1870, letters of administration had been issued on his estate to Maiy A. Hopkins. October 1,. 1873, Mary A. Hopkins, the administratrix, gave a similar receipt for George’s share of the proceeds, $503.29. December 2, 1873, William M. S. signed the following receipt:

“ Kec’d of G-eo. W. & J. S. Hopkins, executors and administrators on John Hopkins’s estate, five hundred and three x\9¥ dolls, in full of all demands due me from the said estate ánd also in full of any or all demands due-me from the said parties above-mentioned up to this date — Dec. 2d, 1S73.

“ Washington, D.C.

“ $503.'29.”

George W. and John S. Hopkins have passed away and, therefore, cannot explain the reasons for their action in thus treating these lots as belonging to the copartnership, but they ■ were coiiversant with the facts and must be regarded as having acted-understandingly upon that basis. The square was used by the partnership for partnership purposes, and i't is not a violent presumption that these lots were purchased with partnership fünds. The question on this branch of the case is, whether by bill filed fifteen years after Mix and his wife gave their deed, and eleven years after the distribution just stated, the heii’s of the trustees ought to be held to account for the other half of the proceeds upon the- ground that the lots belonged to John Hopkins individually. In our judgment such a conclusion is inadmissible under the circumstances.

The bill averred that the conveyance of William M. $. and his wife to 'his brother John S., executed June 20, i860, and recorded July 7, 1860, was fraudulent a,nd void, and procured in pursuance of a general scheme of fraud on- the part of the-, trustees. William' was" not a party to the suit, but by tm decree the deed seems to have been ignored, and Sarah' E. Hopkins, William’s wife, treated as assignee of his share. It is admitted that William signed this deed and delivered it to .his brother, and we think it cannot be properly claimed that he was at the time mentally incompetent to execute, it. It is true he' was in the Government Hospital from August 13, 1864, to September 2, 1864, and from January 19 to March 23, 1865, and also from September 19, 1868, to August 6, 1870, for dipsomania, the last time, being after he had received a blow on the head; but there is much evidence that' he was a man of intelligence and business capacity when not under the'influence of liquor, and if .there were any mental failure after September, 1868, that is not material here. He ■ was called as a witness on behalf of complainants, and testified that his brother persuaded him to sign the deed; that he did not acknowledge it; that he signed his wife’s name to .it at the suggestion of his brother; and that she never knew about it. January 28, 1864, William conveyed to Christopher Ingle,- for the benefit of his wife, all his interest in his father’s estate, and the deed was recorded January 29, 1864. Ingle was not a party to the suit. On the margin of the book in which this deed was recorded is- an entry, according to the custom in the recorder’s office, to the effect that the original • deed was delivered to the beneficiary in May, 1864.

Counsel on both sides refer to certain correspondence between John S. and Sarah E. Hopkins in the summer of 1873, in which both these deeds are mentioned. As to that to John S., Mrs.-Hopkins wrote: “ What William, did I do not know, and if I signed it I signed it not knowing what it was, (which fault was not yours,) for the deed of trust in which William gives me the portion of his father’s - estate is duly recorded, and was January 29, 1864.” In her testimony in chief, Mrs. Hopkins denied that she had joined her husband in a, deed to John S., and asserted that she had never Signed -but one deed, which was a deed to sell a small house, in 1858 or 1859. She remembered that one of the magistrates who took the acknowledgment was named Honn. ■ It appeared that the acknowledgment of the deed of 1860 to John S. was made before two magistrates; one of whom was Mr. Honn, while he was not one of the two justices of the peace before whom the deed of 1859 was acknowledged, and' Mrs. .Hopkins -some days after-wards explained the reference to Mr. Honn as arising -from a remark of counsel. However, upon • cross-examination, she testified that she was afraid she would not recommend any one to trust her memory twenty years back ; and that as to the deed, she still did not recollect anything but the one deed, and yet she might have signed another. She had also completely forgotten her knowledge of the existence of the deed of January 28, 1864, to Mr. Ingle, to which she had referred in her letter of 1873, and which the record in the recorder’s office showed had been delivered to the beneficiary in May, 1864. « .

We understand it to be conceded that when the evidence was taken in this suit both of the justices of the peace before whom the deed of 1860 was acknowledged, as is admitted by the bill, were dead; and, in the absence of evidence' of fraud or collusion on their part, their certificate ought to prevail. Mrs. Hammond stated in her answer, upon information and belief, that this deed of 1860, though absolute on its fáce, was availed of by her father solety as a security and for the protection of his brother, the said William M. S., who was addicted to intoxication, and that the full share of William M. S. in the estate of his father was duly accounted for and paid to him. In- the settlement of March 28, 1865, William’s share, namely, $2667.60, was receipted for by John S., the latter presumably claiming the power to do this by virtue of Wil-' liam’s deed to him. On March 29,1865, William was credited with $2667.60 in an- account opened before that time in, a book kept by George W, and John S., and that account showed that there was paid to. him, on or before June 5, 1865, in instalments, the aggregate sum of $2667.60, after deducting . $1641.01, made up of '$1579.49 due John S. and $61.52 for bill of furniture. On December 2,1873, William receipted for $503.29,.his share of the purchase money from the-Mix lots, and in full of any or all demands to date. This amount is shown on thé same account, and is made up of nine items of cash paid him, commencing with January 6, 1872, and closing with December 2, ,1873. This was not a bill to set aside the deed, nor is i.t framed in the aspect of. repudiating the pay- • ments to. William as made' in fraud of his wife. We 'do not care to comment upon the testimony of William in .this connection. We think complainants failed to make out their oharges of fraud, and that apart from that, the defence of leches interposes an insuperable bar to Contention upon this subject.

We perceive no adequate reason given for the delay in the attack upon this deed, nor in respect of the proceeds of the Mix lots, nor in the assault upon the account stated and settled, in the orphans’ court in 1865. We fail to find any ground assigned for the ignorance of plaintiffs of the proceedings upon the executors’ accounting, or why they received and receipted for their distributive shares as determined - thereby. Indeed, all the matters relied on to justify the imputation of fraud were known or could have been known to the' plaintiffs just as well at the time when they transpired as when the bill was filed. hTo facts are shown of which plaintiffs were ignorant. No discovery was made which might not have been made during the nineteen years. It is true that the children of John Hopkins had confidence in their brother and uncle; but as for nearly twenty years they apparently saw no reason for believing that that confidence had been misplaced, it would require much more convincing evidence than this record affords to justify the conclusion that they had been in fact the victims of imposition. Indeed, we do not understand the testimony of the survivors as affirmatively questioning the integrity1 of the trustees..-

- Mr. Justice Merrick, in his well, considered opinion in this case, after'saying that “the question then reduces itself to the naked question whether the doctrine of a court of chanceiy, with regard to the necessity of the repose of societyis not sufficient \to prevent the opening of this inquiry under these circumstances,” proceeds to examine the two classes of cases to.which the doctrine is -applied, that of constructive fraud in the dealiiig by a trustee with the subject of the trust through an. intervening person for the acquisition of the legal title, and that ;of actual fraud and concealment, and points out the greater liberality in respect of lapse of time in the latter class than ;ih the former. Where there is no fraud’ in fact, he says:

“ If the party, in’ view of ■ all the facts of the ease, has slept upon his rights, a court of chancery will not intervene; and in measuring laches there are two éxtremely important considerations always taken notice of by a court of chancery, which limit and narrow the measure of time which otherwise would be liberal. Where there has been no change of circumstances between the parties and no change with reference to the condition and value of the property, a court of chancery will run very nearly if not quite up to the measure of the statute of limitations as applied in analogous cases in a court of law. But where there has been a change of circumstances with reference to the parties and the property, and still more where death has intervened, so that the-mouth of one party is closed, and those who represent his interests are not in a predicament to avail of the explanations which he might have made, out of the charities of the law and in consideration of the fact that fraud is never to be presumed, but must always be proved and proved clearly, the courts limit very much, in such cases, the measure.of time within which they will grant relief, because the presumption comes in aid of the dead man, that he has gone to his account with a clear conscience. ' In .this case one of ’these trustees, .the survivor, remained-in1 active life and energy for nineteen years after the alleged technical fraud is supposed to have been committed. There was no challenge,during that time, of the transaction. Had there been the law has a right to presume, and does presume, that he would have had opportunities of explaining these transactions and vindicating himself, which opportunities are now1 lost. The counter- - presumption noW arises, that there has been delay with a view to have the undue advantage of evidence on one side no longer i capable of explanation on the other.

“ This is this case stripped of all the surroundings with reference to it, stripped ^f all the imputations and suspicions piled one upon anotheh with artful ingenuity, arising out of a number .of minute' circumstances, no one of which has in. itself, • apart. from o'hers, any significance. The effort has been made, I say, under such circumstances, to impute, fraud.

'“But it is very, remarkable -that, while the circumstances of themselves do not carry any persuasive evidence of fraud to the trained judicial mind, the parties themselves who are impeaching the transaction, the surviving children who had knowledge of what occurred, in their evidence in this cause and under all the temptations to strain or overtop their testimony do not to-day impute any actual malversation to either' of the trustees. The utmost they say is that if they have rights they want them. They never did call in question, in the lifetime of the trustees, the integrity of the trustees: they do not affirmatively call it in question to-day. They simply say, at the uttermost, -that, if they have rights, as has'been suggested to them, in regard to the possibilities of a legal administration of a trust in the manner in which I have stated, they want those rights. Now, under all these circumstances, with all this lapse of time, with all the knowledge they had then and there while the transactions were fresh, with all the temptations now in their own minds to pervert the facts, there is no one of those who are at all reliable.in testimony — and I do • not include W. M. S. Hopkins in this remark — who ventures to impute actual fraud to the trustees whose estates they are now calling in question.”

We concur in these views. In all cases where actual fraud is not made out, but the imputation rests upon conjecture, where the seal of death has closed the lips of those whose character is involved, and lapse of time has impaired the recollection of transactions and obscured their details, the welfare of society demands the rigid enforcement of the rule of diligence. The hour-glass must supply the ravages of the scythe, and those who have slept upon.their rights must be remitted to the repose from which they should not have .been aroused.

. The decree -is reversed, cmd the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the Mil. ■