1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRITANIE HALLMON, Case No. 1:19-cv-01623-DAD-EPG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO: 13 v. (1) FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; 14 STANISLAUS COUNTY HUMAN 15 RESOURCE DEPARTMENT, et al., (2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT SHE WISHES TO PROCEED ONLY AGAINST 16 Defendants. HER EMPLOYER, STANISLAUS COUNTY, FOR EMPLOYMENT 17 DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII, AND VOLUNTARILY DISMISS 18 INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS; OR 19 (3) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT SHE 20 WISHES TO STAND ON THE COMPLAINT, SUBJECT TO FINDINGS 21 AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DISTRICT JUDGE CONSISTENT WITH 22 THIS ORDER 23 (ECF No. 1) 24 THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 25 On August 23, 2019, Plaintiff, Britanie Hallmon (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se and in 26 forma pauperis, commenced this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 27 2000e-5 (“Title VII”), alleging claims against Stanislaus County Human Resource Department 28 1 (the “County”), and the individuals Tamra Thomas, Mari Tamimi, Shelly Anntonucci, and Joan 2 Sahard (the “Individual Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.) This action was initially brought in the 3 Northern District of California, which transferred it to this district on November 15, 2019. 4 For the reasons described below, the Court finds for screening purposes that Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against only her employer, the County of Stanislaus, for a violation of 5 Title VII for employment discrimination and fails to state any other claims. Specifically, Plaintiff 6 does not state cognizable claims against the Individual Defendants under the legal standards 7 explained below. 8 Plaintiff now has options as to how to move forward. Plaintiff may file an amended 9 complaint if she believes that additional factual allegations would state additional claims. If 10 Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the Court will screen that amended complaint in due course. 11 Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a statement with the Court saying that she voluntarily wishes to 12 dismiss the Individual Defendants and proceed against only her employer, the County of 13 Stanislaus, for employment discrimination. Finally, Plaintiff may file a statement with the Court 14 that she wishes to stand on this complaint and have it reviewed by a district judge, in which case 15 the Court will issue findings and recommendations to a district judge consistent with this order. 16 I. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in any case in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma 18 pauperis, the Court must conduct a review of the complaint to determine whether it “state[s] a 19 claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief 20 against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If the Court determines that the complaint 21 fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. An action is frivolous if it is “of little weight or 22 importance: having no basis in law or fact” and malicious if it was filed with the “intention or 23 desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 24 Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 26 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 27 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 28 1 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 2 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 3 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 4 at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678. 5 In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the 6 allegations in the complaint as true, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 7 (1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. 8 Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins 9 v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less 10 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 11 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 12 Iqbal). 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it shall be an unlawful employment 15 practice for an employer to fail to refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate against, any individual 16 because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). To establish 17 a prima facie case of intentional discrimination (known as “disparate treatment”) under Title VII, 18 Plaintiff must show that: “(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for 19 [her] position; (3) [s]he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated 20 individuals outside [her] protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances 21 surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson 22 v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Raad v. Fairbanks North 23 Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 24 The Court has reviewed the Complaint and finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges a 25 claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment discrimination against 26 Plaintiff’s employer, Stanislaus County, to proceed past the screening stage.1 27
28 1 Plaintiff also attaches information indicating she appears to have exhausted the claim at the administrative level. 1 However, Plaintiff names as Defendants the Stanislaus County Human Resource Dept, 2 Tamra Thomas, Mari Tamimi, Shelly Anntonucci, and Joan Sahard. While Title VII provides a 3 cause of action against employers, including government employers, Ass’n of Mexican-Am. 4 Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2000), it “does not provide a separate cause of action against supervisors or co-workers,” Craig v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRITANIE HALLMON, Case No. 1:19-cv-01623-DAD-EPG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO: 13 v. (1) FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; 14 STANISLAUS COUNTY HUMAN 15 RESOURCE DEPARTMENT, et al., (2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT SHE WISHES TO PROCEED ONLY AGAINST 16 Defendants. HER EMPLOYER, STANISLAUS COUNTY, FOR EMPLOYMENT 17 DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII, AND VOLUNTARILY DISMISS 18 INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS; OR 19 (3) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT SHE 20 WISHES TO STAND ON THE COMPLAINT, SUBJECT TO FINDINGS 21 AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DISTRICT JUDGE CONSISTENT WITH 22 THIS ORDER 23 (ECF No. 1) 24 THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 25 On August 23, 2019, Plaintiff, Britanie Hallmon (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se and in 26 forma pauperis, commenced this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 27 2000e-5 (“Title VII”), alleging claims against Stanislaus County Human Resource Department 28 1 (the “County”), and the individuals Tamra Thomas, Mari Tamimi, Shelly Anntonucci, and Joan 2 Sahard (the “Individual Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.) This action was initially brought in the 3 Northern District of California, which transferred it to this district on November 15, 2019. 4 For the reasons described below, the Court finds for screening purposes that Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against only her employer, the County of Stanislaus, for a violation of 5 Title VII for employment discrimination and fails to state any other claims. Specifically, Plaintiff 6 does not state cognizable claims against the Individual Defendants under the legal standards 7 explained below. 8 Plaintiff now has options as to how to move forward. Plaintiff may file an amended 9 complaint if she believes that additional factual allegations would state additional claims. If 10 Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the Court will screen that amended complaint in due course. 11 Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a statement with the Court saying that she voluntarily wishes to 12 dismiss the Individual Defendants and proceed against only her employer, the County of 13 Stanislaus, for employment discrimination. Finally, Plaintiff may file a statement with the Court 14 that she wishes to stand on this complaint and have it reviewed by a district judge, in which case 15 the Court will issue findings and recommendations to a district judge consistent with this order. 16 I. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in any case in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma 18 pauperis, the Court must conduct a review of the complaint to determine whether it “state[s] a 19 claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief 20 against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If the Court determines that the complaint 21 fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. An action is frivolous if it is “of little weight or 22 importance: having no basis in law or fact” and malicious if it was filed with the “intention or 23 desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 24 Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 26 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 27 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 28 1 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 2 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 3 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 4 at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678. 5 In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the 6 allegations in the complaint as true, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 7 (1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. 8 Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins 9 v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less 10 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 11 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 12 Iqbal). 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it shall be an unlawful employment 15 practice for an employer to fail to refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate against, any individual 16 because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). To establish 17 a prima facie case of intentional discrimination (known as “disparate treatment”) under Title VII, 18 Plaintiff must show that: “(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for 19 [her] position; (3) [s]he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated 20 individuals outside [her] protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances 21 surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson 22 v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Raad v. Fairbanks North 23 Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 24 The Court has reviewed the Complaint and finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges a 25 claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment discrimination against 26 Plaintiff’s employer, Stanislaus County, to proceed past the screening stage.1 27
28 1 Plaintiff also attaches information indicating she appears to have exhausted the claim at the administrative level. 1 However, Plaintiff names as Defendants the Stanislaus County Human Resource Dept, 2 Tamra Thomas, Mari Tamimi, Shelly Anntonucci, and Joan Sahard. While Title VII provides a 3 cause of action against employers, including government employers, Ass’n of Mexican-Am. 4 Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2000), it “does not provide a separate cause of action against supervisors or co-workers,” Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1058 5 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint has not stated a cognizable claim against these 6 defendants. 7 Therefore, Plaintiff has, for screening purposes, stated a claim for employment 8 discrimination only against her employer, Stanislaus County. The claims against all other 9 defendants are not cognizable under Title VII as explained above. 10 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 11 The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against her employer, 12 Stanislaus County, for employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 13 Act of 1964. Plaintiff has not stated any other claims. 14 Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely 15 give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the Court will provide Plaintiff 16 with time to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified above. Lopez v. Smith, 17 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint 18 within thirty days. 19 Plaintiff should note that although he has been granted leave to amend, it is not to change 20 the nature of the suit or to add unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 21 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 22 Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 23 Maricopa County, 693 F.3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 24 amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 25 defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly 26 titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 27 under penalty of perjury. 28 4:40 EMCO MAR SMU PO a ee OY VI
1 Alternatively, under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)@) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 2 | plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss all claims against one or more defendants to a case. Plaintiff 3 || may notify the Court she wishes to voluntarily dismiss the Individual Defendants and proceed 4 | against only the County as her employer. 5 Finally, Plaintiff may instead choose to stand on this complaint, in which case the Court 6 will issue findings and recommendations to a district judge recommending that this case be 7 dismissed for the reasons described in this order. 8 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
9 1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall either: a. File a First Amended Complaint, which the Court will screen in due course; b. Notify the Court in writing that she wishes to proceed on her Title VU claim against her employer, Stanislaus County, only and dismiss the individual 12 named defendants; or 13 c. Notify the Court in writing that she wants to stand on her complaint, in which case the Court will issue findings and recommendations to a district judge 15 consistent with this order. 16 2. Should Plaintiff choose to amend her complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the amended 17 complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 1:19-cv-01623- 18 DAD-EPG; and 19 3. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action. 20 21 | IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 . . Dated: _ April 16, 2020 [see hey □□ 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28