Halliburton v. State

528 S.W.2d 216, 1975 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1113

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 15, 1975
• Docket: 49457
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for murder. The jury assessed the punishment at life.

The appellant admitted shooting her common-law husband, Willie Lee Scott, in the front room of their home. No one else was present. She claimed self-defense and no intent to kill.

The sole question for review relates to the proof of her shooting another man.

The State introduced a portion of her confession. Appellant introduced the remainder of the confession and testified that she shot the deceased after he had threatened her with a gun. She related that the deceased had a pistol and while sitting there “pranking with his gun in his hand” he had said, “ ‘Bitch, you know I’ll kill you.’ ” She stated that she went and got her pistol and tried to calm him down. He put the pistol back in his pocket and she put hers back under the pillow on the couch. About five minutes later the argument was renewed. .According to the appellant, the deceased hit her with his pistol and knocked her down. She reached under the pillow on the couch, got her gun and came up shooting. She said that she was not trying to kill him but only to stop him. He grabbed her, they “tusseled,” he hit her on the side of the head again with his pistol and they fell to the floor. While wrestling, she shot him.

After the defense rested the State called Morris Myers who testified that the appellant, in her car, pulled up beside him while he was walking on South Calhoun Street in Fort Worth. She stopped the car and asked him for money that he owed her. He told her that he didn’t have any money and then the appellant picked up her pistol, got out of the car and shot him in the side as he ran. This happened some five weeks after the shooting in the present case.

The appellant complains that the court erred in admitting the testimony of Myers.

The issue of self-defense and no intent to kill was raised during appellant’s testimony when the following occurred:

“Q. (By defense attorney) When you reached up under the couch and got your gun and came up shooting, were you shooting at Scott, trying to kill him?

“A. (Appellant) No, sir, I wasn’t shooting at him or trying to kill him.

“Q. What were you trying to do?

“A. I was trying to stop him. I figured if I shot at him he would stop.

“Q. . . . Now, you were merely trying to stop him when you came up shooting?

“A. Yes, sir, I was.”

The above testimony concerned appellant’s initial shooting at the deceased and prior to the wrestling on the floor where she killed him. Then she testified as follows:

“Q. Now, Mary, at the time you shot him and at the time you went to the ground there and tusseled him, did he have his gun in his hand?

“A. Yes, sir, he did.

“Q. I’ll ask you, Mary, at that time, were you scared that he was going to do you bodily injury or kill you?

“A. Yes, sir, Mr. Williams, I was scared to death.

“Q. All right. Now, let me ask you this, Mary: At all times that this was going on out there, did you want to kill Scott?

“A. No, I loved him.

“Q. You did not want to kill him?

“A. I really did not want to kill him.

“Q. Why did you shoot him when you shot him there the last time?

“A. I was trying to stop him period. It was either him or me. Mr. Williams, that man was going to kill me.

“Q. You actually thought he was going to kill you from what he had done?

“A. I definitely knew he was, Mr. Williams.”

On cross-examination the following occurred:

“Q. Isn’t it a fact that you were just plain mad at him?

“A. No, it is not.

“Q. You didn’t ever intend to kill Scott, did you?

“A. No, sir, I didn’t. How can you kill something you love?”

The trial court in its charge to the jury instructed the jury to limit its consideration of the extraneous offense in passing upon the weight given to the appellant’s testimony and for no other purpose.

The issue in this case is whether the shooting of Myers was material and relevant to a contested issue on the case.

It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that one on trial is to be tried for the offense charged and not for remote or disconnected crimes or for being a criminal generally. See 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C.2d, Section 188. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), outlines numerous situations in which evidence is admissible even though it tends to show an extraneous offense. The Court noted that an extraneous offense could be introduced “to refute a defensive theory raised by the accused.” See Ratcliff v. State, 504 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and the cases it cites.

The appellant testified to self-defense and that she had no intent to kill. She wanted the jury to believe her testimony. The State was authorized to show that she shot another man some time later to show her intent which tended to disprove her testimony. Appellant cites Lolmaugh v. State, 514 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Lolmaugh shot and killed his wife’s lover. The appellant claimed self-defense. This Court held that a part of his confession in which he admitted to a prior shooting of a man who had been his wife’s lover was admissible. When the appellant raised the issue of self-defense, motive became an issue. The prior shooting tended to show Lolmaugh’s state of mind at the time he committed the offense for which he was charged.

In Lolmaugh there was the additional fact of the motive of the defendant. The fact that Lolmaugh is a stronger case for the admission of the extraneous offense does not make the testimony in the present case inadmissible.

In Blankenship v. State, 448 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), the defendant there claimed the defenses of alibi and that he had been “framed.” Evidence of a subsequent robbery involving the appellant reasonably and logically tended to defeat the defenses urged and, therefore, was admissible.

The record contains no objection to the charge limiting Myers’ testimony, and nothing is presented for review.

There being no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.

ODOM, J., dissents.