Hall v. Wilson

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: March 27, 1996
• Docket: CV-94-405-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Hall v. Wilson CV-94-405-M 03/27/96 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Steven Hall, Plaintiff,

v. Civil No. 94-405-M

Bill Wilson; Albert Herlicka; Roland Dovon; Michael Sokolow; Gary Lawrence; Steven Soule; and Viola Lunderville, Defendants.

O R D E R

Steven Hall, an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison,

brings this civil action against the warden and various employees

of the prison, claiming that a number of his constitutional

rights have been violated under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Defendants move for summary judgment. Hall objects.

Factual Background

On March 15, 1994, Hall was scheduled to be moved from one

cell to another within the prison's Secure Housing Unit.1 He was

1 The Secure Housing Unit ("SHU") is reserved for those prisoners who, for various reasons related to their conduct within the prison walls, have been categorized as being of the highest security risk. Accordingly, they are segregated from the general prison population, housed in individual cells, and subjected to the highest levels of control, structure, and supervision. Inmates housed in SHU are reviewed at least every 90 days for possible reclassification to a lower security level told by correctional officers to clean his cell. When the

officers returned approximately 20 minutes later, the floor of

the cell was flooded with about an 1/8" of water and waste from

the cell toilet. Hall was directed to clean the cell, gather his

personal belongings, and segregate them from property issued to

him by the prison. Correctional officers informed Hall that any

property which was not gathered would be considered abandoned and

discarded.

Hall admits that he refused to comply with the correctional

officers' orders to clean his cell, segregate items of personal

property, and present for inspection a pillowcase containing his

personal items. He now claims the pillowcase contained various

legal and religious materials.2 He argues, however, that his

and return to the general prison population. Nevertheless, Hall has apparently spent the vast majority of his time at the prison in SHU, noting that he has "only been out of SHU for basically three months since August of 1991." Hall Deposition at 63 (Exhibit A to defendants' motion for summary judgment).

2 Defendants assert that when an inmate is moved from one cell to another in SHU, prison regulations mandate that he separate his personal property from prison property. He must also specifically identify those materials which are of a legal nature. Correctional officers are then reguired to search the prisoner's belongings for weapons and other contraband before he can be moved to his new cell. Finally, the prisoner is not permitted to carry his belongings to his new cell out of concern that the property bag might be swung at officers as a weapon. See Affidavit of Michael Sokolow at paras. 5-6 (Exhibit 4E to Hall's objection to summary judgment).

2 defiance (at least with regard to his refusal to clean the cell)

was justified because he had not caused the sewage to flood his

cell. Although not material to the issues presently before the

court, defendants are, understandably, unwilling to let Hall's

claim go unchallenged. They assert that Hall intentionally

caused his toilet to back-up and that such a ploy is a common

method of "acting out" by disruptive inmates (particularly when

they know, as did Hall, that they will shortly be moved out of

the soiled cell). Defendants also note that such behavior is

entirely consistent with Hall's prior conduct, which has been

marked by a series of disruptive incidents. Presumably, it is

that history of disruption and defiance that explains Hall's

lengthy tenure in SHU and relatively infreguent status as a

general population inmate.

According to Hall's deposition testimony, after he refused

to clean his cell:

They opened the cell door, told me to back up against the wall, and Roland Doyon started removing State property from the cell, and I had in my possession [a] pillowcase with my property,and Roland Doyon said that he was going to take that. And I said, "that's my property." And he said, "I don't care, we're taking it." And I said, "no, you're not taking it. It's my legal material."

3 Hall deposition at 65. Hall acknowledges that the pillowcase was

State property. Hall deposition at 17, and that he refused to

voluntarily turn it over to corrections officers so that it might

be searched. Hall deposition at 85.

As a result of the March 15, 1994 incident. Hall was

"written-up" for two minor disciplinary infractions. He was

given a hearing, found guilty, and sentenced to five days in

punitive segregation in SHU. Initially, prison administrators

suspended that sentence. It was subseguently executed after Hall

was found to have violated other prison rules.3

Hall claims that his constitutional rights have been

violated in that: (a) he was denied due process in the

disciplinary proceedings which resulted in the five-day sentence

to punitive segregation; and (b) he was denied access to the

3 For inmates housed in SHU, punitive segregation involves moving the prisoner to a different tier of cells within SHU. While in punitive segregation a SHU inmate loses one hour of yard time each day, his access to the day room is cut in half (from two hours to one hour), and his access to certain programming and facility resources is limited. Otherwise, the conditions of confinement are substantially similar to those imposed on other inmates in SHU: punitive segregation occurs in a cell of the same size and in the same building as normal maximum security housing; the inmate is still permitted to have writing utensils, legal material, and religious materials; and, typically, punitive segregation lasts no more than 15 days. See Affidavit of Michael Sokolow at paras. 8-9.

4 courts and deprived of his right to religious freedom when prison

officials confiscated the pillowcase which contained legal and

religious materials. Prison officials subseguently returned

some, but allegedly not all, of the material which Hall had

placed in the pillowcase.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper "if pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A material

fact "is one 'that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.1" United States v. One Parcel of Real Property

with Bldgs., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992) (guoting Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The moving

party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

The party opposing the motion must set forth specific facts

showing that there remains a genuine issue for trial,

demonstrating "some factual disagreement sufficient to deflect

brevis disposition." Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d

816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 112 S.Ct. 2965 (1992).

5 That burden is discharged only if the cited disagreement relates

to a genuine issue of material fact. Wynne v. Tufts University

School of Medicine, 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993).

Discussion

I. Denial of Due Process and Liberty Interests.

Hall's due process claims appear to be based upon his

allegations that he was not permitted to call witnesses to assist

in his defense at the disciplinary hearing and that the prison

failed to act on his appeal following that hearing. He claims

that defendants' conduct violated established prison policy, the

Supreme Court's holding in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539

(1974), and, ultimately, resulted in an unconstitutional

deprivation of liberty without due process.4

The guestion presented to the court is whether Hall had a

liberty interest in remaining out of punitive segregation for

five days, such that under the Fourteenth Amendment he was

entitled to due process of law before that privilege could be

4 Appended to various pleadings submitted by Hall are excerpts from the NH Department of Corrections Policy and Procedure Directive, which Hall claims to be the source of his right to present witnesses at his disciplinary hearings and to appeal any disciplinary sentence imposed upon him.

6 revoked. Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1160 (1st Cir. 1996).

Based upon the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Sandin v.

Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995), the court is compelled to find

that even if Hall's factual allegations are true, he has not been

deprived of a constitutional right. In Sandin, supra, the

Supreme Court held that:

Following Wolff, we recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. The Court noted that " [d]iscipline by

prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls

within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court

of law." I_d. at 2310. Then, turning to the facts of the case

before it, the Court concluded that the State's actions in

placing Conner in disciplinary segregation in the prison's

Special Holding Unit for 30 days "did not work a major disruption

in his environment," I_d. at 2301, and, therefore, "neither the

Hawaii prison regulation in guestion, nor the Due Process Clause

itself, afforded Conner a protected liberty interest that would

7 entitle him to the procedural protections set forth in Wolff."

Id. at 2302.

Similarly, the discipline imposed upon Hall, who was already

confined in the Secure Housing Unit, did not "impose atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life." I_d. at 2300. See also Dominique v.

Weld, 73 F.3d at 1160-61 (holding that removal of prisoner from

work release and return to medium security facility did not

impose an "atypical" hardship upon him in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life). Hall's incarceration in

punitive segregation for five days did not affect any state-

created liberty interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause.

Accordingly, he was not entitled to the procedural protections

articulated in Wolff.

II. Denial of Access to the Courts.

Defendants contend that most, if not all, of the legal (and

religious) materials which were contained in Hall's pillowcase

immediately prior to his transfer to a different cell have been

returned to him. Hall claims that much of that material has yet

to be returned. Further, he alleges that defendants' refusal to

return those materials has prejudiced his ability to litigate certain unidentified claims. Hall does not specify whether he is

referring to ongoing suits (at least one of which was, when Hall

initiated this action, pending before another judge of this

court) or suits which he anticipates filing at some point in the

future.

Defendants argue that Hall has not been denied meaningful

access to the courts. Even assuming that some of his legal

materials were removed and never returned, defendants contend

that Hall has not suffered any actual harm as a result. They

note that while Hall's pleadings reference two ongoing cases (one

in state court and one in this court), he has failed to allege

any prejudice to either of those cases stemming from the alleged

loss of his legal materials on March 15, 1994. In his

deposition. Hall admitted that he replaced some or all of the

allegedly missing legal books. Hall deposition at 69. Further,

defendants point out that Hall does not claim that the allegedly

missing materials were critical or that they could not be

replaced by reference to the prison's law library.

Hall has failed to point to any genuine issue of material

fact with regard to the issue of prejudice stemming from the

alleged loss of his legal materials. While the loss of those materials (or the delay between their confiscation and subsequent

return) may have caused Hall some inconvenience, he has failed to

allege that he sustained any injury or harm of constitutional

magnitude.5 "Absent some further showing that the loss of those

particular documents deprived [Hall] of the ability to

participate meaningfully in the legal process, a court cannot say

that a constitutional deprivation has occurred." Sowell v. Vose,

941 F .2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1991).

If Hall has actually suffered the loss of some of his

personal belongings and/or legal materials, his proper recourse

might involve the filing of a claim against the Department of

5 Based upon this court's records, it appears that Hall's federal suit progressed on a normal track until November 12, 1994, when Hall apparently settled his dispute with prison officials. The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal. With regard to his state petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Hall claims that his petition was dismissed because he did not have an adequate opportunity to prepare his case due to the conditions of his confinement. See Order of Merrimack Superior Court Justice Mohl at 1 (September 19, 1994) (Exhibit 2C to Hall's objection to summary judgment). It is, however, clear from that order that Hall filed his petition in state court well after the incidents giving rise to this proceeding. Accordingly, the court cannot find (nor has Hall specifically claimed) that the alleged detention of his legal materials in March of 1994 in any way adversely affected his ability to pursue litigation which he elected to file five months later. To find such a link between these seemingly unrelated events would, based upon the dearth of substantiating evidence in the record, amount to nothing more than strained speculation.

10 Corrections. The State has a procedure in place to resolve such

claims. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 541-B ("RSA 541-B").

III. Denial of Religious Freedom.

Finally, Hall claims that by failing to return certain

materials which he claims were religious in nature, the

defendants have deprived him of his constitutionally protected

right to freedom of religion. Defendants point out that Hall has

not alleged that they knowingly deprived him of religious

material. In fact. Hall concedes that during his relatively

brief encounter with correctional officers on March 15, 1994, he

never informed them that the pillowcase contained any religious

materials. Instead, he merely asserted, "that's my property. . .

It's my legal material." Hall deposition at 65. Nor does Hall

claim that defendants' alleged loss or destruction of his

religious materials was purposeful or retaliatory. See, e.g.,

Howland v. Kilguist, 833 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1987) ("It is

well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a

constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983

even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have

been proper.").

11 Defendants claim that this is, at best, simply a case

involving the negligent loss of a prisoner's personal belongings,

for which there is an adeguate state remedy: a claim against the

State pursuant to RSA ch. 541-B. The court agrees. That statute

provides a meaningful and adeguate avenue by which Hall might

seek and, if appropriate, receive compensation for his alleged

loss. Simply stated, the claims he has raised in this proceeding

are not of constitutional magnitude. Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327, 332 (1986) ("We think that the actions of prison

custodians in . . . mislaying an inmate's property are guite

remote from the concerns just discussed. Far from an abuse of

power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to

measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that

injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning

of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old

principle of due process of law."); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 533 (1984) ("[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of

property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of

the procedural reguirements of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for

the loss is available."). See Parratt v. Tavlor, 451 U.S. 527

(1981), overruled in part b y , Daniels, 474 U.S. 327.

12 Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary

judgment (document no. 39) is granted. Plaintiff's motion for

discovery of addresses (document no. 35), motion to provide

compulsory process (document no. 36), and motion in limine

regarding Rule 404(b) evidence (document no. 43) are denied as

moot. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment in

favor of defendants.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

March 27, 1996

cc: Steven E. Hall, Pro Se Christopher P. Reid, Esg.