F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 13 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JOHN RUSSELL HALL,
Petitioner,
v. No. 98-9547 (No. 98-076) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT (Petition for Review) OF LABOR,
Respondent.
EG&G DEFENSE MATERIALS, INC.,
Intervenor.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner John Russell Hall petitions this court for review of a final
decision of the United States Department of Labor Administrative Review Board
(“Board”) affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) granting
summary judgment for intervenor EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. (“EG&G”) on
Hall’s environmental whistleblower complaint. We affirm.
Hall claims that his fellow employees and supervisors at EG&G harassed
him after he engaged in activities protected by environmental whistleblower
statutes. The harassment allegedly caused Hall serious psychological problems,
for which he took a disability leave of absence from work. After he had been on
disability leave for a year, on November 14, 1996, EG&G terminated his
employment. Hall received notice of the termination on November 15, 1996.
On January 7, 1997, Hall filed a complaint with the Department of Labor,
alleging that he had been retaliated against for engaging in protected
whistleblowing. EG&G filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that
it should have been filed within thirty days of Hall’s termination. Hall filed a
-2- response, in which he conceded that his complaint was untimely, but asserted that
the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to his mental illness.
Both EG&G and Hall attached affidavits or other materials to their
pleadings. The ALJ reviewed these materials, and converted the motion to
dismiss to one for summary judgment. He found that the circumstances of this
case did not warrant equitable tolling, and granted summary judgment in favor of
EG&G. The Board agreed and affirmed the dismissal.
We review the Secretary of Labor’s decision under § 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(3)(A)
(incorporating standards contained in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)); cf. Trimmer v. United
States Dep’t. of Labor , 174 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing similar
statutory language incorporating standards contained in 42 U.S.C. § 5851(c)(1)).
The Secretary’s decision will be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” Trimmer , 174
F.3d at 1102. The Secretary’s decision on matters of law, however, is reviewed
de novo. See id.
Hall raises three issues. He first contends that the Secretary erred by
deciding the timeliness and equitable tolling issues without allowing him to
complete discovery, without giving him notice that the motion to dismiss would
-3- be converted to a motion for summary judgment, and without affording him a
reasonable opportunity to submit additional material for consideration.
The parties have cited no administrative rule or regulation authorizing the
ALJ to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and we have
found none. The Secretary’s regulations, however, contain a “summary decision”
procedure which operates in much the same way as the summary judgment
authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 18.40, 18.41. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that if a party makes a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and if “matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”
We therefore find it useful to reason from Rules 12(b) and 56 and interpretive
federal case law by analogy.
In an order dated July 18, 1997, the ALJ instructed the parties that
discovery could commence immediately. The ALJ did not enter his recommended
order of summary judgment until nearly seven months later, on February 6, 1998.
It does not appear that Hall made any effort to conduct discovery during this time
period.
Hall asserts that he did not conduct discovery because he did not know he
would be facing a motion for summary judgment. We note, however, that he
-4- attached affidavits and other materials to his response to EG&G’s motion to
dismiss. A party who submits material beyond the pleadings in opposition to a
motion to dismiss cannot complain of undue surprise if the district court treats the
motion as a summary judgment motion. See Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100
F.3d 857, 859 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996); Wheeler v. Hurdman , 825 F.2d 257, 259-60
(10th Cir. 1987). We conclude, therefore, that the ALJ properly converted the
motion to one for summary judgment, and that Hall cannot complain of lack of
notice or opportunity to conduct discovery or to present materials in opposition to
the motion.
In his second issue, Hall asserts that the Board erred as a matter of law in
granting summary judgment on his equitable tolling argument. The Board’s
application of the doctrine of equitable tolling involves a question of law and we
therefore review this issue de novo. See Rose v. Dole , 945 F.2d 1331, 1334 (6th
Cir. 1991).
Each of the statutes upon which Hall’s claims are founded requires the
plaintiff to file his complaint with the Secretary within thirty days of the last
discriminatory or retaliatory action. See 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(1) (Toxic Substance
Control Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(A)
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 13 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JOHN RUSSELL HALL,
Petitioner,
v. No. 98-9547 (No. 98-076) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT (Petition for Review) OF LABOR,
Respondent.
EG&G DEFENSE MATERIALS, INC.,
Intervenor.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner John Russell Hall petitions this court for review of a final
decision of the United States Department of Labor Administrative Review Board
(“Board”) affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) granting
summary judgment for intervenor EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. (“EG&G”) on
Hall’s environmental whistleblower complaint. We affirm.
Hall claims that his fellow employees and supervisors at EG&G harassed
him after he engaged in activities protected by environmental whistleblower
statutes. The harassment allegedly caused Hall serious psychological problems,
for which he took a disability leave of absence from work. After he had been on
disability leave for a year, on November 14, 1996, EG&G terminated his
employment. Hall received notice of the termination on November 15, 1996.
On January 7, 1997, Hall filed a complaint with the Department of Labor,
alleging that he had been retaliated against for engaging in protected
whistleblowing. EG&G filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that
it should have been filed within thirty days of Hall’s termination. Hall filed a
-2- response, in which he conceded that his complaint was untimely, but asserted that
the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to his mental illness.
Both EG&G and Hall attached affidavits or other materials to their
pleadings. The ALJ reviewed these materials, and converted the motion to
dismiss to one for summary judgment. He found that the circumstances of this
case did not warrant equitable tolling, and granted summary judgment in favor of
EG&G. The Board agreed and affirmed the dismissal.
We review the Secretary of Labor’s decision under § 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(3)(A)
(incorporating standards contained in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)); cf. Trimmer v. United
States Dep’t. of Labor , 174 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing similar
statutory language incorporating standards contained in 42 U.S.C. § 5851(c)(1)).
The Secretary’s decision will be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” Trimmer , 174
F.3d at 1102. The Secretary’s decision on matters of law, however, is reviewed
de novo. See id.
Hall raises three issues. He first contends that the Secretary erred by
deciding the timeliness and equitable tolling issues without allowing him to
complete discovery, without giving him notice that the motion to dismiss would
-3- be converted to a motion for summary judgment, and without affording him a
reasonable opportunity to submit additional material for consideration.
The parties have cited no administrative rule or regulation authorizing the
ALJ to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and we have
found none. The Secretary’s regulations, however, contain a “summary decision”
procedure which operates in much the same way as the summary judgment
authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 18.40, 18.41. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that if a party makes a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and if “matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”
We therefore find it useful to reason from Rules 12(b) and 56 and interpretive
federal case law by analogy.
In an order dated July 18, 1997, the ALJ instructed the parties that
discovery could commence immediately. The ALJ did not enter his recommended
order of summary judgment until nearly seven months later, on February 6, 1998.
It does not appear that Hall made any effort to conduct discovery during this time
period.
Hall asserts that he did not conduct discovery because he did not know he
would be facing a motion for summary judgment. We note, however, that he
-4- attached affidavits and other materials to his response to EG&G’s motion to
dismiss. A party who submits material beyond the pleadings in opposition to a
motion to dismiss cannot complain of undue surprise if the district court treats the
motion as a summary judgment motion. See Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100
F.3d 857, 859 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996); Wheeler v. Hurdman , 825 F.2d 257, 259-60
(10th Cir. 1987). We conclude, therefore, that the ALJ properly converted the
motion to one for summary judgment, and that Hall cannot complain of lack of
notice or opportunity to conduct discovery or to present materials in opposition to
the motion.
In his second issue, Hall asserts that the Board erred as a matter of law in
granting summary judgment on his equitable tolling argument. The Board’s
application of the doctrine of equitable tolling involves a question of law and we
therefore review this issue de novo. See Rose v. Dole , 945 F.2d 1331, 1334 (6th
Cir. 1991).
Each of the statutes upon which Hall’s claims are founded requires the
plaintiff to file his complaint with the Secretary within thirty days of the last
discriminatory or retaliatory action. See 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(1) (Toxic Substance
Control Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(A)
(Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b) (Resource, Conservation and
Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b)(1) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9610(b)
-5- (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). It is
undisputed that Hall did not file his complaint within thirty days of his
termination. These thirty-day deadlines are not jurisdictional, however, and are
subject to equitable tolling. See School Dist., City of Allentown v. Marshall , 657
F.2d 16, 18-20 (3d Cir. 1981); cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 455 U.S.
385, 393 (1982) (holding that time limit for filing EEOC charge is not
jurisdictional, but is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling).
Hall claims that the statute of limitations should be tolled because his
mental illness prevented him from filing his complaint during the statutory time
period. Our decision in Biester v. Midwest Health Servs., Inc. , 77 F.3d 1264
(10th Cir. 1996), is dispositive of this issue. Although in that case we declined to
decide whether mental incapacity could toll the statute of limitations, see id. at
1268, we stated that even if we were to adopt such a rule, tolling for mental
incapacity would be allowed only under “exceptional circumstances,” see id. We
identified two such exceptional circumstances as adjudication of incompetency or
institutionalization. See id.
Hall was neither adjudicated incompetent nor institutionalized during the
time period at issue here. Instead, the evidence before the Secretary showed that
Hall handled, with counsel’s assistance, other legal matters which required action
during or soon after the thirty-day statute of limitations period. Thus, even if we
-6- recognized equitable tolling for mental incapacity, it would not apply in this
case. Hall fails to show any exceptional circumstances which would justify
equitable tolling. 1
Finally, Hall contends that the Secretary erred in rejecting his claim of
equitable tolling by relying on the fact that he was represented by counsel on
other matters during the statutory limitations period. We need not consider
whether the Secretary’s rationale includes a legal error. Even if it does, the
Secretary’s other stated rationales for granting summary judgment provide a
sufficient basis for our affirmance. See, e.g. , Vista Hill Found., Inc. v. Heckler ,
767 F.2d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that while agency decision may be
upheld only on basis relied upon by agency, court may affirm if decision is
justified by either of alternative grounds set forth in agency decision).
1 Hall also argues that equitable tolling is appropriate because EG&G caused his mental incapacity. We need not consider whether we recognize such a claim, because Hall fails to show, whatever the source of his incapacity, that he was so impaired that he could not have filed a timely claim. See Biester , 77 F.3d at 1269 n.2.
-7- For the foregoing reasons, Hall’s petition for review is DENIED, and the
Board’s final decision and order is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby Circuit Judge
-8-