Hall v. Cordell

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 29, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0347
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0347 Hall v Cordell 01-29-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0347 Weld County District Court No. 24CV30063 Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge

Andrea M. Hall,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Travis Cordell and Monika Cordell,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 29, 2026

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco, Ingrid J. DeFranco, Brighton, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Kendra N. Beckwith, Nathan B. Thoreson, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Plaintiff, Andrea M. Hall, appeals a part of the district court’s

judgment in her favor against defendants, Travis and Monika

Cordell (the Cordells).1 Specifically, before trial, the district court

denied Hall recovery for noneconomic damages for the death of her

dog. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 At the time of the incident, Hall had two dogs. In November

2023, Hall let both dogs out in her fenced-in backyard. Hall was on

the phone while the dogs were outside, but she heard barking

coming from the backyard. After the barking stopped, only her

golden retriever came to the back door. While Hall was still talking

on the phone, her neighbor, Travis, came to her backdoor with

Sadie, Hall’s toy poodle, in his arms. Travis told Hall that the

Cordells’ dog, Bear, had jumped the fence between their yards and

had severely injured Sadie.

¶3 Hall and Travis drove Sadie to a veterinarian. The veterinarian

told Hall that Sadie had sustained major injuries, would need to be

1 Because the Cordells share the same last name, we refer to the

husband by his first name to avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect in doing so.

1 transported to a different clinic to receive care, and probably would

not survive being transported. Hall’s husband then arrived at the

clinic and asked Travis to drive Hall’s car back to Hall’s house.

Before leaving, Travis paid the veterinarian’s bill. Sadie was

euthanized because of her injuries.

¶4 After the incident, Hall and her husband spoke to other

neighbors and learned that Bear had previously escaped from the

Cordells’ yard and had bitten a neighbor’s granddaughter on the

hand. Hall then reported the incident between Bear and Sadie to

the police. The Cordells were issued a summons and pleaded guilty

in municipal court to owning, keeping, harboring, or possessing a

vicious dog.

¶5 In January 2025, Hall filed a complaint against the Cordells,

asserting claims for negligence, negligence per se, and gross

negligence. She sought economic and noneconomic damages. The

Cordells moved for partial summary judgment on Hall’s request for

noneconomic damages, claiming that, as a matter of law, Hall could

not seek noneconomic damages for the loss of her dog. The court

agreed and granted the motion, having concluded that recovery of

2 damages for the loss of a pet is limited to the actual or intrinsic

value of the pet even when gross negligence is alleged.

¶6 Hall moved the court to reconsider and clarified that her claim

for gross negligence was different from her claim for negligence

because it was based on the Cordells’ “willful and wanton” conduct.

Specifically, Hall argued that the Cordells allowed Bear to enter

Hall’s yard despite knowing that Bear had previously escaped from

their backyard, their yard lacked containment fencing on three

sides, and Bear had previously bitten a child. Hall argued that the

case law supported recovery of noneconomic damages based on

gross negligence and that the jury should decide whether the

Cordells’ conduct was willful and wanton. Hall therefore asked the

court to “permit her to present her claim for [noneconomic]

damages to the jury, contingent on a finding of gross negligence,”

but the court denied the motion.

¶7 Before trial, the parties filed a proposed stipulated trial

management order in which they agreed that the “only issue left to

be tried [wa]s [Hall’s] alleged property damages.” The Cordells

admitted liability for Sadie’s injuries but disputed the amount of

3 Hall’s claimed damages. Hall reasserted her claims for negligence,

negligence per se, and gross (or willful and wanton) negligence.

¶8 As an exhibit to the proposed trial management order, Hall

submitted a list of proposed trial witnesses, which included herself,

her husband, the treating veterinarian, a dog training expert, the

neighbors whose granddaughter had been bitten by Bear, the

responding code enforcement officer, and an individual who

interviewed the veterinarian. Because the sole issue left to be tried

was Hall’s alleged property damage, however, the Cordells moved in

limine to exclude all witness testimony and exhibits apart from

Hall’s testimony and the receipts for a replacement poodle. Hall did

not file an objection.

¶9 Following the pretrial conference, the court issued an order

granting the Cordells’ motion in limine and adopting the stipulated

trial management order. The court’s order noted that the parties

agreed to waive a jury trial.

¶ 10 A few days before trial, Hall submitted an offer of proof

relevant to the gross negligence issue, which included photographic

exhibits of Bear in the Cordells’ backyard and a list of witnesses

from whom Hall would elicit testimony, including other neighbors

4 and a dog trainer. Hall’s counsel mentioned the offer of proof at the

bench trial, and the court clarified that it was filed for “appellate

purposes” and was “not evidence that [the court was] considering

today.”

¶ 11 The court awarded Hall $3,500 for costs to purchase a

replacement poodle, $800 for veterinary fees to spay the new

poodle, $300 for the cost of equivalent training, and $168.02 in

prejudgment interest.

II. Analysis

¶ 12 Hall contends that the court erred by (1) granting the Cordells’

motion for partial summary judgment and holding that

noneconomic damages, including those for emotional distress, are

not recoverable for the loss of a pet even when gross negligence is

alleged; and (2) not allowing a jury to determine whether the

Cordells were grossly negligent. We disagree with both contentions.

A. Preservation

¶ 13 As an initial matter, the Cordells contend that Hall failed to

preserve her argument that a jury should have decided her gross

negligence claim because the parties agreed to a bench trial to

resolve only the amount of damages. We agree that Hall waived her

5 request for a jury trial, but she did not waive her argument that

noneconomic damages for emotional distress are recoverable under

a gross negligence claim.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 14 Whether a party preserved an issue for appeal is a threshold

question; we will not review issues that are insufficiently preserved.

Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 22. An argument “is

preserved for appeal when it is brought to the court’s attention and

the court ruled on it.” In re Marriage of Turilli, 2021 COA 151, ¶ 12.

An argument that is not presented to the trial court is deemed

waived. O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Colo. App.

2010).

2. Analysis

¶ 15 The Cordells contend — and we agree — that Hall waived her

right to a jury trial by stipulating to a bench trial. Hall requested a

jury trial in her complaint, but following a pretrial conference, “the

parties agreed to waive the jury [trial] and [to] proceed to a one day

court trial.” A party who demands a jury but proceeds to a court

trial without objection waives the demand for a jury. MacGregor v.

Porter, 354 P.2d 489, 489-90 (Colo. 1960). Because Hall did not

6 provide a transcript of the pretrial hearing as part of the record on

appeal or provide evidence that she objected, we presume that the

findings detailed in the trial management order support the court’s

conclusion that the parties agreed to waive the jury trial. See Love

v. Klosky, 2016 COA 131, ¶ 18, aff’d on other grounds, 2018 CO 20;

Till v. People, 581 P.2d 299, 299 (Colo. 1978) (“In the absence of a

transcript, we will presume that the findings and conclusions of the

trial court are correct, and that the evidence supports the

judgment.”).

¶ 16 The Cordells also argue that while the stipulation established

that the Cordells were negligent, it did not reserve Hall’s right to

further pursue her gross negligence claim. Thus, she “stipulated

away” her right to pursue a jury trial on a claim for gross negligence

and cannot revive her claim.

¶ 17 On appeal, Hall challenges the court’s holding that, as a

matter of law, noneconomic damages are not recoverable for the

death of her dog even when the injury was the result of gross

negligence. Hall raised this argument with the district court

twice — once in her response to the Cordells’ motion for partial

summary judgment and again in her motion for reconsideration.

7 Both times, the court ruled that Hall could not recover

noneconomic damages as a matter of law. Thus, the issue was

preserved.

B. Noneconomic Damages

¶ 18 Hall contends that the court erred by holding that

noneconomic damages are not recoverable for the destruction of

property even under a gross negligence claim because Colorado

courts have implied that these damages are recoverable for willful

and wanton conduct. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 We review de novo a court’s grant of summary judgment, City

& County of Denver v. Monaghan Farms, Inc., 2023 COA 60, ¶ 20,

“as it is ultimately a question of law,” Montoya v. Connolly’s Towing,

Inc., 216 P.3d 98, 103 (Colo. App. 2008). We apply the same

standard as the trial court when determining whether summary

judgment is warranted. Timm v. Reitz, 39 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Colo.

App. 2001). “The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all

favorable inferences that may be drawn from the undisputed facts,

and all doubts as to the existence of a triable issue of fact must be

resolved against the moving party.” A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II

8 Homeowners Ass’n, 114 P.3d 862, 865 (Colo. 2005). We affirm a

court’s grant of summary judgment when the pleadings and

supporting documents demonstrate that there is no genuine

dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Krol v. CF & I Steel, 2013 COA 32,

¶ 11.

¶ 20 Dogs are considered personal property in Colorado. Colo. Dog

Fanciers, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 820 P.2d 644, 653 (Colo.

1991); Thiele v. City & County of Denver, 312 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo.

1957). The measure of damages for the loss or destruction of

personal property ordinarily is its market value, if it has a market

value. State v. Morison, 365 P.2d 266, 272-73 (Colo. 1961),

overruled on other grounds by, Evans v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 482

P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971). This measure of damages applies in the case

of loss or destruction of animals. Id. at 273. Generally, there is no

recovery in tort for noneconomic damages in connection with an

injury to the plaintiff’s property. Anson v. Trujillo, 56 P.3d 114, 120

(Colo. App. 2002).

9 2. Analysis

¶ 21 Hall contends that several Colorado cases have implied that a

party may recover noneconomic damages for emotional distress

when a defendant’s conduct was willful and wanton. And because

noneconomic damages are recoverable, whether the Cordells acted

willfully and wantonly was an issue of material fact that precluded

summary judgment. We disagree.

¶ 22 In support, Hall relies on two cases: Webster v. Boone, 992

P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1999), and Williams v. Continental Airlines,

Inc., 943 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1996).

¶ 23 In Webster, the plaintiffs brought a simple negligence claim

against an adjacent property owner for flooding that damaged the

plaintiffs’ home and their personal property, which included items

that had belonged to the plaintiffs’ deceased children. 992 P.2d at

1184-85. The plaintiffs were awarded economic and noneconomic

damages, including damages for emotional distress. Id. at 1184.

The court concluded that “such damages [we]re not available under

Colorado law.” Id. at 1185. It went on to note that “[i]n the absence

of fraud, malice, or other willful and wanton conduct, there is

10 generally no recovery in tort for mental suffering resulting from

injury to property.” Id.

¶ 24 In Williams, the plaintiff sought to recover noneconomic

damages resulting from injury to his reputation and mental and

emotional suffering caused by his former employer and others, in

part, for negligently investigating an internal complaint against him,

which accused him of rape. 943 P.2d at 15-16. The court rejected

the plaintiff’s request, stating that “simple negligence cannot

provide the basis for the recovery of damages for mental or

emotional suffering . . . . It is only if the conduct can be determined

to be [willful] or wanton that the recovery of such damages is

otherwise authorized.” Id. at 16.

¶ 25 Hall relies on these cases because they imply that

noneconomic damages are recoverable if a defendant acted willfully

and wantonly. But such reliance is misplaced because Webster and

Williams addressed the plaintiffs’ requests for noneconomic

damages based on negligence claims, not gross negligence. In both

cases, the court held that the plaintiffs could not recover for

emotional distress on their negligence claims. Because recovery for

noneconomic damages in Webster and Williams was premised on

11 negligence, the courts never reached the gross negligence issue;

therefore, any statements implying that recovery for property

damage based on willful or wanton conduct is permitted were dicta,

as they had no bearing on the outcome of the decisions. See Yen,

LLC v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2021 COA 107, ¶ 28 (“The

supreme court itself has defined dictum as ‘judicial comment . . .

that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not

precedential.’” (quoting Sullivan v. People, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 21 n.5)).

¶ 26 Hall cites other cases permitting recovery of noneconomic

damages based on willful or wanton conduct, but these cases are

inapplicable because noneconomic damages were not awarded; the

cases involved fraud or malice; or they involved intentional or

reckless infliction of emotional distress, which Hall did not assert.

See, e.g., Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, 364 P.2d 730, 734 (Colo. 1961)

(finding no basis for an award of noneconomic damages when the

trial court found no willful and wanton conduct after the

defendants relocated a ditch and deprived the plaintiff of irrigation

water); Anson, 56 P.3d at 120 (holding that where fraud, malice, or

like motives are the cause of injury to property, damages for mental

suffering may be proper and remanding the case to the district

12 court for determination of noneconomic damages attributable to the

plaintiff’s fraud claim); Chyrar v. Wolf, 21 P.3d 428, 430 (Colo. App.

2000) (noting that sentimental and emotional value of lost or

destroyed property may be considered only in cases involving

intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress).

¶ 27 Hall further contends that the court erred by granting

summary judgment because the Cordells failed to demonstrate that

there was no genuine issue of material fact. The court determined

that, as a matter of law, Hall could not recover noneconomic

damages for destruction of property under Colorado’s current legal

authority. Thus, there was nothing for the Cordells to prove or

disprove as no factual determination was necessary. A court “may

decide a legal question ‘[i]f there is no genuine issue of any material

fact necessary for the determination of the question of law.’”

EnCana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc. v. Miller, 2017 COA 112, ¶ 10 (quoting

C.R.C.P. 56(h)).

¶ 28 As it stands, Colorado law does not permit recovery of

noneconomic damages based on a claim of gross negligence arising

from the loss of a pet or other property. And Hall does not provide

any supporting case law in which courts of this state have awarded

13 emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet under a theory of

gross negligence. Rather, Colorado law limits recoverable damages

for injury to property to the value of the property itself.

Accordingly, the court did not err by granting the Cordells’ motion

for partial summary judgment.

C. Remaining Claims

¶ 29 Hall also asserts that a gross negligence claim permits a party

to recover exemplary damages. However, she did not seek these

damages in the district court. Hall’s response to the motion for

partial summary judgment notes that these damages are

recoverable by statute, but as the district court mentioned in its

order denying Hall’s motion for reconsideration, Hall did not request

or specially plead exemplary damages and that remedy was not

before the court. See Padilla v. Ghuman, 183 P.3d 653, 658 (Colo.

App. 2007) (“A party who seeks damages that are not the usual and

natural consequence of the wrongful act complained of must

specifically plead and prove them.”). We therefore decline to

address this issue because it was unpreserved and is

underdeveloped in Hall’s opening brief. Antolovich v. Brown Grp.

14 Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to

address underdeveloped arguments).

¶ 30 Hall also contends that there are strong public policy reasons

to view pets as more than property. As support, Hall points to

changes in the state’s legislation regarding pets. See, e.g., § 38-12-

106, C.R.S. 2025 (limiting the security deposit and additional

monthly rent landlords can charge tenants for pets); § 35-82-102,

C.R.S. 2025 (permitting health related research facilities to offer

dogs or cats to animal shelters or rescues for adoption before

euthanizing the animal); § 24-1-123, C.R.S. 2025 (developing a

department of agriculture, including a division of animal welfare); §

18-9-202, C.R.S. 2025, (defining cruelty and aggravated cruelty to

animals). To the extent that Hall argues that public policy and the

evolution of our state’s legislation — both as it applies to

noneconomic damages and animal law — favor recovery of

noneconomic damages for injury to a pet, this argument is best

advanced through other branches of our government. See Markwell

v. Cooke, 2021 CO 17, ¶ 30; Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four

Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 38 (Colo. 2000) (“[C]ourts must avoid

15 making decisions that are intrinsically legislative. It is not up to the

court to make policy or to weigh policy.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE BERGER concur.