Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.

947 F. Supp. 1387, 46 Fed. R. Serv. 26, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18960, 1996 WL 730693
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedDecember 18, 1996
DocketCivil 92-182-JO (LEAD), 94-892-JO, 94-903-JO, 94-907-JO, 94-258-JO, 93-589-JO (LEAD), 94-260-JO, 94-765-JO, 94-902-JO, 94-949-JO and 94-1280-JO
StatusPublished
Cited by74 cases

This text of 947 F. Supp. 1387 (Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 46 Fed. R. Serv. 26, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18960, 1996 WL 730693 (D. Or. 1996).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDÉR

ROBERT E. JONES, District Judge:

1. INTRODUCTION

Currently pending in this court are a number of silicone breast implant cases brought by or on behalf of the plaintiffs against various breast implant manufacturers. 1 Plaintiffs seek damages for injuries they claim to have suffered as a result of implantation with silicone gel breast implants.

Among other things, the plaintiffs assert that silicone from the implants has migrated and degraded in their bodies and has caused a systemic syndrome or illness, which they generally refer to as “atypical connective tissue disease” (ACTD). In essence, plaintiffs claim a “unique constellation of symptoms” consisting of hundreds of symptoms commonly experienced by the general population. 2

This opinion addresses the defendants’ motions in limine to exclude testimony by plaintiffs’ experts concerning any causal link between silicone breast implants and the alleged systemic disease - or syndrome. 3 To resolve these motions, the court, in its role as “gatekeeper” (see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (hereinafter Daubert I), initiated proceedings under Federal Rule of Evidence 104. The process through which the court has endeavored to ■ resolve the pending motions, a process the *1392 court believes to be unique in federal practice to date, is described below.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The breast implant cases at issue here were either filed initially in this court or removed from state court. The cases were then transferred to the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 114580, where they have been managed expeditiously under the watchful eye of the transferee judge, Chief Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. In 1995 and 1996, Judge Pointer remanded a number of cases to Oregon for trial.

All breast implant cases remanded to Oregon, federal district court have been assigned to this judge. After a series of status conferences involving all interested parties and counsel, I determined that, at least initially, similar cases should grouped for trial. I designated the following three trial groups:

Plaintiffs Defendants)
Group 1 4 Hall Pope Stern Preskey Baxter
Group 2 5 . Andrews , Johnston Eisele Bentley Tytlar Bristol-Myers Squib
Group 3 6 Shervey Zingarelli Adamson D. Hall Young Mitchel Bristol-Myers and Medical Engineering Corp.

After initial trial dates were set, the court instructed counsel for Groups 1 and 2 to provide a list of all lay and expert witnesses to be called at trial, together with a narrative statement of each witness’ proposed testimony. The court also instructed counsel to summarize each expert witness’ opinion, to identify all the materials upon which each expert would rely for his or her opinions, and to submit transcripts of any testimony given by the witness in similar cases.

Once the witness materials were duly filed, in July 1996, defendants jointly filed a series of motions in limine to exclude plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony concerning causation. 7 To address these motions, I scheduled an integrated hearing under Rule 104(a) on the admissibility of the scientific evidence. All interested parties and counsel were invited to attend the hearing, which I set for August 1996.

In view of the complicated scientific and medical issues involved and in an effort to effectively discharge my role as “gatekeeper” under Daubert I, I invoked my inherent authority as a federal district court judge to appoint independent advisors to the court. 8 See, e.g., Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 37 (2d Cir.1992) (VanGraafeiland, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Scott v. Sponger Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.1962)); see also 1972 Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 702. Pursuant to that inherent authority, I began a search to find technical advisors with the necessary expertise in the fields of epidemiology, immunology/toxicology, rheumatology, *1393 and chemistry to assist in evaluating the reliability and relevance of the scientific evidence. 9 Dr. Richard Jones, M.D., Ph.D., 10 assisted the court by screening dozens of potential appointees and ultimately selecting four totally unbiased and uncommitted experts in the necessary fields, which the court approved and appointed. The technical ad-, visors and their fields of expertise are: Mer-wyn R. Greenlick, Ph.D. (epidemiology); Robert F. Wilkens, M.D. (rheumatology); Mary Stenzel-Poore, Ph.D. (immunology/toxicology); and Ronald McClard, Ph.D. (polymer chemistry). .

With the exception of Dr. McClard, whom I appointed shortly after the initial Rule 104 hearing terminated, the technical advisors reviewed the parties’ voluminous materials in preparation for the hearing and observed most of the testimony in court. After his appointment, Dr. McClard reviewed all of the relevant materials and the videotaped arguments of counsel, and participated in all subsequent proceedings.

I structured the Rule 104 hearing according to subject matter, with plaintiffs presen^ • ing their experts in a particular field, followed by defendants’ witnesses in the same field. All participating parties stipulated to the experts’ qualifications under Rule 702. Because in proceedings pursuant to Rule 104(a) the court is not bound by rules of evidence, except those that pertain to privileges I ruled that no evidentiary objections would be permitted. 11

At the hearing, which spanned four intense days (August 6-8, 1996), 12 experts on both sides were questioned by counsel, the court, and the technical advisors. The parties then submitted videotaped summations, which the court and all technical advisors reviewed. 13

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Bluebook (online)
947 F. Supp. 1387, 46 Fed. R. Serv. 26, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18960, 1996 WL 730693, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hall-v-baxter-healthcare-corp-ord-1996.