Hall v. Allstate Insurance Co.

407 S.W.3d 603, 2012 WL 6129974, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 1549
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 11, 2012
DocketNos. ED 97990, ED 98073
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 407 S.W.3d 603 (Hall v. Allstate Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hall v. Allstate Insurance Co., 407 S.W.3d 603, 2012 WL 6129974, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 1549 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, Presiding Judge.

Allstate Insurance Company appeals the trial court’s ruling permitting the stacking of underinsured motorist benefits under an Allstate policy held by Brian and Alyson Hall. Because we hold that the policy unambiguously prohibits stacking of un-derinsured coverage, we reverse the trial court’s ruling.

Factual and Procedural Background

Brian Hall sustained serious, permanent, progressive, and disabling bodily injuries as a passenger in a motor vehicle that was hit by tortfeasor Lorraine Guth. Mr. Hall and his wife sued Ms. Guth. Ultimately, the parties reached an agreement.1 Ms. Guth agreed to the entry of a judgment holding her liable to the Halls for compensatory damages. The Halls agreed that said judgment would not constitute a judgment lien upon Ms. Guth’s personal assets. The trial court approved the agreement and, after a damages hearing, entered judgment in favor of the Halls and against Ms. Guth in the amount of fifteen million dollars. The Halls, with the approval of their insurance company Allstate, accepted and exhausted Ms. Guth’s policy limits. Mr. Hall, however, sustained damages far exceeding the amount collected.

[606]*606The Halls filed a claim seeking underin-sured motorist coverage provided in a policy of insurance issued to them by Allstate. The policy insured a total of four vehicles owned by the Halls, three of which were insured with underinsured motor coverage. The policy declaration pages listed these three vehicles separately, and listed each vehicle with underinsured motorist coverage limits of $50,000 for each person and $100,000 for each accident. Allstate charged, and the Halls paid, three separate premiums for the underinsured motorist coverage on the three vehicles.

After the Halls filed a declaratory-judgment action, the Halls and Allstate each moved for summary judgment. All agree that Mr. Hall should recover under his underinsured motorist coverage with Allstate. The parties disagree, however, on the amount of coverage the policy affords. The Halls argue that the underinsured coverage for the three vehicles should stack, to provide a total of $150,000 in coverage for Mr. Hall. They contend the policy expressly provides for stacking by virtue of a sentence in the limits-of-liability section, which states that underinsured motorists coverage limits apply to each insured auto shown on the declarations page. Alternatively, they contend that an ambiguity exists by virtue of the “other insurance” provision, and as such, the policy must be construed in their favor to allow stacking of coverage.

Allstate, on the other hand, argues that provisions against combining limits in the general section of the policy, as well as anti-stacking language in the underinsured section of the policy, expressly, uniformly, and unambiguously prohibit stacking. Therefore, in Allstate’s view the total amount recoverable under the policy is $50,000.2

The trial court concluded that the policy afforded underinsured motorist benefits on all three vehicles, and accordingly entered summary judgment in favor of the Halls, and against Allstate, in the amount of $150,000. Allstate appeals.

Standard of Review

The propriety of summary judgment is a question of law, and our standard of review on appeal is essentially de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is proper if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Rule 74.04.

Summary judgment is frequently used in the context of insurance coverage questions. Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Missouri, 992 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Mo.App.E.D.1999). The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that this Court determines de novo. Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Mo. banc 2010).

Insurance Law

Several rules guide our interpretation of insurance policies. The key is whether the policy’s language is ambiguous or unambiguous. Todd v. Missouri United School Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. banc 2007) (citations omit[607]*607ted). In making this determination, we consider the language in light of the meaning that would normally be understood by the layperson who bought and paid for the policy. Ritchie v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Maune, 277 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Mo.App.E.D.2009). Further, we evaluate policies by reading the policy as a whole. Id. We do not evaluate policy provisions in isolation. Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 135.

“Where insurance policies are unambiguous, the rules of construction are inapplicable, and absent a public policy to the contrary, we will enforce the policy as written.” Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. banc 1992). On the other hand, when we find an insurance policy’s language ambiguous, we apply the rules of construction and we will construe the ambiguous provision against the insurer. Id.; Maune, 277 S.W.3d at 758. An ambiguity exists in an insurance policy when, due to duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the words used, the policy is open to differing reasonable constructions. Maune, 277 S.W.3d at 758 (citations omitted). The mere fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of a term or clause in an insurance policy does not give rise to an ambiguity. Thornburgh Insulation, Inc. v. J.W. Terrill, Inc., 236 S.W.3d 651, 655 (Mo.App. E.D.2007). Similarly, we may not “unreasonably distort the language of the policy or exercise inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity when none exists.” Todd, 223 S.W.3d at 163.

The instant dispute involves stacking of underinsured motorist coverage. “‘Stacking’ refers to an insured’s ability to obtain multiple insurance coverage benefits for an injury either from more than one policy, as where the insured has two or more separate vehicles under separate policies, or from multiple coverages provided for within a single policy, as when an insured has one policy which covers more than one vehicle.” Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 135 (quoting Niswonger, 992 S.W.2d at 313).

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407 S.W.3d 603, 2012 WL 6129974, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 1549, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hall-v-allstate-insurance-co-moctapp-2012.