1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CARNEICE KATHRINE HALL- Case No. 21-cv-07770-SI JOHNSON, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 9 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN v. FRANCISCO'S MOTION TO DISMISS 10 COMPLAINT CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 11 FRANCISCO, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 14
12 Defendants.
13 14 Defendant City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) brings the instant motion to dismiss 15 plaintiff’s complaint. Dkt. No. 14 (Motion to Dismiss). Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 16 previously vacated the hearing and decided the motion on the papers. For the reasons stated below, 17 the Court hereby GRANTS CCSF’s motion with leave to amend. 18 19 BACKGROUND 20 Pro se plaintiff, Carneice Katherine Hall-Johnson, is a “negro” woman who suffers from 21 asthma and lives in San Francisco, CA. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1 (Complaint). 22 The complaint names CCSF as a defendant and states: “Mayor's Office of Housing and 23 Community Development, or ("MOHCD") is the asset manager of The City and County of San 24 Francisco Housing Stock FIVE88, located at 588 Mission Bay Blvd N, San Francisco, California 25 94158.” Id. ¶ 3. 26 The complaint alleges Chinatown Community Development Center (“CCDC”), “is an 27 affordable housing community professionally management company that manages FIVE88 1 CCDC is “part of a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance within the meaning of 2 Title VI. Here, Defendants were acting under color of state law when they violated Plaintiff’s 3 constitutional and other federal rights.” Id. 4 On September 22, 2021, Ms. Hall-Johnson received in the mail, and that same day submitted, 5 an application for FIVE88 located at 588 Mission Bay Boulevard North, San Francisco. Id. ¶ 8. 6 Plaintiff attached her proof of income from the Social Security Administration, Supplemental 7 Security Income, including the certification form for Section 42 Tax Credit Program qualification, 8 and submitted the application to FIVE88. Id. FIVE88 allegedly forwarded plaintiff’s information 9 to the Section 42 Tax Credit and LOSP Compliance Department. Id. Plaintiff also alleges FIVE88 10 emailed her inquiring if she received any subsidy. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff replied saying the only subsidy 11 she received was her Social Security Income. Id. ¶ 9. 12 On September 27, 2021, plaintiff alleges she received a letter from FIVE88, stating it could 13 not approve her application for residency because of her social security income. Id. ¶ 10. The next 14 day, plaintiff, with a legal public relations specialist from HCOPP L.L.C., called the CCDC to 15 inquire about the denial of plaintiff’s application, including the denial of the Section 42 Tax Credit 16 Certification and LOSP subsidy. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges a CCDC Manager, Ken, answered the 17 call, and told the HCOPP L.L.C. public relations specialist that plaintiff’s application was denied 18 because she “was disabled, receiving SSI payments, and was black, and only Chinese people, and 19 Chinese speaking people qualified for the Section 42 Tax Credit Program and LOSP subsidy 20 program to participate in housing opportunities, and subsidies at FIVE through Chinatown 21 Community Development Center, and The Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community 22 Development.” Id. ¶ 12. 23 On October 3, 2021, plaintiff filed a housing discrimination claim with the Department of 24 Fair Employment and Housing against CCDC, MOHCD, and the city of San Francisco. Id. ¶ 13. 25 The next day, plaintiff submitted a government claim. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges defendants 26 discriminated against her because of her race and disability, and she is now homeless as a result. Id. 27 ¶¶ 15-16. 1 Doctrine), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 2 1973, the Fair Housing Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1988, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 3 Title VI § 2000, the California Disabled Persons Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54, et seq.), and 42 U.S.C. 4 §§ 1981 and 1982. Id. ¶¶ 17-50. 5 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if 8 it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 9 dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires 11 the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 12 unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened 13 fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 14 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 15 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 16 Court must assume the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in her 17 favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the Court is 18 not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 19 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 21 lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the 22 Court has an obligation to “construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the [plaintiff] the benefit 23 of any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, pro 24 se pleadings must still allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine whether a claim 25 has been stated. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 26 If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. 27 When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally required to provide pro se litigants with 1 be overcome by amendment.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). In 2 determining whether amendment would be futile, the Court examines whether the complaint could 3 be amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without contradicting any of the allegations of 4 [the] original complaint.” Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). Leave to 5 amend should be liberally granted. Id. at 296-97. 6 7 DISCUSSION 8 Defendant CCSF’s motion to dismiss boils down to one argument: plaintiff’s complaint fails 9 as to CCSF because it 10 does not allege … what conduct by any City employees forms the basis of [plaintiff’s] claims against the City Defendant.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CARNEICE KATHRINE HALL- Case No. 21-cv-07770-SI JOHNSON, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 9 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN v. FRANCISCO'S MOTION TO DISMISS 10 COMPLAINT CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 11 FRANCISCO, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 14
12 Defendants.
13 14 Defendant City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) brings the instant motion to dismiss 15 plaintiff’s complaint. Dkt. No. 14 (Motion to Dismiss). Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 16 previously vacated the hearing and decided the motion on the papers. For the reasons stated below, 17 the Court hereby GRANTS CCSF’s motion with leave to amend. 18 19 BACKGROUND 20 Pro se plaintiff, Carneice Katherine Hall-Johnson, is a “negro” woman who suffers from 21 asthma and lives in San Francisco, CA. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1 (Complaint). 22 The complaint names CCSF as a defendant and states: “Mayor's Office of Housing and 23 Community Development, or ("MOHCD") is the asset manager of The City and County of San 24 Francisco Housing Stock FIVE88, located at 588 Mission Bay Blvd N, San Francisco, California 25 94158.” Id. ¶ 3. 26 The complaint alleges Chinatown Community Development Center (“CCDC”), “is an 27 affordable housing community professionally management company that manages FIVE88 1 CCDC is “part of a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance within the meaning of 2 Title VI. Here, Defendants were acting under color of state law when they violated Plaintiff’s 3 constitutional and other federal rights.” Id. 4 On September 22, 2021, Ms. Hall-Johnson received in the mail, and that same day submitted, 5 an application for FIVE88 located at 588 Mission Bay Boulevard North, San Francisco. Id. ¶ 8. 6 Plaintiff attached her proof of income from the Social Security Administration, Supplemental 7 Security Income, including the certification form for Section 42 Tax Credit Program qualification, 8 and submitted the application to FIVE88. Id. FIVE88 allegedly forwarded plaintiff’s information 9 to the Section 42 Tax Credit and LOSP Compliance Department. Id. Plaintiff also alleges FIVE88 10 emailed her inquiring if she received any subsidy. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff replied saying the only subsidy 11 she received was her Social Security Income. Id. ¶ 9. 12 On September 27, 2021, plaintiff alleges she received a letter from FIVE88, stating it could 13 not approve her application for residency because of her social security income. Id. ¶ 10. The next 14 day, plaintiff, with a legal public relations specialist from HCOPP L.L.C., called the CCDC to 15 inquire about the denial of plaintiff’s application, including the denial of the Section 42 Tax Credit 16 Certification and LOSP subsidy. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges a CCDC Manager, Ken, answered the 17 call, and told the HCOPP L.L.C. public relations specialist that plaintiff’s application was denied 18 because she “was disabled, receiving SSI payments, and was black, and only Chinese people, and 19 Chinese speaking people qualified for the Section 42 Tax Credit Program and LOSP subsidy 20 program to participate in housing opportunities, and subsidies at FIVE through Chinatown 21 Community Development Center, and The Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community 22 Development.” Id. ¶ 12. 23 On October 3, 2021, plaintiff filed a housing discrimination claim with the Department of 24 Fair Employment and Housing against CCDC, MOHCD, and the city of San Francisco. Id. ¶ 13. 25 The next day, plaintiff submitted a government claim. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges defendants 26 discriminated against her because of her race and disability, and she is now homeless as a result. Id. 27 ¶¶ 15-16. 1 Doctrine), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 2 1973, the Fair Housing Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1988, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 3 Title VI § 2000, the California Disabled Persons Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54, et seq.), and 42 U.S.C. 4 §§ 1981 and 1982. Id. ¶¶ 17-50. 5 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if 8 it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 9 dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires 11 the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 12 unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened 13 fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 14 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 15 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 16 Court must assume the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in her 17 favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the Court is 18 not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 19 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 21 lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the 22 Court has an obligation to “construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the [plaintiff] the benefit 23 of any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, pro 24 se pleadings must still allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine whether a claim 25 has been stated. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 26 If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. 27 When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally required to provide pro se litigants with 1 be overcome by amendment.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). In 2 determining whether amendment would be futile, the Court examines whether the complaint could 3 be amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without contradicting any of the allegations of 4 [the] original complaint.” Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). Leave to 5 amend should be liberally granted. Id. at 296-97. 6 7 DISCUSSION 8 Defendant CCSF’s motion to dismiss boils down to one argument: plaintiff’s complaint fails 9 as to CCSF because it 10 does not allege … what conduct by any City employees forms the basis of [plaintiff’s] claims against the City Defendant. Plaintiff alleges only that the City Defendant is 11 the asset manager for FIVE88, but does not allege that the City Defendant owns the property. Nor does it allege that the City Defendant is responsible for CCDC or its 12 agents. Furthermore, the Complaint does not allege how the City Defendant was involved with the denial of her application to FIVE88, or how the City Defendant is 13 liable for any purported discriminatory statements made by the CCDC employee in relation to that application. Consequently, the Complaint fails to clearly allege facts 14 that sufficiently establish liability for the City Defendant. 15 Dkt. No. 14 at 6. 16 As currently plead, defendant CCSF is correct, the complaint fails to allege facts establishing 17 CCSF could be liable for race or disability discrimination. Indeed, the complaint does not allege 18 CCSF, or CCSF’s agents, made any improper statements or took any improper actions. Rather, the 19 complaint only alleges the CCDC manager, Ken, made racist and ableist statements. Id. ¶ 12. To 20 survive a motion to dismiss with respect to CCSF, plaintiff must either (1) allege a nexus, or 21 connection, between CCSF and CCDC such that CCSF is liable for the alleged racist and ableist 22 statements and actions of CCDC or (2) allege racist and/or ableist statements made by CCSF 23 employees, representatives, or agents. For example, if plaintiff can allege CCSF owns FIVE88 or 24 that CCDC’s actions can be legally imputed to CCSF, her claims are viable. 25 26 CONCLUSION 27 Defendant CCSF’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED with leave to amend. 1 Failure to timely file an amended complaint will result in the claims against CCSF 2 being dismissed without leave to amend. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 || Dated: February 8, 2022 Site WU tee 7 SUSAN ILLSTON 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 a 12
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