F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
ALFORD M. HALEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-6105 (W. District of Oklahoma) GARY E. GIBSON; DREW (D.C. No. 99-CV-748-C) EDMONDSON; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Alford M. Haley, proceeding pro se, is before this court seeking a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) which he must obtain before he can appeal
the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that an appeal may not be taken from the denial of a §
2254 habeas petition unless the petitioner first obtains a COA). Haley has not
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right; he, therefore,
is not entitled to a COA and his appeal is dismissed. See id. § 2253(c)(2).
Haley was convicted of first degree murder in Oklahoma state court and
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On direct
appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), Haley raised the
following four issues: (1) the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
support his conviction because the testimony of an accomplice was not
corroborated; (2) the state trial court erred when it overruled his objection to a
jury instruction on other crimes evidence; (3) the trial court made erroneous
evidentiary rulings when it allowed testimony of witness intimidation, admitted
handwritten notes written by Haley, and allowed a police officer to read his notes
into the record; and (4) the sentence imposed is excessive. The OCCA issued an
opinion affirming Haley’s conviction and sentence. After exhausting his state
-2- remedies, Haley filed the instant § 2254 habeas petition reasserting the four
claims he raised before the OCCA. 1
The district court assigned Haley’s petition to a United States magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge recommended
that the petition be dismissed. After reviewing Haley’s objections, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, and dismissed
Haley’s petition. 2 The district court also refused to grant Haley a COA.
Haley filed his habeas petition after the April 24, 1996 effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA,
therefore, governs this court’s review of Haley’s claims. Because each of Haley’s
claims has already been addressed by the OCCA on the merits, this court cannot
grant the writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented at trial.” Id. § 2254(d)(2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.
Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
1 The district court liberally construed Haley’s habeas petition as raising constitutional questions.
The district court also denied Haley’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis 2
on appeal and Haley renewed that motion before this court. Haley’s renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied.
-3- Haley first claims that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction. Specifically, Haley asserts that the state failed to prove
that he caused the death of the victim because the only evidence linking him to
the murder was the testimony of his accomplice. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 742
(providing that a defendant cannot be convicted based upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice). Recognizing that Haley’s claim is not cognizable
on habeas review, Johnson v. Turner , 429 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1970), the
district court recharacterized Haley’s claim as a constitutionally-based sufficiency
of the evidence claim that can be raised in a § 2254 petition. See Jackson v.
Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979). On habeas review of sufficiency of the
evidence claims, this court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319.
The Report and Recommendation contains a comprehensive discussion of
the evidence presented at Haley’s trial. This evidence was not limited to the
testimony of Haley’s accomplice, but also included the testimony of eyewitnesses
to the murder. We agree with the district court that the evidence presented at
Haley’s trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient
-4- to support Haley’s conviction. Haley’s sufficiency of the evidence claim,
therefore, lacks merit.
Haley next argues that the trial court erred when it made three separate
evidentiary rulings. “State court rulings on the admissibility of evidence may not
be questioned in federal habeas corpus proceedings unless they render the trial so
fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.”
Brinlee v. Crisp , 608 F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 1979). Haley claims the trial court
erred when it admitted evidence of witness intimidation; allowed the admission
of incriminating, handwritten notes attributed to Haley; and allowed a police
officer to read his notes into the record. Each of these claims was thoroughly
analyzed by the magistrate judge and discussed at length in the Report and
Recommendation and, in the interest of judicial economy, we will not repeat the
magistrate judge’s analysis on each evidentiary issue. We agree with the district
court’s conclusion that Haley has failed to demonstrate how any of the trial
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
ALFORD M. HALEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-6105 (W. District of Oklahoma) GARY E. GIBSON; DREW (D.C. No. 99-CV-748-C) EDMONDSON; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Alford M. Haley, proceeding pro se, is before this court seeking a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) which he must obtain before he can appeal
the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that an appeal may not be taken from the denial of a §
2254 habeas petition unless the petitioner first obtains a COA). Haley has not
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right; he, therefore,
is not entitled to a COA and his appeal is dismissed. See id. § 2253(c)(2).
Haley was convicted of first degree murder in Oklahoma state court and
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On direct
appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), Haley raised the
following four issues: (1) the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
support his conviction because the testimony of an accomplice was not
corroborated; (2) the state trial court erred when it overruled his objection to a
jury instruction on other crimes evidence; (3) the trial court made erroneous
evidentiary rulings when it allowed testimony of witness intimidation, admitted
handwritten notes written by Haley, and allowed a police officer to read his notes
into the record; and (4) the sentence imposed is excessive. The OCCA issued an
opinion affirming Haley’s conviction and sentence. After exhausting his state
-2- remedies, Haley filed the instant § 2254 habeas petition reasserting the four
claims he raised before the OCCA. 1
The district court assigned Haley’s petition to a United States magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge recommended
that the petition be dismissed. After reviewing Haley’s objections, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, and dismissed
Haley’s petition. 2 The district court also refused to grant Haley a COA.
Haley filed his habeas petition after the April 24, 1996 effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA,
therefore, governs this court’s review of Haley’s claims. Because each of Haley’s
claims has already been addressed by the OCCA on the merits, this court cannot
grant the writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented at trial.” Id. § 2254(d)(2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.
Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
1 The district court liberally construed Haley’s habeas petition as raising constitutional questions.
The district court also denied Haley’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis 2
on appeal and Haley renewed that motion before this court. Haley’s renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied.
-3- Haley first claims that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction. Specifically, Haley asserts that the state failed to prove
that he caused the death of the victim because the only evidence linking him to
the murder was the testimony of his accomplice. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 742
(providing that a defendant cannot be convicted based upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice). Recognizing that Haley’s claim is not cognizable
on habeas review, Johnson v. Turner , 429 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1970), the
district court recharacterized Haley’s claim as a constitutionally-based sufficiency
of the evidence claim that can be raised in a § 2254 petition. See Jackson v.
Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979). On habeas review of sufficiency of the
evidence claims, this court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319.
The Report and Recommendation contains a comprehensive discussion of
the evidence presented at Haley’s trial. This evidence was not limited to the
testimony of Haley’s accomplice, but also included the testimony of eyewitnesses
to the murder. We agree with the district court that the evidence presented at
Haley’s trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient
-4- to support Haley’s conviction. Haley’s sufficiency of the evidence claim,
therefore, lacks merit.
Haley next argues that the trial court erred when it made three separate
evidentiary rulings. “State court rulings on the admissibility of evidence may not
be questioned in federal habeas corpus proceedings unless they render the trial so
fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.”
Brinlee v. Crisp , 608 F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 1979). Haley claims the trial court
erred when it admitted evidence of witness intimidation; allowed the admission
of incriminating, handwritten notes attributed to Haley; and allowed a police
officer to read his notes into the record. Each of these claims was thoroughly
analyzed by the magistrate judge and discussed at length in the Report and
Recommendation and, in the interest of judicial economy, we will not repeat the
magistrate judge’s analysis on each evidentiary issue. We agree with the district
court’s conclusion that Haley has failed to demonstrate how any of the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Haley’s
evidentiary’s claims, therefore, are also without merit.
Haley next argues that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on
the limited purpose for which the jury could consider evidence of other crimes
committed by Haley. The district court noted that not only did Haley fail to
object to the jury instruction at trial, but that the instruction of which Haley
-5- complains was submitted by Haley himself. A petitioner who claims the trial
court gave an erroneous jury instruction is not entitled to habeas relief on his
claim when the error complained of resulted from the petitioner’s own conduct in
submitting the instruction. See Parker v. Champion , 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th
Cir. 1998). Even if the invited error doctrine did not apply, Haley is not entitled
to relief on this claim in a § 2254 habeas petition unless the state court’s error
“had the effect of rendering the trial so fundamentally unfair as to cause a denial
of a fair trial in the constitutional sense.” Brinlee, 608 F.2d at 854. This court
agrees with the district court that Haley’s trial was not rendered fundamentally
unfair by the allegedly erroneous instruction. 3
In his final argument, 4 Haley claims the sentence imposed by the trial court
was excessive. If we construe Haley’s claim as a due process challenge to his
sentence, Haley is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim if the sentence
imposed is within the limitations set by statute. See Vasquez v. Cooper , 862 F.2d
3 Haley includes a one-sentence argument in his appellate brief that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the allegedly erroneous jury instruction. This claim was not presented to the district court in Haley’s § 2254 petition and this court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Rhine v. Boone , 182 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
Haley also argues that the district court’s recharacterization of his Motion 4
to Deny Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a reply violated his due process rights. Haley also claims that the denial of a Motion to Order Summary Judgment he filed was fundamentally unfair and violated his due process rights. Haley’s claims are utterly without merit.
-6- 250, 255 (10th Cir. 1988). The crime of which Haley was convicted is
punishable by death, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or life
imprisonment. See Okla Stat. tit. 21, §§ 701.7, 701.9. Haley’s sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is, therefore, clearly within the
statutory limits and his claim is without merit. If Haley’s claim is construed as
an Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence, Haley is likewise not entitled to
relief because his sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the crime he
committed. See Hawkins v. Hargett , 200 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999).
Haley must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right” before he is entitled to a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Haley may make
this showing by demonstrating the issues raised are debatable among jurists, a
court could resolve the issues differently, or that the questions presented deserve
further proceedings. See Slack v. McDaniel , 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1603-04 (2000).
Upon review of the relevant case law, Haley’s appellate brief and his application
for a COA, and the entire record on appeal, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that all of Haley’s claims lack merit and that Haley has failed to
demonstrate that the OCCA’s adjudication of his claims is “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or is
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented at trial.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
-7- This court concludes the issues raised by Haley are not reasonably
debatable, subject to a different resolution on appeal, or deserving of further
proceedings. Haley, therefore, has not made a substantial showing of the denial
of a federal right and he is not entitled to a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
We deny Haley’s application for a COA and dismiss his appeal for substantially
those reasons set out in the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation dated
February 15, 2000 and the district court’s order dated March 7, 2000.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge
-8-