Haley v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedAugust 4, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-00282
StatusUnknown

This text of Haley v. Commissioner of Social Security (Haley v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haley v. Commissioner of Social Security, (N.D. Ind. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DANIELLE R. HALEY,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-282 DRL

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Danielle R. Haley appeals from the Social Security Commissioner’s final judgment denying her disability insurance benefits. Ms. Haley requests remand of her claim for further consideration. Having reviewed the underlying record and the parties’ arguments, the court remands the Commissioner’s decision. BACKGROUND Ms. Haley suffers from a variety of physical and mental health impairments. Her severe physical impairments include Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, fibromyalgia, and obesity [R. 12]. She also suffers from the non-severe physical impairments of diabetes, obstructive sleep apnea, hypothyroidism, and postural orthostatic tachycardia (POTs) [R. 13]. Ms. Haley also suffers from the non-severe mental impairments of anxiety and depression [R. 13]. Ms. Haley filed a Title II application for benefits on April 18, 2017, alleging disability beginning June 1, 2016 [R. 10]. Her application was denied initially on August 22, 2017, and again upon reconsideration on January 4, 2018 [Id.]. Her claims were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in a hearing on February 12, 2019 [Id.]. In an April 2, 2019, decision, the ALJ denied Ms. Haley’s petition on the basis that she could not show that she was disabled as defined by the Social Security Act [R. 7-8, 20]. The ALJ found that Ms. Haley has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with the following limitations: she can frequently reach with both upper extremities and frequently handle and finger with both hands [R. 15]. She can occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, and climb ramps/stairs [Id.]. She can never work at unprotected

heights or around dangerous machinery with moving mechanical parts, and she cannot operate a motor vehicle as part of her work-related duties [Id.]. Additionally, every sixty minutes, the claimant must be allowed to shift positions or alternate between sitting and standing for at least one to two minutes at a time while remaining on task [Id.]. The ALJ found that Ms. Haley could perform her past relevant work as a music teacher, a secondary teacher, and a receptionist [R. 18]. Additionally, the ALJ found that she could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy [R. 20]. This decision became final when the Appeals Council denied Ms. Haley’s request for review [R. 1]. STANDARD The court has authority to review the Council’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); however, review is bound by a strict standard. Because the Council denied review, the court evaluates the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final word. See Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2013). The ALJ’s findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and nonreviewable. See Craft v.

Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is that evidence which “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusions,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), and may well be less than a preponderance of the evidence, Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401). If the ALJ has relied on reasonable evidence and built an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to conclusion,” the decision must stand. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). Even if “reasonable minds could differ” concerning the ALJ’s decision, the court must affirm if the decision has adequate support. Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008)). DISCUSSION When considering a claimant’s eligibility for disability benefits, an ALJ must apply the standard five-step analysis: (1) is the claimant currently employed; (2) is the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments severe; (3) do her impairments meet or exceed any of the specific

impairments listed that the Secretary acknowledges to be so severe as to be conclusively disabling; (4) if the impairment has not been listed as conclusively disabling, given the claimant’s residual function capacity, is the claimant unable to perform her former occupation; (5) is the claimant unable to perform any other work in the national economy given her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992). The claimant bears the burden of proof until step five, when the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant can perform other work in the economy. See Young, 957 F.2d at 389. Ms. Haley challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that she is not totally disabled. She advances a laundry list of arguments that at times overlap. The court addresses two arguments today: her contention that the ALJ erred in considering her subjective symptoms, and her contention that the ALJ didn’t consider her obesity in combination with her other impairments in making an RFC determination.

A. Subjective Symptoms. Ms. Haley says the ALJ erred in analyzing her subjective symptoms, specifically her pain related to Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome (EDS). An ALJ follows a two-step process to evaluate a claimant’s subjective complaints. First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a-b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 3 (Mar. 16, 2016). Second, once the existence of a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms is established, the ALJ evaluates the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they impose work-related functional limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Because an ALJ is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of a witness, the ALJ’s consideration of a claimant’s symptom testimony is entitled to “special deference.” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). If an ALJ’s determination is grounded in the record and he articulates

his analysis of the evidence “at least at a minimum level,” Ray v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted), creating “an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result,” Ribaudo v.

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Craft v. Astrue
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Simila v. Astrue
573 F.3d 503 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Elder v. Astrue
529 F.3d 408 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Mildred Thomas v. Carolyn Colvin
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Schomas v. Colvin
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Haley v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haley-v-commissioner-of-social-security-innd-2021.