UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEEN HALEEM,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 23-1471 (JEB)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Deen Haleem has served in the military for over four decades, most recently as a
Master Sergeant in the U.S. Army Reserves. That role required him to hold a Top Secret security
clearance. After the Department of Defense informed Haleem that it intended to revoke his
clearance, he submitted a Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act request for documents
relating to the revocation. Unhappy with what he received, Haleem commenced this suit in May
2023. Although Plaintiff did not succeed on any of his claims before this Court, he did receive
additional records from the Department of Defense during litigation. He now moves for attorney
fees and costs on the ground that he substantially prevailed in this FOIA suit. While the Court
finds that Haleem is eligible for fees, he has not shown that he is entitled to an award. The Court
will thus deny Plaintiff’s Motion.
I. Background
As past Opinions detail the background of this suit, see, e.g., Haleem v. U.S. Dep’t of
Def., 2025 WL 2097495 (D.D.C. July 25, 2025); Haleem v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 2024 WL 230289
1 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2024), the Court will outline only the facts relevant to the outstanding Motion
for Attorney Fees. In February 2022, DoD notified Haleem of its preliminary decision to revoke
his Top Secret security clearance. See ECF Nos. 30-2 (Pl. Resp. SUMF), ¶¶ 1–2; 1 (Compl.),
¶ 43. Haleem responded with a Privacy Act and FOIA request to U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command (INSCOM) for records relating to the revocation. See ECF No. 29-2 (July
Michael Heaton Declaration), ¶ 3; Pl. Resp. SUMF, ¶ 5. In response, INSCOM released 432
pages to Plaintiff, withheld 113 pages that it claimed satisfied various exemptions under those
statutes, and referred 33 pages to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) for further review.
See July Heaton Decl., ¶¶ 11–12, 16; Pl. Resp. SUMF, ¶ 12. Roughly a year after his initial
request, Haleem submitted another request for the withheld 113 pages and a review of
redactions. See Pl. Resp. SUMF, ¶¶ 17–18, 20. The Department denied the request as
duplicative. Id., ¶ 21.
Unsatisfied with DoD’s disclosures, Haleem filed this suit in May 2023 to recover the
withheld 113 pages and expedite USARC review of the 33 pages. See generally Compl., ¶¶ 78–
141. Defendants — the initial Complaint listed both DoD and the Department of Justice as
parties — then moved to dismiss the claims. See ECF No. 11 (Def. MTD). On January 22,
2024, the Court granted that Motion in part, including dismissing Justice as a party and most
claims against DoD, and denied it in part. Haleem, 2024 WL 230289, at *15. Left outstanding
were claims that: “(a) [T]he Army Intelligence and Security Command’s denial of Plaintiff’s
2023 request violated the Privacy Act, (b) the U.S. Army Reserve Command’s failure to respond
to his [referred] 2022 request violated the Freedom of Information Act, and (c) the Army
Intelligence and Security Command’s denial of his 2023 request violated the Freedom of
Information Act.” ECF No. 17 (Jan. Order) at 1.
2 Both parties then moved for summary judgment on the outstanding issues. See ECF Nos.
29–34. After reviewing the withheld 113 pages in camera, the Court initially ordered the release
of only 17 pages. See ECF No. 39 (Dec. Order). DoD then moved for reconsideration. See ECF
No. 44 (Mot. for Recons.). After additional briefing and a hearing, in which the Department
provided a fuller explanation for the withholding, the Court granted the Motion for
Reconsideration, agreeing that those 17 pages could be withheld as law-enforcement techniques
under Exemption 7(E). See ECF No. 50 (July Order); Haleem, 2025 WL 2097495, at *3.
Although the litigation focused primarily on the 113 withheld pages, there were also the
33 pages seemingly under review by USARC. On August 10, 2023 — four months after this
lawsuit was filed and over a year and a half after the initial FOIA request — INSCOM informed
Haleem that USARC had returned the pages to it without action. See Pl. Resp. SUMF, ¶ 27.
Following receipt of the pages, INSCOM referred them to Central Command for review. Id., ¶
28. Central Command withheld 8 pages and returned the other 25 to INSCOM in early May
2025. Id., ¶ 29; ECF No. 29-4 (Brandon Tegtmeier Declaration), ¶ 6. The 25 pages were
partially released to Haleem on May 21, roughly a year after the filing of this suit and two years
after his initial FOIA request. See Pl. Resp. SUMF, ¶ 30.
Plaintiff now seeks to recover attorney fees for the expense of the litigation.
II. Legal Standard
Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i), a court “may assess against the United States
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in which
the complainant has substantially prevailed” in his FOIA request. See Brayton v. Off. of the U.S.
Trade Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “This language naturally divides the attorney-
fee inquiry into two prongs, which our case law has long described as fee ‘eligibility’ and fee
3 ‘entitlement.’” Id. (quoting Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 470 F.3d 363, 368–69 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)). Complainants are “eligible” for an award if they have “substantially prevailed.” Id.;
Negley v. FBI, 818 F. Supp. 2d 69, 72 (D.D.C. 2011). If the complainant is eligible, the court
must then “consider[] a variety of factors” to determine whether he is “entitled” to fees. Brayton,
641 F.3d at 524–25; see also Davy v. CIA, 550 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (outlining
relevant factors). Finally, if the complainant is both eligible and entitled to fees, the court
proceeds to the final step of “analyz[ing] whether the amount of the fee request is reasonable.”
Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 811 F. Supp. 2d 216, 237 (D.D.C. 2011).
III. Analysis
The Court need look at only eligibility and entitlement to resolve the dispute here.
A. Eligibility
There are two ways for a complainant to substantially prevail. First, he may be
vindicated through a judicial order, written agreement, or consent decree. See 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(I). Second, he may also prevail if the agency voluntarily or unilaterally changes
its position, so long as the claim is not insubstantial. Id., § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II). The parties
seemingly agree that the first avenue is inapplicable here. See ECF Nos. 53-1 (Pl. Fee Mot.) at
5–7; 55 (Def. Fee Mot. Opp.) at 6–7. That makes sense given that the Court ultimately ruled for
Defendant. The outstanding question, therefore, is whether Plaintiff’s filing of the lawsuit led
the agency to change its position with respect to the initial request.
Courts analyze this question under the catalyst test: “[T]he question under the catalyst
theory is whether the ‘institution and prosecution of the litigation caused the agency to release
the documents obtained.’” Grand Canyon Tr. v. Bernhardt, 947 F.3d 94, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(quoting Church of Scientology v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (cleaned up).
4 While “the mere filing of the complaint and the subsequent release of the documents is
insufficient to establish causation,” id. (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 745 F.2d 1476,
1496 (D.C. Cir. 1984)), it is “certainly a salient factor.” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 2009 WL 1743757, at *3 (D.D.C. June 15, 2009). Indicia of causation include
the length of the delay, Harvey v. Lynch, 178 F. Supp. 3d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom.
Harvey v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4220323 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2017), and any justification an agency
might have for inaction. Calypso Cargo Ltd. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2011), aff’d, 2012 WL 10236551 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2012).
While the overall dispute between the parties has involved numerous documents, the suit
sought only the withheld 113 pages and the 33 pages initially referred to USARC. See Compl.,
¶¶ 78–141. Ultimately, only 25 of the latter group were produced. See Pl. Fee Mot. at 2–4; Def.
Fee Mot. Opp. at 8. Haleem nonetheless argues that he has substantially prevailed, as “the
record demonstrates that it was the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint that caused Defendants to
process the request.” Pl. Fee Mot. at 5. Defendant, unsurprisingly, disagrees.
Plaintiff first points out that the documents at issue were produced a considerable amount
of time after the initial request. Id. DoD correctly responds that delay alone is not enough to
establish that litigation caused the document production. See Def. Fee Mot. Opp. at 9. It relies
on Zynovieva v. Deptartment of State, 2023 WL 2755599 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2023), for the
proposition that “some amount of delay in excess of the statutory limit is, regrettably, a common
feature of the FOIA process.” Def. Fee Mot. Opp. at 9 (quoting Zynovieva, 2023 WL 2755599,
at *6). In Zynovieva, however, the delay was just under 150 business days from request to
receipt. See 2023 WL 2755599, at *6. Here, Haleem waited over two years for the final
documents. See Pl. Fee Mot. at 5; Def. Fee Mot. Opp. at 8. While elapsed time alone is not
5 enough to determine that litigation drove the document production, the period here suggests that
litigation likely played a part. See Harvey, 178 F. Supp. at 8 (“[A]n unusually long delay might
give rise to the inference that the agency forgot about, or sought to ignore, a FOIA requester’s
request.”).
Next, Haleem argues that there is “no evidence that Defendant was going to take any
action on [his] request anytime soon prior to the filing of this lawsuit.” Pl. Fee Mot. at 6. DoD
responds that the processing of the initial request — via the referral to USARC — commenced
prior to the lawsuit; furthermore, subsequent processing by USARC did not occur until many
months after facing suit. See Def. Fee Mot. Opp. at 9. Defendant asserts that our situation is
similar to many cases where “[t]he wheels had been set in motion months before [the] suit was
filed,” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2013), and “[d]efendant
has provided a detailed timeline of events leading up to the release of the requested records.”
Calypso Cargo, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
In all those cases, however, the detailed timeline demonstrated that work on the FOIA
request was ongoing. For example, in Calypso Cargo, the defendant provided a detailed
summary of each step of the process: a two-month search for documents, a seventh-month
review of the documents by the legal office, and a final few-week correction and review. Id. at
4–5; see also Am. First Legal Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 2024 WL 5484078, at *3–4
(D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2024), R. & R. adopted as modified, 2025 WL 1276808 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025)
(detailing six different steps department took over a year in responding to FOIA request). Here,
DoD has provided some details on the timeline, but it is a far cry from the level of detail in the
cases upon which it relies. See ECF Nos. 55-1 (Dec. Michael Heaton Declaration), ¶¶ 24–30;
55-2 (Cedrick Lowe Declaration), ¶¶ 7–14; 55-3 (Thomas Adams Declaration), ¶¶ 3–4.
6 Collectively, this information shows an imperfect process replete with “administrative
errors by USARC,” Dec. Heaton Decl., ¶ 27, and mismarked FOIA referrals. See Lowe Decl.,
¶ 10. Notably, USARC provides no explanation of its activities during the ten-month period
from November 1, 2022, to August 10, 2023. See Adams Decl., ¶¶ 3–4. While the wheels of the
FOIA request may have been in motion prior to the filing of the suit, it appears that there was a
roadblock once the request was sent to USARC. That barrier was cleared only after the lawsuit
was filed. As Plaintiff rightly highlights, furthermore, unlike the volume of materials under
review in Calypso Cargo (over 1000 pages), there were only 33 pages at issue here. Considering
the paucity of material, the length of time of review, and the details provided by the Government,
it appears that, on balance, the lawsuit was the catalyst for the processing of the USARC referral.
Defendant nonetheless contends that any production of the USARC documents is
irrelevant to a fee award because “that specific claim was never before this Court.” Def. Fee
Mot. Opp. at 10. Rather, in the Government’s eyes, the only issue the Court considered was the
“non-response from USARC.” Id. at 11. And that claim was dismissed as moot. Id. at 11–12.
This argument misses the forest for the trees. First, Plaintiff’s claim focused on the production
of the USARC documents, not just their delay. Second, the specific claim relating to the 2022
records was dismissed as moot after the production of a portion of those pages. See Haleem v.
U.S. Dep’t of Def., 2024 WL 5159073, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2024), rev’d on other grounds,
2025 WL 2097495 (D.D.C. July 25, 2025); Def. Fee Mot. Opp. at 11–12. The question at issue
here is whether the filing of the lawsuit resulted in the production of any of the documents at
issue in the case. Grand Canyon Tr., 947 F.3d at 97. The balance of the evidence suggests that
the answer is yes. Plaintiff has thus cleared the first bar and demonstrated that he is eligible for
fees.
7 B. Entitlement
As explained above, while a plaintiff might be eligible for attorney fees, that does not
mean that he is entitled to such an award. Brayton, 641 F.3d at 524. Courts in this circuit
consider four factors under the entitlement prong: “(1) [T]he public benefit derived from the
case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the
records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s withholding of the requested documents.”
Davy, 550 F.3d at 1159. Factors 2 and 3 are generally considered together. Id. at 1160;
McKinley v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 739 F.3d 707, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “The sifting of those
criteria over the facts of a case is a matter of district court discretion,” Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep’t
of Just., 965 F.2d 1092, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and “[n]o one factor is dispositive.” Davy, 550
F.3d at 1159. The Court looks at each, combining the second and third.
1. Public Benefit
The greater the public benefit, the more likely it is that Plaintiff will be entitled to fees.
See STS Energy Partners LP v. FERC, 214 F. Supp. 3d 66, 69 (D.D.C. 2016). Haleem advances
two related arguments that the release of these records confers a public benefit. First, he
maintains that there is such a benefit in learning about the soundness of agency actions. See Pl.
Fee Mot. at 8 (“[T]he litigation served a public purpose: ensuring the government complies with
its statutory duties, deterring improper withholding, and holding agencies accountable.”); ECF
No. 56 (Pl. Fee Mot. Reply) at 9 (“Most importantly, ‘courts have repeatedly recognized a public
interest in understanding the thoroughness, fairness, and accuracy of government investigations
and operations.’”) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Def. Counterintelligence & Sec. Agency, 806
F. Supp. 3d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)). Second, Haleem contends that there is a public benefit in
shining light on how the military treats personnel and records. See Pl. Fee Mot. at 8 (“The
8 public would benefit from understanding how members of the military are wrongfully targeted
based on prejudice and racism.”); Pl. Fee Mot. Reply at 10 (“[The lawsuit] shed additional light
on how the Department of War stores records related to security clearances and interacts with
other federal agencies . . . .”).
Defendant responds that there is no public benefit here, primarily because the records are
specific to Haleem. See Def. Fee Mot. Opp. at 16 (“Given how specific these records are to
Haleem, any public benefit in disclosure is virtually nonexistent.”). DoD also argues that the
lawsuit did not reveal systemic deficiencies. Id. at 17 (“The Department fails to see how this
lawsuit could have possibly demonstrated that the Department did not conduct an adequate
search when the Court declined to even consider such a claim.”). Finally, it asserts that the lack
of evidence of public dissemination of the documents undermines the public-benefit claim. Id. at
18.
DoD has the better of this dispute. To begin, Plaintiff’s reliance on New York Times is
misplaced. There, while the data released was “only one data point,” the court found that there
was a public benefit given that the data related to Elon Musk. See 806 F.3d at 452 (“[The data
point] is a significant one, given Musk’s prominence and level of authority.”) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, while Haleem is correct that there is a public
benefit when the release “adds to the fund of knowledge that citizens can use to make informed
political or social decisions,” Pl. Fee Mot. at 8, there is no evidence that the released pages here
will “contribute to the public’s ability to make vital political choices.” Cotton v. Heyman, 63
F.3d 1115, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Perhaps acknowledging the weakness of this argument, Haleem offers another theory in
his Reply, relying on Negley, 818 F. Supp. 2d. See Pl. Fee Mot. Reply at 10. There, the court
9 found that while the documents sought were personal, there was a benefit to citizens “seeking to
find out what their government is up to.” Negley, 818 F. Supp. 2d. at 75. There is no similar
benefit here. In Negley, the litigation discussed previously unidentified databases and provided
information on “how those databases are indexed.” Id. In addition to the novelty of the
information, the court found it especially valuable to the public “given the FBI’s long history of
recalcitrance and grudging compliance with FOIA.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has not proposed, and the Court has not identified, any similar novel findings or
recalcitrance here. Factor 1 thus weighs in Defendant’s favor.
2. Private Incentive
“The second and third factors . . . assess whether a plaintiff has sufficient private
incentive to seek disclosure without attorney’s fees.” Davy, 550 F.3d at 1160 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The private incentive “need not be strictly commercial; any private interest will
do.” Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1095.
Haleem had such a private interest here because he was in the midst of fighting to restore
his security clearance and to understand why it was revoked. See Def. Fee Mot. Opp. at 19
(highlighting examples from Complaint). While he states that “personal interest was but one
factor in seeking the documents,” he does not point to what those other factors might be. See Pl.
Fee Mot. at 10. Additionally, given that there is not a public benefit, there is no need to assess
whether public and private benefits are intertwined. See Playboy Enters. v. U.S. Customs Serv.,
959 F. Supp 11, 16 (D.D.C. 1997). Without the former, only the latter benefits remain. Factors 2
and 3 thus weigh in favor of DoD.
10 3. Reasonableness of Withholding
“The fourth factor considers whether the agency’s opposition to disclosure had a
reasonable basis in law and whether the agency had not been recalcitrant in its opposition to a
valid claim or otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior.” Davy, 550 F.3d at 1162 (cleaned up).
Plaintiff does not spend much time with the fourth factor, as he rightly notes that the
burden rests with Defendant. See Pl. Fee. Mot. at 10; Davy, 550 F.3d at 1163 (“The question
is . . . whether the agency has shown that it had any colorable or reasonable basis for not
disclosing the material until after [Plaintiff] filed suit.”). What ink Plaintiff does spill mostly
recounts the delay in receiving any documents. See Pl. Fee Mot. at 10; Pl. Fee Mot. Reply at 11–
12. DoD, on the other hand, primarily focuses on the 113-page request and does not address the
25 pages ultimately released. See Def. Fee Mot. Opp. at 21–22. Yet the latter pages are the only
ones at issue in this fee Motion. Without any real defense position here, the last factor lands in
Haleem’s column.
* * *
While Defendant’s withholding may have been unreasonable, that is outweighed by
Plaintiff’s substantial private interest in bringing this suit and the absence of a resulting public
benefit. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees.
IV. Conclusion
While the Court finds Plaintiff eligible for attorney fees, he has not shown that he is
entitled to an award. As such, the Court will issue a contemporaneous Order denying Plaintiff’s
Motion.
11 /s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: March 2, 2026