Haleck v. TRT, Inc.

7 Am. Samoa 3d 133
CourtHigh Court of American Samoa
DecidedJune 27, 2003
DocketCA No. 20-02
StatusPublished

This text of 7 Am. Samoa 3d 133 (Haleck v. TRT, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering High Court of American Samoa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haleck v. TRT, Inc., 7 Am. Samoa 3d 133 (amsamoa 2003).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL FROM REPRESENTING BOTH CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

The Plaintiffs, shareholders of Defendant TRT, Inc. (“TRT”), brought a shareholder’s derivative suit alleging, inter alia, that Defendant Agaoleatu Tautolo (“Agaoleatu”), a director of both TRT and Defendant American Samoa 2000, Inc. (“AS2000”), breached his fiduciary duty to [135]*135the corporations.1 They now move to disqualify the attorneys from representing both the corporations and the individual defendants, as directors of the corporations.

I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of this motion a little background is needed. Count four in Plaintiffs’ complaint is directed to Agaoleatu, for alleged breach of his fiduciary duty as a director of TRT and AS2000 and as the controlling officer of TRT. Defendants themselves concede, perhaps unintentionally, that count four alleges that Agaoleatu “engaged in self-dealing, which implicates [his] duty of loyalty.” (See Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 4) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the same attorneys represent all Defendants: the two corporations, TRT and AS2000, and the four individual directors, Agaoleatu, Agaese Ace Tago, Murray R. Drake, and Raymie P. Snow.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert that the attorneys of record should be disqualified from representing the corporations because the interests of the corporations and the individual Defendants are inherently adverse. They do not object, however, to the attorneys continuing representation of the individual directors. Defendants counter that there is no conflict of interest and that their attorneys should be allowed to stay on the case. They make other arguments, which we will address below.

In American Samoa, the conduct of attorneys is governed by the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See H.C.R. 104. We must look to those rules to determine whether a conflict exists. Representation of corporations is dealt with in Rule 1.13, which states, inter alia, “[a] lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers; employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of rule 1.7.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(e). This section, however, addresses lawsuits by third parties against the listed individuals. Derivative actions present a more'complicated matter.

Derivative actions are actions brought by shareholders on behalf of the corporation, not individually. See In re Oracle Secs. Litigations, 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The corporation, “[although [136]*136named a defendant, ... is the real party in interest, the stockholder being at best the nominal plaintiff.” Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970). In some cases, shareholders will seek relief for minor corporate violations, such as mismanagement. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1316 (3d Cir. 1993). On the other hand, at times, shareholders may level serious charges against directors of the corporation such as fraud or self-dealing. See id. An attorney’s role in such situations is contemplated by the Model Rules:

The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend [an action to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations-otherwise known as a derivative action]. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer’s client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization’s affairs, to be defended by the organization’s lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer’s duty to the organization and the lawyer’s relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(e), cmt. 12 (emphasis added).

Rule 1.7, in turn, provides:

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation,

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7.

The overwhelming majority of courts which have analyzed this issue have taken the commentary of Rule 1.13 to heart, and have required disqualification under Rule 1.7, where at the very least, the shareholders put forth a claim of serious wrongdoing. See generally Bell Atl. Corp., 2 [137]*137F.3d 1304; Musheno v. Gensemer, 897 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pa. 1995); In re Oracle, 829 F. Supp. 1176; Messing v. FDI, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 776, 782 (D.N.J. 1977); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Co., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N. D. Ill. 1975); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Rogers v. Virgin Land, Inc., 1996 W.L. 493174 (D.V.I.); Forrest v. Baeza, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (1997); Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975); Tydings v. Berk Enterprises, 565 A.2d 390 (Md. App. 1989); Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1959).2

As the defendants concede, count four of the complaint puts forth a serious charge of self-dealing and breach of duty of loyalty, raising the concerns of conflict and warranting disqualification. One possible exception to this disqualification arises when a case is “patently frivolous.” See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1317. At this stage, however, having already denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, it is clear that the lawsuit is not frivolous.

Defendants have cited only two cases in support of their position. The first is an unpublished appellate decision from Hawaii, Retotal v. Hawaii Ballroom Dance Ass ’n, 2002 Haw. App. LEXIS 34, which relies wholly on Defendants’ second case, Robinson v. Snell’s Limbs and Braces of New Orleans, Inc., 538 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 1989). Such dearth of authority is not convincing. Moreover, in Retotal, the derivative action sought only an accounting, which standing alone does not constitute a “serious” allegation warranting dismissal under even the majority rule.

Defendants argue three other points of contention.

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Related

Ross v. Bernhard
396 U.S. 531 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Robinson v. Snell's Limbs and Braces of New Orleans, Inc.
538 So. 2d 1045 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1989)
Cannon v. US Acoustics Corporation
398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Illinois, 1975)
Musheno v. Gensemer
897 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1995)
Tydings v. Berk Enterprises
565 A.2d 390 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1989)
Messing v. FDI, Inc.
439 F. Supp. 776 (D. New Jersey, 1977)
Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa
230 N.W.2d 905 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1975)
In Re Oracle Securities Litigation
829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. California, 1993)
Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Company
218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. New York, 1963)
Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc.
9 A.D.2d 760 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1959)

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Bluebook (online)
7 Am. Samoa 3d 133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haleck-v-trt-inc-amsamoa-2003.