UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEPHEN HALE,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-3389 (ACR) v.
YMCA OF METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Stephen Hale brings this employment discrimination action under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Defendant YMCA of Metropolitan Washington. This matter
is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for improper venue. Dkt. 6. For the
reasons that follow, the Court TRANSFERS this case to the Eastern District of Virginia and
DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked for Defendant from February 18, 2020, through June 30, 2023, at the
Fairfax County YMCA in Reston, Virginia. Dkt. 1 ¶ 10–11, 13. On June 30, 2023, two of
Defendant’s employees terminated Plaintiff from his position as Associate Executive Director of
the Fairfax County YMCA because he had enrolled his two children in YMCA preschool
services for free and permitted other employees to enroll their children in YMCA programs for
free. Id. ¶¶ 17–18; Dkt. 7 at 3. Defendant contends Plaintiff tried to conceal those actions. Dkt.
1 ¶ 18. But Plaintiff claims that, far from hiding his actions, his supervisor was fully aware that
he had enrolled his children without paying tuition. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. Plaintiff, who is a white man, id. ¶ 12, alleges that black employees and women working for Defendant routinely enrolled their
children in YMCA services “at no cost or significantly reduced cost” and faced no discipline, id.
¶¶ 27–34. He claims Defendant discriminated against him based on his race and sex, and that
Defendant terminated his employment at YMCA “under the pretext that he failed to comply with
YMCA’s policy without consent and approval of YMCA’s management.” Id. ¶ 58.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on September
24, 2025. Id. ¶ 1. On November 5, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for improper venue under the venue selection provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3). Dkt. 6. Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendant’s Motion on November 11,
2025, and requested that the Court transfer this case to the Eastern District of Virginia in lieu of
dismissal. Dkt. 8 at 1. Defendant argues that dismissal, not transfer, is in the interest of justice
because Plaintiff and his attorney should have filed this case in the correct venue. Dkt. 9 at 3–4.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3),
the Court must accept the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
2215 Fifth Street Assocs., LP v. U-Haul Int’l, 148 F. Supp. 2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2001). But the
Court does not need to accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 2215 Fifth Street Assocs.,
LP, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 54. To succeed under a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the moving
party must present facts that will defeat the plaintiff’s assertion of venue. Id.
Title VII includes a specific venue provision which permits plaintiffs to bring Title VII
actions (1) “in any judicial district in the State where the unlawful employment practice is
alleged to have been committed,” (2) in the judicial district where “the employment records
2 relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or (3) in the judicial district where
“the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). If the respondent cannot be found in the above districts, then a
plaintiff may bring a Title VII action in (4) “the judicial district in which the respondent has his
principal office.” Id. The plaintiff holds the burden of establishing that venue is proper.
McLaughlin v. Holder, 864 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137 (D.D.C. 2012).
When a plaintiff files their action in the wrong venue, courts shall “dismiss, or if it be in
the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The decision about whether to dismiss or transfer a case in the
interest of justice rests within the discretion of the court. Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722
F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983). “Generally, the ‘interest of justice’ requires courts to transfer
cases to the appropriate judicial district, rather than dismiss them.” Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, 231 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463,
466–67 (1962); James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 16, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2002).
This is especially true where dismissal would deprive a plaintiff of the opportunity to obtain
relief because the statute of limitations would bar any subsequent action. Ebron v. Dep’t. of the
Army, 766 F. Supp. 2d 54, 58–59 (D.D.C. 2011).
3 III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that venue is improper in this Court because the District of Columbia
does not satisfy any of the venue options in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Dkt. 7 at 4. The Court
agrees.
To begin, the relevant events underlying Plaintiff’s claims did not occur here. Plaintiff
worked in Reston, Virginia, for three years. Dkt. 1 ¶ 13. Defendant investigated Plaintiff’s
conduct in Virginia and terminated his employment there. Dkt. 7-1 at 2; Dkt. 7 at 4. Plaintiff
does not dispute any of these facts. Nor does he dispute that, but for the alleged unlawful
employment practice, he would have continued working in Virginia rather than in the District of
Columbia. Id. at 6; Dkt. 7-1 at 2; see generally Dkt. 8. Accordingly, under both the first and
third venue options in § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia. 1
The same is true under the Statute’s second venue option. The parties dispute where
Plaintiff’s employment records are maintained and administered. Plaintiff asserts he “had a
reasonable belief” that his records were maintained and administered in the District of Columbia.
Dkt. 8 at 4. Defendant, however, has submitted a declaration from its Senior Vice President of
Human Resources stating that Plaintiff’s employment records are maintained and administered in
Virginia. Dkt. 7-1 at 2. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Indeed, he acknowledges
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEPHEN HALE,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-3389 (ACR) v.
YMCA OF METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Stephen Hale brings this employment discrimination action under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Defendant YMCA of Metropolitan Washington. This matter
is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for improper venue. Dkt. 6. For the
reasons that follow, the Court TRANSFERS this case to the Eastern District of Virginia and
DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked for Defendant from February 18, 2020, through June 30, 2023, at the
Fairfax County YMCA in Reston, Virginia. Dkt. 1 ¶ 10–11, 13. On June 30, 2023, two of
Defendant’s employees terminated Plaintiff from his position as Associate Executive Director of
the Fairfax County YMCA because he had enrolled his two children in YMCA preschool
services for free and permitted other employees to enroll their children in YMCA programs for
free. Id. ¶¶ 17–18; Dkt. 7 at 3. Defendant contends Plaintiff tried to conceal those actions. Dkt.
1 ¶ 18. But Plaintiff claims that, far from hiding his actions, his supervisor was fully aware that
he had enrolled his children without paying tuition. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. Plaintiff, who is a white man, id. ¶ 12, alleges that black employees and women working for Defendant routinely enrolled their
children in YMCA services “at no cost or significantly reduced cost” and faced no discipline, id.
¶¶ 27–34. He claims Defendant discriminated against him based on his race and sex, and that
Defendant terminated his employment at YMCA “under the pretext that he failed to comply with
YMCA’s policy without consent and approval of YMCA’s management.” Id. ¶ 58.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on September
24, 2025. Id. ¶ 1. On November 5, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for improper venue under the venue selection provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3). Dkt. 6. Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendant’s Motion on November 11,
2025, and requested that the Court transfer this case to the Eastern District of Virginia in lieu of
dismissal. Dkt. 8 at 1. Defendant argues that dismissal, not transfer, is in the interest of justice
because Plaintiff and his attorney should have filed this case in the correct venue. Dkt. 9 at 3–4.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3),
the Court must accept the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
2215 Fifth Street Assocs., LP v. U-Haul Int’l, 148 F. Supp. 2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2001). But the
Court does not need to accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 2215 Fifth Street Assocs.,
LP, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 54. To succeed under a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the moving
party must present facts that will defeat the plaintiff’s assertion of venue. Id.
Title VII includes a specific venue provision which permits plaintiffs to bring Title VII
actions (1) “in any judicial district in the State where the unlawful employment practice is
alleged to have been committed,” (2) in the judicial district where “the employment records
2 relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or (3) in the judicial district where
“the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). If the respondent cannot be found in the above districts, then a
plaintiff may bring a Title VII action in (4) “the judicial district in which the respondent has his
principal office.” Id. The plaintiff holds the burden of establishing that venue is proper.
McLaughlin v. Holder, 864 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137 (D.D.C. 2012).
When a plaintiff files their action in the wrong venue, courts shall “dismiss, or if it be in
the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The decision about whether to dismiss or transfer a case in the
interest of justice rests within the discretion of the court. Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722
F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983). “Generally, the ‘interest of justice’ requires courts to transfer
cases to the appropriate judicial district, rather than dismiss them.” Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, 231 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463,
466–67 (1962); James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 16, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2002).
This is especially true where dismissal would deprive a plaintiff of the opportunity to obtain
relief because the statute of limitations would bar any subsequent action. Ebron v. Dep’t. of the
Army, 766 F. Supp. 2d 54, 58–59 (D.D.C. 2011).
3 III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that venue is improper in this Court because the District of Columbia
does not satisfy any of the venue options in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Dkt. 7 at 4. The Court
agrees.
To begin, the relevant events underlying Plaintiff’s claims did not occur here. Plaintiff
worked in Reston, Virginia, for three years. Dkt. 1 ¶ 13. Defendant investigated Plaintiff’s
conduct in Virginia and terminated his employment there. Dkt. 7-1 at 2; Dkt. 7 at 4. Plaintiff
does not dispute any of these facts. Nor does he dispute that, but for the alleged unlawful
employment practice, he would have continued working in Virginia rather than in the District of
Columbia. Id. at 6; Dkt. 7-1 at 2; see generally Dkt. 8. Accordingly, under both the first and
third venue options in § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia. 1
The same is true under the Statute’s second venue option. The parties dispute where
Plaintiff’s employment records are maintained and administered. Plaintiff asserts he “had a
reasonable belief” that his records were maintained and administered in the District of Columbia.
Dkt. 8 at 4. Defendant, however, has submitted a declaration from its Senior Vice President of
Human Resources stating that Plaintiff’s employment records are maintained and administered in
Virginia. Dkt. 7-1 at 2. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Indeed, he acknowledges
that “[t]o the extent the Defendant has established that the relevant employment records were
maintained and [administered] in . . . Virginia, the appropriate action is not to dismiss the case
based upon the Plaintiff’s honest mistake but rather to transfer the case in the interests of justice
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.” Dkt. 8 at 4.
1 The fourth option in § 2000e-5(f)(3) is inapplicable in this case because Defendant can be found in Virginia. Dkt. 7 at 6. 4 While the parties appear to agree that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia,
they disagree on whether the Court should dismiss or transfer this case under § 1406(a). Id. at 5;
Dkt. 9 at 1–2. The Court concludes that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this case.
Plaintiff had 90 days from July 10, 2025, to file suit after receiving his right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC. Dkt. 8-3 at 1–4. Because more than 90 days have passed, dismissal would
effectively bar Plaintiff from refiling his claims in the proper venue. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s decision to file in the District of Columbia “was a strategic litigation decision to
attempt to forum shop. This decision was based on a guess with almost no factual basis that the Y
maintained his personnel records in D.C. and driven by the apparent desire to litigate in D.C.
instead of Virginia.” Dkt. 9 at 1.
The record, however, does not support the severe sanction of dismissal. Plaintiff
submitted a declaration stating he believed, in good faith, that venue was proper in the District of
Columbia because he believed employment records were “managed by YMCA’s Human
Resources staff and leadership located in Washington, DC, at the YMCA headquarters.” Dkt. 8-1
at 2. Plaintiff also filed this action within 90 days, which demonstrates he acted diligently in
pursuing his claims. See Sanchez v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2009). Under
these circumstances, the Court sees no reason to penalize Plaintiff by dismissing his case.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the interests of justice favor transfer rather than dismissal. See
id.
5 IV. CONCLUSION
Because venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Court TRANSFERS this
case to the Eastern District of Virginia and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as moot. A
separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this day.
Date: June 10, 2026 _________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge