Hale v. Collis
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MATTHEW HALE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 21-1469 (JEB)
BUREAU OF PRISONS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Matthew Hale filed this pro se action that sets forth constitutional and statutory claims against the Federal Bureau of Prisons and one of its employees. The Court previously dismissed Hale’s case in part, leaving BOP as the sole Defendant and allowing only the causes of action related to freedom of speech to proceed. BOP now moves to transfer venue to the district where Hale is currently incarcerated — the Southern District of Illinois. The Court will grant the Motion. I. Background Hale, a member of the World Church of the Creator, or “Creativity,” is no stranger to the judicial system. As previously outlined by the Court, this action is yet another attempt to overcome BOP’s restrictions placed on him, including ones that deny him a Creativity-mandated diet and, as is significant here, reject all of his correspondence that mentions Creativity. See Hale v. Collis, No. 21-1469, 2022 WL 3016747, at *2 (D.D.C. July 29, 2022).
In July 2020, BOP transferred Hale from a Colorado facility to USP Marion in Illinois, where he is housed in a Communications Management Unit (CMU). See ECF No. 12-3, Exh. 2 (Inmate History). There, all of Hale’s phone calls and letters are closely monitored by an
intelligence analyst with BOP’s Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU). Hale, 2022 WL 3016747, at *2. When an analyst believes that a communication could pose a safety threat either inside or outside the prison, she recommends that the on-site warden block it. Id. According to Hale, the Warden at USP Marion continues to block all his letters — both incoming and outgoing — that mention Creativity and other writings that he claims are unrelated to the group. Those writings include a draft for a new book and several “articles about current affairs.” ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 9–12, 14–18.
Hale brought this action against BOP, the CTU, and analyst Michael Collis, alleging a series of claims relating to both his religious exercise and right to free speech. Id., ¶¶ 8–33; see also Hale, 2022 WL 3016747, at *3. Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. Hale, 2022 WL 3016747, at *11. The Court dismissed both Collis and the CTU as Defendants, as well as Hale’s causes of action related to religious exercise, but it allowed the free-speech claims to proceed against BOP. Id. The extant claims allege that BOP violated the First Amendment by (1) rejecting all correspondence mentioning Creativity; (2) pretextually rejecting correspondence that has nothing to do with Creativity; and (3) refusing to allow him to publish his book and articles. Id. at *3, *11. BOP, as the remaining Defendant, now moves to transfer venue to the Southern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See ECF No. 43 (Mot.) at 1. II. Legal Standard Even if a plaintiff has brought its case in a proper venue, a case may be transferred to any other district where the case might have been brought for “the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). District courts have “discretion . . . to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of
convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
To warrant transfer of venue under § 1404(a), BOP must first show that Hale could originally have brought the case in the Southern District of Illinois. See Treppel v. Reason, 793 F. Supp. 2d 429, 435 (D.D.C. 2011). Second, Defendant must establish that “considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer . . . .” Sierra Club v. Flowers, 276 F. Supp. 2d 62, 65 (D.D.C 2003). The second inquiry requires that a court balance a number of case-specific factors relating to the public and private interests at stake. See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29. III. Analysis The Court addresses this two-step analysis in . . . two steps.
A. Original Venue BOP asserts that transferring the case to the Southern District of Illinois is appropriate because it could have been filed there initially. Where the defendant in a civil action is an agency of the United States, venue is appropriate in “any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . , or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1); see also id. (applying to officers or employees of these agencies).
As Hale resides in Southern Illinois and no real property is involved, venue is proper there. The first requirement of a § 1404(a) transfer is thus satisfied.
B. Case-Specific Factors The Court next moves to the private- and public-interest factors under § 1404(a). “Those private-interest factors include: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s choice of
forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.” Douglas v. Chariots for Hire, 918 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted). “The public-interest factors include: (1) the transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the transferor and transferee courts; and (3) the local interest in having local controversies decided at home.” Id. (citation omitted).
1. Private-Interest Factors To streamline its analysis, the Court will discuss the first three private-interest factors separately and the last three together.
a. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum While courts generally defer to a plaintiff’s choice of forum, deference is not always warranted “where the plaintiff’s choice of forum has no meaningful ties to the controversy,” and where transfer is sought “to [a] forum with which [the] plaintiff[] ha[s] substantial ties and where the subject matter of the lawsuit is connected.” Ngonga v. Sessions, 318 F. Supp. 3d 270, 275 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Jimenez v. R&D Masonry, Inc., No. 15-1255, 2015 WL 7428533, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2015)). “Indeed, when the forum preferred by the plaintiff is not his home forum, and the defendant prefers the plaintiff’s home forum, there is little reason to defer to the plaintiff’s preference.” Id. (quoting Jimenez, 2015 WL 7428533, at *3).
Such is the case here. Hale makes clear that he would like to litigate this case in Washington. See ECF No. 45 (Pl. Opp.) at 1–3. That, however, is not his home forum, as he has been incarcerated since July 2020 at USP Marion, located within the Southern District of Illinois. The subject matter of his lawsuit, moreover, is connected to the transferee district, as that is where the challenged mail restriction occurred. See Ngonga, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 275; see also
White v. Hill, No. 21-2348, 2021 WL 8055764, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2021) (allowing transfer in challenge to BOP mail-restriction policies). Hale’s choice of forum, therefore, weighs only slightly against transfer.
b. Defendant’s Choice of Forum A defendant’s choice of forum is relevant in deciding a § 1404(a) motion, but it is “not ordinarily entitled to deference.” Tower Labs, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 3d at 326. While BOP’s choice may weigh in favor of transfer, the remaining private-interest factors — those relating to convenience and justice — are more significant. Id. (noting these factors overcome slight deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum).
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