Halbert v. Yousif

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: January 20, 2000
• Docket: 98-1805
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0031P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0031p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

;  In Re: SAMI YOUSIF,  Debtor.  ________________________  No. 98-1805

 TODD M. HALBERT, > Plaintiff-Appellant,     v.   SAMI YOUSIF; SANA YOUSIF; FLORENCE TANNERS,   Defendants-Appellees.  INCORPORATED,

 1

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. Nos. 97-75047; 97-75048—Julian A. Cook, Jr., District Judge. Argued: October 29, 1999 Decided and Filed: January 20, 2000 Before: WELLFORD, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

1 2 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 19

_________________ that enables a court of appeals to determine whether the district court’s order is a final and appealable order without COUNSEL having first to reach the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, I think that we should adopt “the prevailing view that courts of ARGUED: Todd M. Halbert, Southfield, Michigan, for appeals lack jurisdiction over appeals from orders of district Appellant. John D. Hertzberg, Southfield, Michigan, for courts remanding for significant further proceedings in Appellees. ON BRIEF: Todd M. Halbert, Southfield, bankruptcy courts.” Dicola v. American Steamship Owners Michigan, for Appellant. John D. Hertzberg, Southfield, Mut. Protection and Indem. Ass’n, Inc. (In re Prudential Michigan, for Appellees. Lines, Inc.), 59 F.3d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted); see also In re Lopez, 116 F.3d at 1192 (“[A] WELLFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in decision by the district court on appeal remanding the which GILMAN, J., joined. MOORE, J. (pp. 13-19), bankruptcy court’s decision for further proceedings in the delivered a separate concurring opinion. bankruptcy court is not final, and so is not appealable to this court, unless the further proceedings contemplated are of a _________________ purely ministerial character.”). In the present case, the district OPINION court affirmed much of the bankruptcy court’s decision, but _________________ it remanded the case to the bankruptcy court so that the bankruptcy court could make further factual findings to HARRY W. WELLFORD, Circuit Judge. Todd M. support its conclusion that Halbert violated the disclosure Halbert, a Michigan attorney representing himself on this requirements of § 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b). appeal as he did in the district court, takes appeals from Halbert, 225 B.R. at 354-58. Because the district court’s denials of his applications for attorney fees with respect to order remanding the case for further factual findings two separate bankruptcy cases, one involving Sami and Sana contemplates significant further proceedings in the Yousif and the other involving the corporation controlled by bankruptcy court, I do not believe that the district court’s the Yousifs, Florence Tanners, Incorporated (“Tanners”). The order should properly have qualified as a final order within Yousifs and Tanners filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases and the meaning of § 158(d), and thus the district court could not were represented before and after these filings by Halbert. properly certify that it had issued a final judgment of a Ultimately, after protracted proceedings, the bankruptcy court separate claim pursuant to Rule 54(b). issued an opinion denying the requested fees based on what the court perceived as a “systematic” pattern of impropriety I concur in the judgment of the majority because I believe on Halbert’s part, involving transfers of merchandise to the that we do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s attorney from the debtors and allegations of preferential order denying Halbert’s fee application in the Tanners’ payments and transfers. bankruptcy case.

Debtors claim that Halbert was not qualified under bankruptcy law and rules to serve as counsel in the Chapter 11 proceedings, and that transfers of merchandise to Halbert had occurred during the 90-day period before the filings and constituted preferential transfers under § 547(b) of the Code. In one opinion of the bankruptcy court, appealed to the 18 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 3

from Tanners within the ninety-day preference period, Halbert district court and essentially affirmed, at least in part, the became ineligible to serve as its attorney, at least in the former found that some antecedent debt was satisfied by the absence of curative measures which did not occur here.” transfer at issue, disqualifying Halbert. We have found that Halbert v. Yousif, 225 B.R. 336, 344 (E.D. Mich. 1998). The there is a serious jurisdictional question in these cases district court, however, also vacated the bankruptcy court’s consolidated for appeal and asked the parties to address the determination that Halbert had violated the disclosure issue at oral argument. See Millers Cove Energy Co. v. requirements set forth in § 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule Moore (In re Millers Cove Energy Co.), 128 F.3d 449, 450 2016(b), remanding this issue to the bankruptcy court for (6th Cir. 1997) (“‘Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be further factual findings. Halbert, 225 B.R. at 354-58. conferred on federal courts by consent of the parties. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction, moreover, is an issue If we were to decide on appeal that Halbert’s fee that may be raised at any time, by any party, or even sua application was properly denied on grounds that he was not a sponte by the court itself.’”) (quoting Ford v. Hamilton Invs., disinterested person within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 257 (6th Cir. 1994)). § 327(a), then the issue involving Halbert’s compliance with the disclosure requirements of § 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule We have jurisdiction to entertain orders and judgments that 2016(b), like the issue involving the fraudulent release in effectively and finally dispose of all claims presented to the Gardner, becomes non-dispositive. See, e.g., Halbert, 225 district court. This requirement is referred to as the final B.R. at 356-57 (“Violations of the disclosure and judgment rule, embodied principally in 28 U.S.C. § 1291: disinterestedness rules are independent of each other, “The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals although the remedies for each are similar.”). If, on the other from all final decisions of the district courts. . . .” In the hand, we were to decide to reverse the bankruptcy court’s dispute before us, each bankruptcy case retained its separate determination that Halbert was not a disinterested person, identity, although the appeals from the separate orders or then the issue involving the disclosure requirements of judgments were consolidated for purposes of briefing and § 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) would become a argument; the cases of the Yousifs and Tanners were treated “central, determinative issue underlying [the] dispute.” In re separately by the bankruptcy court and subsequently by the Gardner, 810 F.2d at 92. This example illustrates the district court. concerns that I have about the approach that we articulated in Gardner: this approach may require the court of appeals to I. THE YOUSIF APPEAL decide the merits of the issue that has been decided by the district court before it can determine whether the issue that The district court made the following findings pertinent to has been remanded by the district court for further factual the Yousifs’ bankruptcy appeal: findings by the bankruptcy court is central to the outcome of the case. Halbert submits that this Court should enter a summary judgment in his favor and against the Yousifs because the If we were to follow the approach that this court articulated Bankruptcy Court did not cite any law and found no facts in Gardner, then I believe that we would be forced to reach upon which to support its denial of his request for the merits of the district court’s decision before we could attorney fees relating to services rendered in the Yousifs’ determine whether the district court’s order denying Halbert’s bankruptcy. This Court agrees. All of his deficiencies, fee application in the Tanners case is a final and appealable which were the subject of the two opinions by the order. I believe, however, that we should adopt an approach Bankruptcy Court, relate to his conduct in the Tanners bankruptcy proceeding. In fact, there is no discussion or 4 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 17

evaluation of Halbert’s compliance or noncompliance that the debtor had executed in favor of the insurance with his disclosure and disinterestedness duties in the company was fraudulent. The bankruptcy court determined Yousif case.39 that the insurance policy did not cover the accident, and it held that the release that the debtor had executed in favor of Therefore, the entry of a summary judgment by the the insurance company was not fraudulent. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Court in favor of the Yousifs is vacated. district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination Further, the issue of whether a summary judgment should that the policy did not cover the accident, but it remanded the be entered on Halbert’s application for fees in the issue involving the release to the bankruptcy court for further Yousifs’ case is remanded for further consideration by factual determinations. the Bankruptcy Court. 39 We determined that the district court’s order was a final and Although the Bankruptcy Court did recite the Rule 2016(b) appealable order because the “legal issue concerning the disclosures made by Halbert in the Yousif case, In re Florence interpretation of the insurance policy [was] the central, Tanners, 209 B.R. at 442, it did not make any factual findings or legal conclusions that are pertinent to those disclosures. determinative issue underlying [the] dispute.” Id. at 92. Even though the district court’s “remand directed further factual (emphasis added). This judgment by the district court determinations on a question of whether the release was effectuating a remand to the bankruptcy court in the Yousifs’ fraudulent,” the court explained that this “question becomes case is not a final judgment and is therefore not appealable; academic if [the insurance company] were found not liable the case was “vacated and remanded” to the bankruptcy court under the insurance policy at issue.” Id. (emphasis in for necessary factual findings and/or legal conclusions. See, original). Thus, after our decision in Gardner, an appeal of a e.g., Marlow v. Rollins Cotton Co., 146 F.3d 420, 422 (6th district court order reviewing a bankruptcy court decision Cir. 1998) (“A decision is final if it ‘ends the litigation on the would appear to qualify as a final and appealable order so merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the long as the district court does not “remand[ ] the case for a judgment.’”) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, factual determination on an issue central to the case.” Id. at 233 (1945)). 91 (emphasis in original). II. THE TANNERS APPEAL The court’s decision in Gardner is directly analogous to the present case. Here, the bankruptcy court denied Halbert’s fee We have similar reservations concerning jurisdiction over application in the Tanners’ bankruptcy case because it the appeal in the Tanners case. The district court summarized determined that he had received undisclosed merchandise the decision of the bankruptcy court and indicated its general transfers during the ninety-day preference period and approval of its actions. The district court concluded that the therefore did not qualify as a disinterested person within the bankruptcy court correctly determined that Halbert unlawfully meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). The bankruptcy court also withdrew funds from a $26,600 retainer fee on several determined that Halbert had violated the disclosure occasions “until it was fully depleted without filing requirements set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) and Bankruptcy supplemental disclosures or seeking Court approval” and Rule 2016(b). The district court affirmed the bankruptcy thereby violated Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) and 11 U.S.C. court’s denial of Halbert’s fee application on grounds that § 330. The district court held that the bankruptcy court Halbert did not qualify as a disinterested person pursuant to correctly determined that Halbert violated these and other § 327(a), explaining that “[t]he Bankruptcy Court correctly fiduciary obligations imposed on him by bankruptcy law and determined that, as a result of receiving transfers of value 16 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 5

– the Bankruptcy Rule that incorporates Federal Rule of Civil that it properly denied his fee applications as sanctions. The Procedure 54(b) – applies to contested matters “unless the district court also found sufficient evidence supporting the court otherwise directs”). Thus, I concur in the judgment of bankruptcy court’s finding that Halbert violated Bankruptcy the majority and conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to Rule 2014(a) by failing to disclose that he had received hear Halbert’s appeal in the Tanners’ bankruptcy case because merchandise transfers from Tanners within ninety days of the the district court did not issue a certification pursuant to Rule Yousifs’ and Tanners’ bankruptcy filings, thus disqualifying 54(b) as required by our precedents. himself under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) to serve as Tanners’ counsel. This circuit’s current approach, which asks whether a district court has complied with the Rule 54(b) certification After approval of the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny requirements when a district court has affirmed part of the Halbert’s fees on a number of bases, the district court added bankruptcy court’s decision and has remanded other parts of this observation calling for the vacating of at least a part of the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings, is the bankruptcy court’s determination: simply a way of letting the district court initially decide whether the partial judgment is final. See Brotherton v. The Court, after noting that “[c]learly, there was an Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 559 (6th Cir. 1999) (“By its terms, agreement that Tanners would pay for those services, but Rule 54(b) applies only to final judgments.”); General Halbert did not disclose such an agreement,” concluded Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 that Halbert’s failure to disclose this agreement violated (6th Cir. 1994) (“The first step in certification, entry of partial his disclosure duties under § 329(a) and Rule 2016(b). final judgment, is satisfied where some decision made by the Id. district court ultimately disposes of one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties in a multi-claim/multi-party Although it is undoubtedly plausible to deduce that a action.”). Indeed, Rule 54(b) certification is only appropriate fee agreement existed between Halbert and Tanners for if the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s these services in contemplation of bankruptcy, there is no determination of a claim but remanding certain issues to the direct information relating to any such agreement in any bankruptcy court for further factual findings qualifies as a of the material upon which the Bankruptcy Court relied. final and appealable order. Thus, there is no extrinsic evidence from which the Bankruptcy Court could have found that this agreement This circuit has addressed the underlying question of existed, the method of payment, or the date on which it finality on one occasion. See Breyfogle v. Grange Mut. Cas. was mutually accepted by, and binding upon, the parties. Co. (In re Gardner), 810 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1986). In Gardner, Consequently, the applicable standards of review for the this court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear a Appellees’ dispositive motion preclude the Bankruptcy bankruptcy appeal even though a district court had reversed court from having found sufficient material facts from and remanded part of the bankruptcy court’s decision. The which the existence and terms of the parties’ agreement plaintiffs in Gardner sued a debtor and his insurance could be determined. company for the personal injuries that they sustained in an automobile accident involving the debtor. The plaintiffs Strict compliance with the directive to draw all sought damages from the debtor’s insurance company on reasonable inferences in favor of Halbert should have grounds that the insurance policy at issue covered the resulted in the Bankruptcy Court making no finding automobile accident. The plaintiffs also alleged that a release about such an agreement. Apart from whether this directive required the assumption that Halbert agreed to 6 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 15

work on the bankruptcy pro bono, about which this Court described as “full blown federal lawsuits within the larger expresses no opinion, the Bankruptcy Court improperly bankruptcy case,” and are initiated when a party files a assumed that any such agreement fell within the bounds complaint with the bankruptcy court. Section 1120(A)(1) of § 329(a) and Rule 2016(b). This conclusion was Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Interfirst Bank Dallas, reached even though Halbert presented uncontested N.A.(In re Wood and Locker, Inc.), 868 F.2d 139, 142 (5th extrinsic evidence which indicated that his only fee Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). Rule 54(b) applies to agreement with Tanners was achieved on September 1, adversary proceedings that are brought within the context of 1993, more than one year before its petition was filed. a larger bankruptcy proceeding through Bankruptcy Rule Indeed, Halbert contends on appeal that this fee 7054, which incorporates Rule 54(b). In re Millers Cove agreement, which provided for an hourly fee of $165, is Energy Co., 128 F.3d at 451. the only one relating to the bankruptcy, a claim which is undisputed by the Appellees. In the Tanners’ bankruptcy case, Halbert filed an application with the bankruptcy court for the payment of While the Court expresses no opinion as to whether attorney fees, and Tanners responded by filing an objection to Halbert was under a duty to disclose this fee agreement, his fee application. I do not believe that these proceedings it is apparent that the Bankruptcy Court drew inferences qualify as adversary proceedings pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule against him based on an incomplete understanding of the 7001,3 see, e.g., In re Chambers, 140 B.R. 233, 239 (N.D. Ill. facts and the parties’ positions on this issue. The 1992) (“The court agrees with the bankruptcy court’s finding Bankruptcy Court also failed to set forth on the record that the Rule 7001 does not govern requests for attorneys the basis for this alleged violation while at the same time fees.”); 10 LAWRENCE P. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY being unable to establish the date on which the alleged ¶ 9014.01 (15th ed. 1998) (explaining that “contested agreement was entered. Cf. In the Matter of Prudhomme, applications for the payment of professional fees” are 43 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1995) (court can order “contested matters,” which “do not qualify as adversary disgorgement of fee paid more than one year before filing proceedings because they are not defined as such by Rule of petition because one year limitation period in § 329(a) 7001”); instead, I believe that this case is more properly is rebuttable presumption that any compensation paid characterized as a contested matter. See FED. R. BANKR. P. before pre-petition year period is not in contemplation of 9014. bankruptcy and consequently § 329(a) does “not provide a limitations period beyond which the court cannot Nevertheless, I believe that consistent with our precedents reach.”). Therefore, the findings and conclusions of the the district court must issue a certification pursuant to Rule Bankruptcy Court on this issue must be vacated. 54(b) before Halbert may appeal the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of his fee application .... because the Bankruptcy Rules state that the Rule 54(b) certification requirements apply to contested matters. See [T]he Bankruptcy Court gives no indication of having FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 (stating that Bankruptcy Rule 7054 evaluated his argument that the November 19, 1994 merchandise transfer, as well as other merchandise deliveries, could be applied exclusively to non- 3 I do not agree with the majority’s decision to “view this appeal as bankruptcy related services that were provided before the an adversary proceeding to determine Halbert’s eligibility for attorney’s petitions were filed. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court fees and liability for sanctions and apply Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7054 and 7001(1).” 14 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 7

appealable to this court, unless the further proceedings does not appear to have addressed Tanners’ argument contemplated are of a purely ministerial character.”), cert. that all of the merchandise transfers to Halbert were in denied, 522 U.S. 1014 (1997), with Official Comm. of payment of pre-1994 fee obligations. Unsecured Creditors of Life Serv. Sys., Inc. v. Westmoreland County MH/MR, 183 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 1999) (holding that As a consequence, it appears that the Bankruptcy Court an appeal involving a district court order remanding part of a did not evaluate this issue in a light most favorable to case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings is final Halbert. Hence, its findings and conclusions with regard and appealable if the policy considerations underlying the to this matter must be vacated. bankruptcy proceedings would be furthered by an immediate appeal). ....

This circuit has adopted a unique approach for determining The Bankruptcy Court held that Halbert violated his whether an appeal from a judgment by a district court disclosure duties under Rule 2016(b) by not revealing the remanding a case to the bankruptcy court for further receipt of six post-confirmation fees from Tanners, proceedings is a final and appealable order. See In re Millers totaling $51,868.92. Cove Energy Co., 128 F.3d at 450-52; Seor, Inc. v. Textron Oil Corp. (In re Frederick Petroleum Corp.), 912 F.2d at 853- .... 54. In an attempt to “establish[ ] a much-needed, bright-line test for determining finality [and] providing certainty for . . . [T]he record on this issue is insufficient and, thus, litigants,” we have held that a bankruptcy appeal is not final it precludes any meaningful judicial review of the unless the district court complies with the certification contested issue. requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). In re .... Frederick Petroleum Corp., 912 F.2d 850, 853-54 (6th Cir. 1990); see also In re Millers Cove Energy Co., 128 F.3d at For these reasons, the findings and conclusions of the 451-52. As the court in Millers Cove explained, “In the Bankruptcy Court on this issue are vacated. absence of certification under Rule 54(b) as to the finality of a partial disposition by the district court in a bankruptcy (footnotes omitted). Despite vacating the bankruptcy court’s proceeding, any partial disposition is deemed non-final for opinion and judgment in several particulars as above-related, purposes of appeal.” Id. at 452. the district court proceeded to find that “the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of Halbert’s fee application in the Tanners’ The court in Millers Cove, however, was careful to point case was fully warranted.” out that the bankruptcy dispute at issue in the case was brought as 2an adversary proceeding pursuant to Bankruptcy The judgment, however, concluded: Rule 7001. Id. at 451-52. Adversary proceedings have been The denial by the Bankruptcy Court of Halbert’s fee application in the Tanners’ bankruptcy case is affirmed, 2 Bankruptcy Rule 7001 sets forth those proceedings that qualify as although certain findings of fact and conclusions of law adversary proceedings: An adversary proceeding includes “a proceeding upon which the holding by the Bankruptcy Court was to recover money or property, other than a proceeding to compel the based are vacated and remanded to the Bankruptcy debtor to deliver property to the trustee, or a proceeding under § 554(b) Court. or § 725 of the Code, Rule 2017, or Rule 6002.” 8 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 13

(emphasis added). Under the circumstances, although the _____________________ district court has noted affirmance of the bankruptcy court in the Tanners case in a number of aspects, we confess that we CONCURRENCE cannot determine, due to what we perceive are, at best, _____________________ ambiguities in the lengthy decision of the district court, whether there has been rendered a final judgment within the KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, concurring. I meaning of § 1291 in the Tanners case. “Certain findings . . . join Part I of the majority’s opinion because I agree that the upon which the holding by the Bankruptcy Court was based” district court’s order remanding Halbert’s fee application in were “vacated and remanded,” and are relevant to the issues the Yousifs’ bankruptcy case is not a final and appealable presented in this appeal. “If . . . the district court order order. I concur in the judgment of the majority with respect remands the case for a factual determination on an issue to Part II of its opinion, but I write separately to clarify this central to the case, the district court order is determined not circuit’s approach for determining “the finality of district to be appealable because the case cannot be resolved properly court orders remanding a case for further proceedings in until the appropriate fact-finder, the bankruptcy court, makes bankruptcy court.” Millers Cove Energy Co. v. Moore (In re necessary factual findings.” Breyfogle v. Grange Mutual Millers1 Cove Energy Co.), 128 F.3d 449, 451 (6th Cir. Casualty (In re Gardner), 810 F.2d 87, 91-92 (6th Cir. 1987). 1997). Because the bankruptcy court serves as an “adjunct” to the district court, “we view all the proceedings in this action, We have jurisdiction to review only the “final decisions, whether in the Bankruptcy Court or the District Court as one judgments, orders, and decrees” of a district court when a proceeding in bankruptcy.” Seon, Inc. v. Textron Oil Corp. district court has acted in an appellate capacity and has (In re Frederick Petroleum Corp.), 912 F.2d 850, 853 (6th reviewed a bankruptcy court decision. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d); Cir. 1990). Thus, we view this appeal as an adversary see also In re Millers Cove Energy Co., 128 F.3d at 451. proceeding to determine Halbert’s eligibility for attorney’s Courts of appeals, however, have had a difficult time agreeing fees and liability for sanctions and apply Federal Rules of on exactly what constitutes a final decision when reviewing Bankruptcy Procedure 7054 and 7001(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. an appeal of a district court order reviewing a bankruptcy 54(6). See, id. at 853-54; Millers Cove Energy Co. v. Moore court decision – particularly when a district court has affirmed (In re Millers Cove Energy Co.), 128 F.3d 449 (6th Cir. part of the bankruptcy court’s decision and has remanded 1997). Rule 54(b) provides that: other parts of the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. Compare In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 1191, 1192 (7th (b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Cir.) (holding that “a decision by the district court on appeal Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief remanding the bankruptcy court’s decision for further is presented in an action, whether as a claim, proceedings in the bankruptcy court is not final, and so is not counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 1 than all of the claims or parties only upon an express I write separately only with respect to Part II of the majority’s determination that there is no just reason for delay and opinion, which addresses the part of the district court’s order that affirms the bankruptcy court’s denial of “Halbert’s fee application in the Tanners’ upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In bankruptcy case,” and vacates and remands to the bankruptcy court the absence of such determination and direction, any “certain findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the holding order or other form of decision, however designated, by the Bankruptcy Court was based.” Halbert v. Yousif, 225 B.R. 336, 360 (E.D. Mich. 1998). 12 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 9

been met; first, the district court must “clearly which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or other evidence[] its intent that the opinion . . . represent[ed] rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not the final decision in the case;” second, the judgment terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and must have been “properly recorded on the clerk’s the order or other form of decision is subject to revision docket;” and third, “the appellee from the district court at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all [must not have] objected to perfecting the appeal from the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. that order.” See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 192 (6th Cir.), cert. (1956) (“[Rule 54(b)] does not supersede any statute denied, 512 U.S. 883 (1991) (quoting Bankers Trust v. Mallis, controlling appellate jurisdiction. It scrupulously recognizes 435 U.S. 381, 387 (1978)). the statutory requirement of a ‘final decision’ under § 1291 as a basic requirement for an appeal to the court of appeals.”). In this case, a remand for entry of a separate judgment while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal would serve no The district court has made no determination that “there is purpose if the judgment was not a final appealable order. no just reason for delay” on a final judgment entered as “to Likewise, even if the district court had entered a separate one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties.” No document, we still would need to inquire into its finality. See Rule 54(b) certification was issued or requested. “In the Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 385-86 n.6 (“Even if a separate absence of certification under Rule 54(b) as to the finality of judgment is filed, the courts of appeals must still determine a partial disposition by the district court in a bankruptcy whether the district court intended the judgment to represent proceeding, any partial disposition is deemed non-final for the final decision in the case.”); see also Green v. Nevers, No. purposes of appeal.” In re Millers Cove Energy Co., 128 F.3d 98-1695, 1999 WL 1044239 *n.2 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 1999). at 452. Accordingly, we find that we clearly have no jurisdiction in We therefore lack subject matter jurisdiction under 28 the Yousifs’ appeal. We must also decline jurisdiction in the U.S.C. § 158(d) and must dismiss the appeal. See id. attempted Tanners’ appeal for the reasons indicated because it is premature. We pass to another matter of concern on the issue of jurisdiction--Halbert’s notice of appeal, which is set out below: 10 In re Yousif No. 98-1805 No. 98-1805 In re Yousif 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT The notice of appeal may be insufficient because, among EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN other things, it does not name the court to which appeal is SOUTHERN DIVISION taken. See, however, Dillon v. United States, 184 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that “where only one TODD M. HALBERT, CONSOLIDATED avenue of appeal exists, [Fed. R. App. P.] 3(c)(1)(C) is APPEALS satisfied even if the notice of appeal does not name the appellate court”). The notice makes no reference to a separate Appellant, Case Nos. 97-CV-75047 judgment entry that appears in the joint appendix in the 97-CV-75048 Tanners case. The only reference is to the lengthy “Order” from which we have cited a number of excerpts. The “Order” v. Hon. Julian Abele Cook, Jr. is really an opinion dealing with two separate cases, one of which we have found to be clearly not appealable. SAMI YOUSIF, SANA YOUSIF, and FLORENCE TANNERS, INC., Furthermore, the record does not reflect that there was a separate judgment entry, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, which Appellees. mandates entry of a separate document. This requirement may be waived, however, under certain circumstances. See ____________________________________/ Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978). In the present case, the district court entered its order on the docket NOTICE OF APPEAL sheet, and the defendants did not object to perfecting the appeal from that order. However, because it remanded the Todd M. Halbert (“Appellant”) appeals as a matter of Yousifs case in its entirety and the Tanners case in part for right from that certain Order entered by the District Court further findings, it is certainly arguable that the district court on July 2, 1998. did not evidence clear intent that the opinion be a final The parties to the Order appealed from and the names decision in the case and thus did not meet the requirements of their respective attorneys are as follows: for waiver.

Sami Yousif and Sana Yousif: C. William Garratt, In certain cases “although the absence of a separate Esq. document does not foreclose appellate review, . . . ‘the question raised by [the] appeal can be more fully considered Florence Tanners, Inc.: C. William Garratt, Esq. if the decision below is made explicit in a judgment.’” Beukema’s Petroleum Co. v. Admiral Petroleum Co., 613 ___________________________ F.2d 626, 628-29 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that Bankers Trust TODD M. HALBERT (P33488) applied to appeals from preliminary injunctions) (quoting Counsel for Appellant Turner v. Air Transport Lodge 1894, 585 F.2d 1180 (2d Cir.), 24359 Northwestern Hwy., #250 cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1978)). Southfield, MI 48075 (243) 356-6204 Following Bankers Trust, this court held that

DATED: July 10, 1998 [T]he parties to an appeal may waive the separate judgment requirement where three conditions have