Haggerty v. ICAO

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 25CA2325
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA2325 Haggerty v ICAO 06-18-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2325 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 27118-2025

Lindsey Haggerty,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Tow and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026

Lindsey Haggerty, Pro Se

No appearance for Respondent ¶1 Lindsey Haggerty appeals an order of the Industrial Claim

Appeals Office (Panel) denying his request for a new hearing. We

affirm the Panel’s order.

I. Background

¶2 Haggerty worked as a truck driver for 10 Roads Express, LLC

(Employer). When he transitioned from full- to part-time work for

Employer, Haggerty applied for unemployment benefits. A deputy

for the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) granted

Haggerty’s claim for unemployment benefits. Employer appealed

that decision to the Division’s hearing officer, who scheduled the

matter for an evidentiary hearing on November 14, 2025.

¶3 Employer attended the hearing, but Haggerty did not. After

reviewing Employer’s evidence, as well as the Division’s file, the

hearing officer agreed with the deputy that Haggerty “was partially

separated” from employment during the summer of 2025, when he

transitioned from full- to part-time status. However, the hearing

officer then found that Haggerty fully separated from Employer at

the end of that summer. See § 8-73-108(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (“In

the event a claimant has more than one separation from the same

adjudicable employer, the most recent separation shall be

1 controlling as to the determination of eligibility for benefits

attributable to that employer.”). At that time, according to the

hearing officer’s findings, suitable work was available and the

working conditions were not unsatisfactory, but Haggerty did not

accept Employer’s offers of work or respond to Employer’s attempts

to contact him about work and, therefore, “by his actions . . . quit

th[e] employment.” Because Haggerty “quit without providing a

reason,” the hearing officer concluded that Haggerty was

disqualified from receiving benefits under section

8-73-108(5)(e)(XXII), which applies when the claimant quits “under

conditions involving personal reasons.”

¶4 Haggerty requested a new hearing from the Panel. After

exchanging correspondence with Haggerty regarding the reasons he

missed the hearing, the Panel concluded that Haggerty failed to

establish good cause excusing his absence. Accordingly, the Panel

denied his request for a new hearing and noted that the case would

“proceed on [Haggerty’s] appeal” of the hearing officer’s decision

denying benefits. Haggerty did not separately appeal that decision

to the Panel, though; rather, in response to the Panel’s request for

information, he indicated that, if a new hearing was not granted, he

2 did not wish to proceed with an appeal of the merits based only on

the evidence presented at the November 14, 2025, hearing.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶5 Where a claimant fails to attend a hearing he did not initially

request, he may secure a new hearing only if he establishes good

cause for failing to participate the first time. Div. of Unemployment

Ins. Reg. 11.2.13.2, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. In determining

whether good cause exists, the Panel considers, among other

things, (1) whether the claimant “acted in the manner that a

reasonably prudent individual would have acted under the same or

similar circumstances”; (2) whether the Division committed an

administrative error; (3) whether the claimant’s failure to appear

prejudiced any other interested party; and (4) “whether denying

good cause would lead to a result that is inconsistent with the law.”

Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.8, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.

Generally, the Panel has discretion to weigh those factors, and we

will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. See

Nguyen v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 174 P.3d 847, 848-49 (Colo.

App. 2007).

3 B. The Panel Did Not Err by Denying Haggerty a New Hearing

¶6 The order on appeal is the Panel’s order denying Haggerty a

new hearing. We discern no error by the Panel.

¶7 The question for the Panel was whether Haggerty had

established good cause for missing the November 14, 2025, hearing.

It was undisputed that on November 6, Haggerty registered for the

hearing and provided a telephone number, and on the date and

time of the hearing, the hearing officer attempted to call Haggerty at

the number provided, but Haggerty neither answered the phone nor

returned the call. Instead, fifteen minutes after the hearing started,

Haggerty checked in and provided a different phone number.

Haggerty later explained that the initial number was for a landline

home telephone (instead of the cell phone he ordinarily uses), and

he was not at home at the time of the hearing so he could not

answer the hearing officer’s call. He did not know why that number

was provided when he registered for the hearing.

¶8 The Panel concluded that there were no circumstances outside

Haggerty’s control that prevented him from appearing for the

hearing on November 14 and no administrative error on the part of

the Division. Instead, the Panel determined that Haggerty had

4 failed to act reasonably by (1) providing a landline telephone

number to which he did not have access at the time of the hearing

and (2) failing to re-register with the second number at any point

before the hearing.

¶9 Haggerty does not argue that the Panel acted in excess of its

powers, legally erred, reached a decision unsupported by the factual

findings, or abused its discretion, and we perceive no basis for such

an argument. See § 8-74-107(6)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2025 (listing the

grounds on which the Panel’s decision may be set aside by the

court). Consequently, we will not disturb the Panel’s order on

review. See Middlemist v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 958 P.2d 486, 495

(Colo. App. 1997) (noting the appellant’s obligation to identify

specific errors and legal authorities supporting reversal).

C. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Review the Hearing Officer’s Decision

¶ 10 Haggerty argues the hearing officer erred in finding that he

quit his job. However, that issue is not properly before us.

¶ 11 A claimant who wishes to challenge a hearing officer’s decision

must first file an appeal with the Panel. See § 8-74-104(1), C.R.S.

2025. Once the Panel has rendered a decision, the claimant may

5 seek review in the court of appeals. See § 8-74-107. But here, the

only decision rendered by the Panel was a decision denying

Haggerty’s request for a new hearing. The Panel’s order did not

adjudicate the merits of the hearing officer’s decision disqualifying

Haggerty from receiving benefits. And it does not appear that

Haggerty appealed the hearing officer’s decision; thus, there is no

order by the Panel concerning the denial of benefits for us to review.

III. Disposition

¶ 12 The Panel’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE BROWN concur.