Haggard v. Hayden
This text of 494 N.E.2d 338 (Haggard v. Hayden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The Appellant Harold (Rick) Haggard, a Muncie, Indiana policeman, instituted the present five count action for an alleged § 1983 civil rights violation and an alleged intentional tort by Appellees, Gene V. Hayden, Individually; Chief Gene V. Hayden, Muncie Police Department; Alan Wilson, Mayor of Muncie Muncie City Common Council; Police and Fire Commission, City of Muncie; Muncie Police Department; and John Doe Ranked Muncie Police Officers Appointed by Chief Gene V. Hayden (the City). The trial court, without a jury, found for Haggard on each count and awarded him damages totaling $25,000, attorneys fees, and injunctive relief.
The City filed a Motion to Correct Error. In the entry denying the City's motion, the trial court, on its own motion, set aside its judgment of damages on Haggard's Counts 2, 83, and 5 and ordered a new trial on damages on these counts. Haggard now appeals the trial court's order.
We reverse.
Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 59(D) requires "[elach claimed error [in a motion to correct error] shall be stated in specific rather than general terms, and shall be accompanied by a statement of the facts and grounds upon which the errors are based." Like parties who file a motion to correct error, the trial court, too, is required to comply with the rule when it sue sponte finds error. In Lake Mortgage Co. v. Federal National Mortgage Association (1975), 262 Ind. 601, 321 N.E.2d 556, the trial court granted a new trial on its own motion 1 "because of the complexity of the [340]*340issues herein, the jury may have been confused in its conclusions and verdict." 262 Ind. at 603, 321 N.E.2d at 557. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed a trial court, upon its own motion, may grant relief for errors specified in T.R. 59(A)(1-9). However, the court further held the trial court, in so doing, was required by the then numbered TR. 59(B) to support the asserted error with "a statement of the facts and grounds upon which the errors are based." Accordingly, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in granting a new trial based on the trial court's "unsupported conclusion that the jury was confused by the complexity of the issues." 262 Ind. at 607, 321 N.E.2d at 560.
In the present case, the trial court sua sponte2 ordered a new trial on damages, stating "the tenor of testimony concerning Carolyn Haggard's [Haggard's wife's] cessation of employment was misleading and would have had an effect upon the judge's attitude in awarding damages in Counts 2, 3, and 5 as to become in effect an improper element in considering damages in those counts." R. at 128. The trial court's entry is as deficient as the entry in Lake Mortgage Co. Just as the Lake Mortgage Co. court failed to provide a statement of facts on which it based its conclusion the jury was confused by the complexity of the issues, so, too, the instant trial court failed to provide a statement of facts supporting its conclusions the tenor of testimony concerning Carolyn Haggard's cessation of employment was misleading and affected the award of damages to her husband.
Indeed, the trial court could not provide such a statement because the record is devoid of evidence which supports its conclusion. The only "evidence" before the [341]*341trial court which attacked the trial testimony concerning Carolyn Haggard's employment was the "evidence" which the City asserted was "newly discovered" in its motion to correct error. Necessarily, then, only that "evidence" could lead the trial judge to conclude the "tenor of the testimony concerning Carolyn Haggard's cessation of employment was misleading" (Record at 139) and impacted on the award of damages to her husband. However, the trial court specifically overruled the City's claim of error based upon the asserted "newly discovered evidence." The trial court found the alleged "newly discovered evidence" was available and could have been discovered before trial and, therefore, could not constitute the basis for the grant of a new trial. If it could not form the basis for a new trial on a party's motion because it was not newly discovered, it is a similarly inadequate basis for a new trial on the court's own motion.
Therefore, the trial court erred in granting a new trial on damages on its own motion because it failed to provide a statement of facts supporting its conclusion of error as required by TR. 59(D). Further, the trial court could not provide the requisite statement of facts due to a lack of supporting evidence in the record.
The judgment of the trial court granting a new trial on damages on Haggard's Counts 2, 3 and 5 is reversed and this cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the judgment in favor of Haggard on Counts 2, 3 and 5.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
494 N.E.2d 338, 1986 Ind. App. LEXIS 2669, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haggard-v-hayden-indctapp-1986.