Hagerman v. City of Dayton

71 N.E.2d 246, 147 Ohio St. 313, 147 Ohio St. (N.S.) 313, 170 A.L.R. 199, 34 Ohio Op. 238, 1947 Ohio LEXIS 407
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 22, 1947
Docket30703
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 71 N.E.2d 246 (Hagerman v. City of Dayton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 71 N.E.2d 246, 147 Ohio St. 313, 147 Ohio St. (N.S.) 313, 170 A.L.R. 199, 34 Ohio Op. 238, 1947 Ohio LEXIS 407 (Ohio 1947).

Opinions

This case was appealed to the Court of Appeals on questions of law and fact. No motion was filed in that court to challenge the jurisdiction of that court to entertain the cause upon such appeal.

Under the authorities cited in the per curiam opinion inTrumbull Savings Loan Co. v. Saviers, 115 Ohio St. 403,154 N.E. 317, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to proceed.

The Chief Justice, Judge Bell and the writer are of the opinion that as the instant case was not a chancery case and as the parties had no power to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals, that court should have retained and decided the case on questions of law. (Section 12223-22, General Code.) However, we must now accept the Saviers case as stare decisis.

Appellant complains that "the Court of Appeals should have reviewed the declaratory judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and either affirmed or reversed said judgment." We cannot sustain this contention of appellant.

Among the matters complained of by appellant is the consideration by the Court of Appeals of ordinance No. 15937, enacted subsequent to the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, and the holding of the Court of Appeals thereon "that the question heretofore adjudicated by said Common Pleas Court determining that the expense or costs involved in making such union dues deductions could not be paid from public funds is now a moot question upon which this court will express no opinion."

It was held in the case of Miner v. Witt, City Clerk, 82 Ohio St. 237, 92 N.E. 21:

"It is not the duty of the court to answer moot questions, and when, pending proceedings in error in this court, an event occurs without the fault of either party, which renders it impossible for the court to grant any relief, it will dismiss the petition in error." *Page 326

In the case of Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653,40 L.Ed., 293, 16 S.Ct., 132, quoted with approval by this court in itsper curiam opinion in the case of Miner v. Witt, supra, Mr. Justice Gray says:

"The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. And such a fact, when not appearing on the record, may be proved by extrinsic evidence."

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Court of Appeals committed no error in considering ordinance No. 15937. CompareState, ex rel. Apple, v. Pence et al., Bd. of Edn., 137 Ohio St. 569, 31 N.E.2d 841.

The principal question propounded by appellant is: "Did the Court of Appeals commit error when it found that the city of Dayton, Ohio, could enter into a valid agreement with its employees in favor of a labor union as contemplated by the language of Section 6346-13 of the General Code of Ohio relating to a check-off on the wages of such employees by the enactment of an ordinance providing for dues deduction?"

Section 6346-13, General Code (118 Ohio Laws, 656), provided at the time of the enactment of ordinance No. 15776:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6346-12 of the General Code of Ohio, no assignment of, or order for wages or salary shall be valid if made after *Page 327 this act goes into effect. Nothing herein shall affect or invalidate any contract or agreement between the employers and their employes, or as between employers, employes, and any labor union as to any check-off on the wages of such employes as may be agreed upon."

The constitutionality of the foregoing section, or any part thereof, not having been challenged, we shall not pass upon that question.

Under Section 6346-13, General Code, as it stood at the time of the passage of ordinances No. 15776 and No. 15937, any assignment of, or order for, wages or salary was invalid in the absence of a contract such as described in Section 6346-13, General Code. We are of the opinion that a municipal corporation of the state of Ohio does not come within the meaning of "employers" as used in Section 6346-13, General Code. We are also of the opinion that civil service appointees do not come within the definition of 'employes" as used in such section.

It is earnestly argued by appellees that the municipality has the power to enact the ordinance herein in question, under the home-rule provision of the Ohio Constitution, especially Sections 3 and 7 of Article XVIII thereof.

Section 3 provides:

"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws."

Section 7 provides:

"Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of Section 3 of this Article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government."

Appellees argue that "the ordinance obviously isn't *Page 328 nor is it claimed to be a 'police, sanitary or other similar regulation.' " We cannot agree with this contention. The enactment of any ordinance which is aimed at the preservation of the health, safety, welfare or comfort of citizens of a municipality is the exercise of police power. Ordinance No. 15776 (with or without its supplemental ordinance No. 15937) is the exercise of police power. Ordinance No. 15776 conflicts with a general law, to wit, Section 6346-13, General Code, which provides that no wage assignments except those specifically exempted shall be valid. The wage assignments covered by ordinance No. 15776 do not come within the exception of the statute.

There is no municipal purpose served by the checkoff of wages of civil service employees. Counsel for appellees argue that a check-off is a convenience to both the municipal appointee and the labor union. We must be realistic and take judicial notice, of what is generally known, that the check-off is a means of maintaining membership. Indeed, the record in this case shows that each so-called contract member is required to give a cognovit note for twenty months dues in advance and these proposed check-off payments are to be applied on such notes. The check-off is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the civil service laws of the state.

Section 10 of Article XV of the Constitution of Ohio provides:

"Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state, the several counties, and cities, shall be made according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by competitive examinations.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
71 N.E.2d 246, 147 Ohio St. 313, 147 Ohio St. (N.S.) 313, 170 A.L.R. 199, 34 Ohio Op. 238, 1947 Ohio LEXIS 407, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hagerman-v-city-of-dayton-ohio-1947.