Hagelin v. Caudill

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedJuly 15, 2021
Docket7:21-cv-00077
StatusUnknown

This text of Hagelin v. Caudill (Hagelin v. Caudill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hagelin v. Caudill, (W.D. Va. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

DAVID ALLEN HAGELIN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:21CV00077 ) v. ) OPINION AND ORDER ) SGT. CAUDILL, ) By: James P. Jones ) United States District Judge Defendant. )

David Allen Hagelin, Pro Se Plaintiff.

The plaintiff, David Allen Hagelin, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a prison official at Wallens Ridge State Prison (“Wallens Ridge”) used excessive force against him and failed to accept his evidence as “a ‘material witness’ in a 1986 Federal Capital Murder for Hire in Manson, Maine.” Compl. 2, ECF No. 1. After review of the record, I find that Hagelin’s subsequent submissions, seeking interlocutory injunctive relief, mandamus, or to amend his claims, must be denied. Since filing the Complaint, Hagelin has submitted the following pleadings that seek interlocutory injunctive relief from the court: ECF Nos. 2, 6 (a proposed amendment to ECF 2 that I will grant), 12, and 16. Specifically, Hagelin wishes to be transferred to a federal prison (without any evidence that he has a federal conviction or prison sentence) or to be assigned a single cell in a mental health pod at Wallens Ridge. Hagelin alleges that the defendant, Sergeant Caudill, and other officers at Wallens Ridge have created a hostile environment toward him by calling

him names related to his offense conduct. He also states that he fears for his life after Caudill allegedly said he wished Hagelin was dead. Hagelin also claims that another inmate at Wallens Ridge, Jason Karivias, has

threatened to kill him and continually harasses him. Hagelin allegedly heard Karivias confess that he ordered a former roommate to murder two people. Because Hagelin promises to aid law enforcement in prosecuting Karivias for these murders, Karivias has allegedly threatened Hagelin’s life and has repeatedly harassed him.

In another motion, Hagelin asks the court to order prison officials not to transfer him to River North Correctional Center (“RNCC”). From information other inmates have provided to him, he believes he will be harshly treated there in various

ways and will not be allowed to use his hearing aids or charger for eight months. Because preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking such relief must make a clear showing “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). To qualify as irreparable, the feared harm must be “neither remote nor speculative, but actual

and imminent,” Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1989),1 such that it poses a real and immediate threat, Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1983).

Hagelin’s desire for transfer to a federal prison is not a form of relief that I can grant. The Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) are tasked with determining the appropriate detention

facility for each prisoner in their custody. It is not the court’s province to assign inmates to one prison system over the other, or one facility over another. See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding BOP, not court, has authority to designate place of confinement for purposes of serving federal sentences

of imprisonment). Therefore, to the extent Hagelin seeks transfer to a federal prison, I must deny his motions. For similar reasons, I also find an insufficient basis for a court order to prohibit

Hagelin’s transfer to RNCC. The court simply does not decide where VDOC officials can house the inmates in their custody. Moreover, by Hagelin’s own admission, his fears of RNCC are conclusory and based on hearsay from officers and inmates. He also states no facts suggesting an imminent risk that he will be

transferred there or that such a transfer would cause him irreparable harm.

1 I have omitted internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations here and throughout this Opinion, unless otherwise noted. Hagelin’s motions also concern his fears about Inmate Karivias. This issue, however, is completely unrelated to Sergeant Caudill, the only defendant in this

§ 1983 action. “[A] preliminary injunction may never issue to prevent an injury or harm which not even the moving party contends was caused by the wrong claimed in the underlying action.” Omega World Travel v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d

14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997). To warrant interlocutory relief, the movant “must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Id. Hagelin does not allege that Caudill is aware of Karivias’ alleged past threats and harassment to Hagelin, or that Caudill knows

of Karivias’ alleged murderous acts or any other reason this inmate may pose a serious risk of harm to other inmates. There is also no indication that Caudill is responsible for designating when certain inmates should be kept apart from each

other. Because Caudill’s misconduct alleged in the Complaint has no causal relationship to Karivias’ threats to Hagelin’s safety, I cannot find that preliminary injunctive relief is warranted on this topic in this case. Hagelin is advised to share information directly with prison officials about any person or condition that he

believes threatens his safety. Hagelin’s submissions also include his demand for a “writ of mandamus to compel the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] to investigate Hagelin’s assertion

that he is a material witness in the Manson, Maine Federal Capital Murder.” Pet. Mandamus 6, ECF No. 17. Mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy and will only issue where “the alleged duty to act involves a mandatory or ministerial obligation

which is so plainly prescribed as to be free of doubt.” First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Durham v. Baker (In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Durham), 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). For the issuance of a writ of mandamus to be proper, three

elements must coexist: “(1) the petitioner has shown a clear right to the relief sought; (2) the respondent has a clear duty to do the particular act requested by the petitioner; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Id. It is well established that a court cannot issue a mandamus directing the FBI

to investigate a particular matter, as Hagelin demands. See, e.g., Gant v. FBI, 992 F. Supp. 846, 848 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'’d, 155 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing other cases). Federal law provides that the FBI “may investigate” federal crimes, but this

authority creates a “discretionary rather than mandatory authority” to investigate. Id. Because the second element required for a writ of mandamus is absent, I need not consider the remaining elements to deny Hagelin’s mandamus request directed to the FBI.2

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Related

Kevin L. Barden v. Patrick Keohane, Warden
921 F.2d 476 (Third Circuit, 1991)
Gant v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
992 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. West Virginia, 1998)
Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn
701 F.2d 278 (Fourth Circuit, 1983)
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Baker
860 F.2d 135 (Fourth Circuit, 1988)
Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger
888 F.2d 969 (Second Circuit, 1989)

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