Habberson, T. v. White, H.
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Opinion
J-S18003-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
TAYLOR DAIN HABBERSHON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : HEATHER SUE WHITE : : Appellant : No. 1704 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered November 12, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Civil Division at No(s): 2025-00629
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MAY 26, 2026
Heather Sue White (“Appellant”) appeals from the November 12, 2025
order entered in the Mifflin County Court of Common Pleas that granted the
petition for protection from abuse (“PFA”) that Taylor Dain Habbershon filed
against Appellant pursuant to the PFA Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the PFA order.
Upon careful review, we affirm.
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. On July 7,
2025, Taylor1 filed a petition for PFA against Appellant on behalf of himself,
his wife, Cassandra Habbershon, and his three minor children. Taylor and
Appellant were former intimate partners.
____________________________________________
1As Taylor and his wife share a last name, we refer to them by their first names. J-S18003-26
The PFA court held a bifurcated PFA hearing on September 29, 2025,
and November 10, 2025. Relevant to this appeal, Taylor testified to two
incidents that occurred on July 3 and July 4, 2025. On July 3, 2025, while
Cassandra was driving with Taylor and the children in the car, Appellant
tailgated their vehicle and, while passing the vehicle at high speed,
aggressively swerved her vehicle towards them several times. On July 4,
2025, while Taylor, Cassandra, and the children were parked in a Walmart
parking lot, Appellant approached them and yelled, “Fuck you fuckers. I’ll kill
you all.” N.T. Hr’g, 9/29/25, at 16. Taylor testified that since those incidents,
Appellant and Appellant’s husband had continued “stalking, driving by the
house, [and] harassing” the family. Id. at 20. Appellant and her husband
testified and denied threatening or harassing Taylor or his family.
On November 10, 2025, the court granted the PFA petition and issued
a final PFA order, set to expire on July 7, 2026.
This appeal followed. Appellant and the PFA court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2
Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Did the [PFA] court
abuse its discretion in granting [the PFA] petition, where the law was not
applied to sufficiently determine abuse?” Appellant’s Br. at 3 (capitalization
altered).
2 The PFA court, in its statement in lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, directs us
to its reasoning on the record at the November 10, 2025 hearing. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Statement, 1/6/26.
-2- J-S18003-26
In a PFA action, this Court reviews the PFA court’s “legal conclusions for
an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d
1050, 1053-54 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc). A PFA court does not abuse its
discretion for a mere error of judgment; rather, we will find an abuse of
discretion “where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law
is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias[,] or ill will.” Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1019
(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Moreover, on appeal, this Court will
defer “to the credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who
appeared before it.” Karch v. Karch, 885 A.2d 535, 537 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citation omitted). It is well-settled that “the trier of fact while passing upon
the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free
to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36
A.3d 613, 619 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a grant of PFA
relief, “we review the evidence of record in the light most favorable to, and
grant all reasonable inferences to, the party who prevailed before the PFA
court.” Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2021). The petitioner
need only establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence to be entitled
to relief. Custer, 933 A.2d at 1058; see also Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d
720, 724 (Pa. Super. 2004) (defining preponderance as “the greater weight
of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly”). Indeed, “[t]he petitioner’s
-3- J-S18003-26
testimony is sufficient if it is believed by the trial court.” Custer, 933 A.2d at
1058.
“Abuse” is defined, in relevant part, as “[t]he occurrence of one or more
of the following acts” between former intimate partners, including “[p]lacing
another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury” or “[k]nowingly
engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another
person, including following the person, without proper authority, under
circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(2), (5).
“In the context of a PFA case, the court’s objective is to determine
whether the victim is in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.]”
Raker, 847 A.2d at 725. The intent of the abuser is irrelevant to this
determination. Id. “Actual physical harm is not a prerequisite for entry of a
PFA order; the victim need only be in reasonable fear of imminent serious
bodily injury.” Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 477 (Pa. Super.
2008).
Appellant argues that Taylor did not demonstrate a course of conduct of
abuse and characterizes the instant case as “a single threat [] and an
aggressive maneuver of a passing vehicle on the roadway[,]” asserting that
“there was insufficient historical evidence presented to support the finding of
abuse[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 9-10. Appellant also argues that “[Taylor’s] own
testimony, as well as [Cassandra’s], reveals that neither feared serious
imminent harm” during either incident. Id. at 12.
-4- J-S18003-26
The PFA court found that Taylor had established his case by a
preponderance of the evidence and specifically identified Taylor and
Cassandra’s testimony regarding Appellant’s “road rage aggression” when
Appellant “sped up beside [them.]” N.T. Hr’g, 11/10/25, at 101.
Reviewing the evidence of record in the light most favorable to and
granting all reasonable inferences to Taylor, we find that there was sufficient
evidence of abuse based solely on the July 3, 2025 “road rage” incident as
Appellant’s dangerous behavior placed Taylor in reasonable fear of a serious
car accident. Taylor and Cassandra’s testimony that Appellant aggressively
swerved her vehicle towards theirs several times while speeding at 90 miles
per hour, causing Taylor to “fear for [his] safety and the safety of [his]
family[,]” supports the PFA court’s conclusion that Appellant committed an act
that placed the family in “reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”
N.T. Hr’g, 9/29/25, at 9, 20; 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(2). Therefore, the PFA court
did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in granting the PFA order.
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