H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Whiting Milk Co.

186 N.E.2d 904, 345 Mass. 287, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421, 1963 Mass. LEXIS 655
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedJanuary 4, 1963
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 186 N.E.2d 904 (H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Whiting Milk Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Whiting Milk Co., 186 N.E.2d 904, 345 Mass. 287, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421, 1963 Mass. LEXIS 655 (Mass. 1963).

Opinion

Cutter, J.

Hood seeks to enjoin Whiting from “unfairly competing with” it by using milk cartons “substantially identical in size and shape” and colored in a combination of red and white “closely similar . . . in . . . tone” to that used by Hood, which Hood alleges “had acquired a secondary significance designating . . . [Hood] as the source of origin of the . . . milk . . . sold in . . . [such] cartons.” On information and belief, Hood alleges that Whiting “deliberately discontinued its former blue, yellow, *288 and white color scheme and adopted a red and white color scheme with intent that its newly colored container would present a general appearance similar to that of . . . [Hood’s] container, and would thereby confuse purchasers.” It is further alleged that display of the Hood and Whiting cartons, particularly the half gallon containers, in self-service stores “has, in fact, . . . misled purchasers into selecting” a Whiting container instead of a Hood container.

Flattened samples of Hood’s container and of Whiting’s former and present containers were annexed to, and referred to in, the bill. There are substantial differences between the design of the Hood container and that of either Whiting container and in the portions of the respective containers upon which dark colored ink appeared. 1 The details of the design were not similar.

Whiting filed a demurrer which was sustained on the ground that the bill set forth no facts entitling Hood to equitable relief against Whiting. Hood appealed from an interlocutory decree sustaining the demurrer and from a final decree dismissing the bill.

1. We interpret the allegations of the bill as referring to, and as controlled by, the actual sample containers attached to the bill. See Donahue v. Kenney, 327 Mass. 409, 413, 414 (where, in passing upon a plea, a copy of a document attached to the bill and not denied was considered to be true). Cf. Caton v. Reuther, 341 Mass. 547, 553. The demurrer, addressed to the bill as a whole on the grounds of *289 want of equity (see Baker v. Paeff, 318 Mass. 366, 368), was properly sustained, if actual proof of the allegations of the bill, read as referring to these sample containers, would not entitle Hood to relief, and should have been overruled if upon such proof relief could be granted on any ground or for any purpose. We assume, for purposes of passing upon the demurrer, that the Hood carton before us has acquired a secondary meaning (if as a matter of law such a significance can be acquired in the circumstances), that Whiting intended that its new carton “would present a general appearance similar to that of” Hood’s and would mislead purchasers into buying Whiting’s milk instead of Hood’s milk, and that purchasers have been misled. These assumptions, however, relate to and are limited by the actual appearance of the respective containers.

2. The Hood container and the Whiting container are made by the same manufacturer (Weyerhaeuser Company, Milk Carton Division) and are precisely the same shape. No contention appears to be (or could well be) made that this shape is not functional (see Restatement: Torts, §§ 741, 742) or that Whiting, or indeed any milk vendor, is not as much entitled as Hood to use such containers, just as any milk vendor may purchase and use ordinary milk bottles. Examination of the decoration of the two cartons shows no substantial similarity (apart from color) in design. We think it fair to say that the only resemblance (apart from the functional aspect of size and shape) is in the red color of the portions of the containers which are not the natural color of the cardboard, or, perhaps, is in the existence of the combination of red and natural color (inevitable, of course, if only one printing of the cardboard is to be employed).

The principle governing the acquisition of a right to protection in the use of color in connection with the marketing of goods was stated in New England Awl & Needle Co. v. Marlborough Awl & Needle Co. 168 Mass. 154, 156, “Of course a person cannot claim the monopoly of a color in connection with a particular line of trade, and very likely *290 not in connection with the labels of a certain kind of goods generally. But the most universal element may be appropriated as the specific mark of a plaintiff’s goods if it is used and claimed only in connection with a sufficiently complex combination of other things” 2 (emphasis supplied). Injunctive relief has been granted, with appropriate limitations, where color and other elements in combination have operated to confuse the public. See Hildreth v. D. S. McDonald Co. 164 Mass. 16, 17 (relief against “a palpable imitation” of the plaintiff’s red printed yellow wrappers of molasses candy); Grocers Supply Co. v. Dupuis, 219 Mass. 576, 578-579 (labels “simulating those of the plaintiff in color, design and reading matter” on similar packages with “like trade names”); California Wine & Liquor Corp. v. William Zakon & Sons, Inc. 297 Mass. 373, 376-377 (brand labels on two similar bottles filled with the same whiskey, one brand sold under the name “Four Aces” and the other brand under the name “Boyal Flush,” contained playing cards similarly arranged, trade names printed in an arc upon corresponding spots of the label, identical descriptions of the product in about the same spot on the label, and the same color scheme); Norton v. Chioda, 317 Mass. 446, 447-448, 451 (the distinctive combination of four colors and a roof light on the plaintiff’s taxicabs was protected from imitation by the defendants which caused confusion when vehicles were seen from the front) . 3

Other courts have been slow to protect labels, packages, or products where similarity of color alone was involved. *291 See Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co. 175 F. 2d 795, 797-799 (3d Cir.); Fram Corp. v. Boyd, 230 F. 2d 931, 934 (5th Cir.); Norwich Pharmacol Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 271 F. 2d 569 (2d Cir.). See also Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Houston Ice & Brewing Co. 250 U. S. 28, 29-30. Cf. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 265 U. S. 526, 531-532. 4 Nevertheless, when taken in connection with other factors, color is an element to consider where unfair competition by intentional passing off is in issue. See Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks (2d ed.) § 82.1 (h), and also §§ 71.5-71.5 (b); Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (4th ed.) §§ 116-133. See also

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Bluebook (online)
186 N.E.2d 904, 345 Mass. 287, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421, 1963 Mass. LEXIS 655, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/h-p-hood-sons-inc-v-whiting-milk-co-mass-1963.