H. E. Schwitters & Sons v. United States

26 C.C.P.A. 288, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 234
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 27, 1938
DocketNo. 4165
StatusPublished

This text of 26 C.C.P.A. 288 (H. E. Schwitters & Sons v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
H. E. Schwitters & Sons v. United States, 26 C.C.P.A. 288, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 234 (ccpa 1938).

Opinion

Lenroot, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal brings before us for review a judgment of the United States Customs Court, Third Division, overruling appellant’s protest against the classification by the collector at the port of New York and assessment with duty upon an importation from Cuba of olera in its natural state. The merchandise was classified by said collector under paragraph 774 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The protest claimed it to be free of duty under paragraph 1722 of said tariff act; other alternative claims were made in the protest, but they are not pressed here.

Said competing provisions of the tariff act read as follows:

Par. 774. Vegetables in their natural state: * * * all other, not specially provided for, 50 per centum ad valorem * * *.
Par. 1722. Moss, seaweeds, and vegetable substances, crude or unmanufactured-not specially provided for.

The case was originally submitted to the Customs Court upon a stipulation of fact which, so far as is here pertinent, reads as follows:

It is stipulated and agreed by and between counsel for the plaintiff and the Assistant Attorney General for the United States in the matter of the above entitled protest as follows:
1. That the merchandise assessed with duty at the rate of 50% ad valorem, less 20 % ad valorem by virtue of the Treaty of Commercial Reciprocity concluded [289]*289between the United States and the Republic of Cuba December 11, 1902, under the provisions of paragraph 774, Tariff Act of 1930, consists of okra.
2. That the said merchandise consists of the fruit or pod of the plant botanically known as hibiscus esculentus or Abelmoschus esculentus.
3. That the said fruit or pods are cut from the plant and imported in that •condition.
4. That the said merchandise is in its natural condition.
5. That Exhibit 1 hereto attached may be received in evidence as a true sample of the merchandise the subject of this protest.

The Customs Court rendered a decision overruling said protest, but a rehearing was granted and a further stipulation of fact was entered into, which-reads as follows:

It is stipulated and agreed by and between counsel for the plaintiff and the Assistant Attorney General for the United States in the matter of the above entitled protest that the statement quoted below found in United States Tariff Commission’s Report to The President on Fresh Vegetables, Report No. 39, Second Series, is true and correct, and agree that the same be considered as evidence in the case at bar:
DESCRIPTION AND USES
Okra, also known as gumbo, is a tropical plant. The edible portion consists of the fruit, or seed pod, which is gathered two or three times a week and used while green and tender. It is used chiefly in soups, but is also served as a vegetable. It is canned commercially on a very small scale, but is mostly marketed, in the fresh state.
It is further stipulated and agreed that the protest be deemed submitted on this stipulation.

Upon the case being again submitted, the Customs Court rendered a decision again overruling said protest and entered judgment accordingly; from such judgment this appeal was taken.

But one question is involved, viz, whether the imported merchandise is, in a tariff sense, a vegetable in its natural state and properly classified under paragraph 774, or is a crude or unmanufactured vegetable substance, free of duty under paragraph 1722.

It is appellant’s contention that the merchandise is not a vegetable because, under the stipulation, it is chiefly used in soups, and that, in order for a substance to be classified as a vegetable, it must be such as is commonly used as the vegetable part of the meal.

Appellant’s counsel cites a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court. We quote from his brief as follows:

In the case of Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U. S. 412, 32 L. ed. 995 (1889), the Supreme Court of the United States passed upon the dutiable classification of white beans. The importer claimed they were dutiable as seeds and the Government claimed they were dutiable as vegetables. In remanding the cause for a new trial, the court said, inter alia:
On the other hand, in speaking generally of provisions, beans may well be included under the term “vegetables.” As an article of food on our tables, whether baked or boiled, or forming the basis of soup, they are used as a vegetable, as well when ripe as when green.
[290]*290In Nix v. Hedden, 149 U. S. 304, 37 L. ed. 745 (1893), the issue was whether tomatoes should pay duty as vegetables or as fruit. In holding that tomatoes-were vegetables in the tariff sense, the Supreme Court stated as follows: .
Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all those are vegetables, which are grown in> kitchen gardens, and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, a,re like potatoes,, carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery, and lettuce, usually served at dinner in, with, or after the soup, fish, or meats which constitute the-principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.

It will be observed that in both of these cases the court recognized' that vegetables may form the basis of soup or be eaten in soup.

The case of Von Bremen, McMonnies & Co. v. United States, 168 Fed. 889, is also cited by counsel for appellant. The case involved the dutiable classification of truffles. The court stated:

The Supreme Court held in Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U. S. 412, 9 Sup. Ct. 559, 32 L. Ed. 995, and in Nix v. Redden, 149 U. S. 304, 13 Sup. Ct. 881, 37 L. Ed. 745, that the word “vegetables” in the tariff acts must be given its ordinary rather than its botanical meaning. Therefore beans, which are seeds botanically, and tomatoes, which are fruits, were classed in accordance with the ordinary understanding as vegetables, usually served at dinner. Though truffles belong to the vegetable kingdom, they are used solely as a condiment in cooking and never separately served as a table dish, and are not included in the trade or in ordinary usage among vegetables. * * *

It will be observed that that case involved the classification of a. condiment. A number of decisions of this court are also cited, but. all of them involved the dutiable classification of condiments or relishes not used as articles of food.

In the case of United States v. Wallace et al., 4 Ct. Cust. Appls. 142, T. D.

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Related

Robertson v. Salomon
130 U.S. 412 (Supreme Court, 1889)
Nix v. Hedden
149 U.S. 304 (Supreme Court, 1893)
United States v. Wallace
4 Ct. Cust. 142 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1913)
Togasaki v. United States
12 Ct. Cust. 463 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1925)
Von Bremen v. United States
168 F. 889 (Second Circuit, 1909)

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Bluebook (online)
26 C.C.P.A. 288, 1938 CCPA LEXIS 234, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/h-e-schwitters-sons-v-united-states-ccpa-1938.