Guzman v. Western State Bank of Devils Lake, ND

381 F. Supp. 1262, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6603
CourtDistrict Court, D. North Dakota
DecidedSeptember 25, 1974
DocketCiv. 4826
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 381 F. Supp. 1262 (Guzman v. Western State Bank of Devils Lake, ND) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. North Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guzman v. Western State Bank of Devils Lake, ND, 381 F. Supp. 1262, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6603 (D.N.D. 1974).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BENSON, Chief Judge.

In this action, plaintiffs, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), § 2201, and § 2202, are challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 32-08 North Dakota Century Code (NDCC), and pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and § 1343(4) are seeking redress from the defendants. Defendants have moved under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment of dismissal.

There are certain unresolved issues of fact in the case relating to plaintiffs’ allegations of abuse of legal process, bad faith, invasion of privacy, negligence, breach of warranty and damages, all of which are properly issues to be resolved in an action pending in the State Court. For the purpose of consideration of defendants’ motions in this Court, there are no genuine issues as to any material fact.

The plaintiffs entered into a retail installment contract and security agreement with Defendant William Johnson, doing business as Bill’s Mobile Homes, Devils Lake, North Dakota, on September 14, 1970, for the purchase of a 1970 Medallion Mobile Home. Under the *1264 agreement, Johnson and subsequent assignees retained title. Johnson assigned the retail contract and security agreement executed by the plaintiffs to defendant, The Western State Bank of Devils Lake, North Dakota (Western), which took it with recourse. On the same date, a second security agreement was taken by Western from plaintiffs covering the mobile home and a 1969 Chevrolet automobile, apparently securing some interest which Western had in the automobile. The plaintiffs resided in the mobile home, which remained mounted on its wheels with siding attached.

Plaintiffs became delinquent on their payments. 1 Western proceeded against the plaintiffs through an attachment action pursuant to Chapter 32-08 NDCC. 2 The action was filed in District Court, State of North Dakota, Second Judicial District, Rolette County, North Dakota, and has not been tried.

As required by law, a verified complaint, an affidavit setting forth the grounds for attachment, and a bond, were filed with the clerk of court who thereupon issued a warrant of attachment under the seal of the court and attested in the name of a judge of the court. The warrant was delivered to Defendant LeRoy Ouellette, Sheriff of Rolette County, for execution. See § 32-08-05, § 32-08-01, subd. 8, § 32-08-06, § 32-08-04, and § 32-08-08 NDCC.

The Sheriff executed the warrant by seizing the mobile home and automobile, which was the procedure provided by law. 3 Plaintiffs then commenced an action in federal court, alleging that in authorizing seizure without prior notice and hearing, Chapter 32-08 NDCC violated the Fourteenth Amendment requirements of due process. Plaintiffs rely principally on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). However, defendants have based their motion on Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974). 4 This Court has concluded that the North Dakota attachment statutes give the debtor the same constitutional protections which the Supreme Court found under the laws of Louisiana in Mitchell, and on the 17th day of September, 1974, entered its Order dismissing plaintiffs’ federal claims.

In Mitchell, the creditor had filed a suit against the debtor alleging the sale of a refrigerator, range, stereo and washing machine through an installment sales contract. Payment was in arrears and the creditor alleged that it had a vendor’s lien on the goods. The complaint was accompanied by an affidavit from the creditor’s credit manager attesting to the truth of the facts alleged. The creditor also asserted that it had *1265 reason to believe that the debtor would encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the merchandise during the pendency of the proceedings. Based on this petition and affidavit, and after posting of the required bond, the judge issued a writ of sequestration. Pursuant to the writ of sequestration, seizure was made and a summons was served. The issue was whether the seizure constituted a deprivation of property without due process of law. It was held that the issuance of the sequestration writ without notice and hearing did not violate procedural due process, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, since the Louisiana system adequately protected the debtor's interest, and that where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate.

“[TJhere is scant support in our cases for the proposition that there must be final judicial determination of the seller’s entitlement before the buyer may be even temporarily deprived of possession of the purchased goods. On the contrary, it seems apparent that the seller with his own interest in the disputed merchandise would need to establish in any event only the probability that his case will succeed to warrant the bonded sequestration of the property pending outcome of the suit. Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950). The issue at this stage of the proceeding concerns possession pending trial and turns on the existence of the debt, the lien, and the delinquency. These are ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof; and we think it comports with due process to permit the initial seizure on sworn ex parte documents, followed by the early opportunity to put the creditor to his proof. The nature of the issues at stake minimize the risk that the writ will be wrongfully issued by a judge. The potential damage award available, if there is a successful motion to dissolve the writ, as well as the creditor’s own interest in avoiding interrupting the transaction, also contribute to minimizing this risk.” Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 609, 94 S.Ct. at 1901, 40 L. Ed.2d at 414, 415.

Plaintiffs direct their principal attack on the provision of the North Dakota statute which authorizes the clerk of court to issue a warrant of attachment.

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Related

Johnson v. Haugland
303 N.W.2d 533 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1981)
Rolette County v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.
452 F. Supp. 125 (D. North Dakota, 1978)
Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina
392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D. North Carolina, 1975)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
381 F. Supp. 1262, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6603, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guzman-v-western-state-bank-of-devils-lake-nd-ndd-1974.