Guzman v. Brazon

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedMarch 7, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00226
StatusUnknown

This text of Guzman v. Brazon (Guzman v. Brazon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guzman v. Brazon, (W.D.N.C. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION 3:24-cv-00226-RJC-SCR ESTEBAN ARAUJO GUZMAN ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ORDER ) ) BEGE ANDREINA KATTA ) BRAZON ) ) Respondent. ) ____________________________________) THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Application for a Warrant Seeking Physical Custody of the Child, and Scheduling of an Expedited Hearing. (Doc. No. 4). The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 9003(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). By necessity, all facts and allegations contained herein are taken solely from Petitioner’s filings. Based on the verified complaint, the Child was born on June 2, 2021, in Lima Peru, where Petitioner, Respondent, and the Child resided together. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). The Child attended nursery school in Peru. Id. On July 13, 2023, Petitioner, Respondent, and the Child visited Indian Trail, North Carolina together. Id. Shortly before they were due to leave, on July 30, 2023, Respondent and her family members advised Petitioner that she and the child would not return to Peru. Id. at 4. Petitioner believes the Child is staying with Respondent and her family at the family’s home in Indian Trail, North Carolina. On September 7, 2023, Petitioner’s Request for Return of the Child was

submitted to the United States Department of State through the Peruvian Central Authority. Id. Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint and Petition for Return of the Child, (Doc. No. 1), on February 26, 2024. The present motion was filed March 1, 2024. Petitioner brings this action under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention”) and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).1 In sum, Petitioner seeks the following: (a) an immediate ex parte temporary restraining order prohibiting the removal of the Child

from the jurisdiction of this Court pending a hearing on the merits of this Verified Complaint, and further providing that no person acting in concert or participating with Respondent, shall take any action to remove the Child from the jurisdiction of this Court pending a determination on the merits of the Verified Petition; (b) a warrant issued by the Court requiring the United States Marshall to take physical custody of the child and place her in the Petitioner’s care pending a hearing on the

merits of the Verified Complaint, and further authorizing such officer to serve Respondent with notice of the hearing and the pleadings filed by Petitioner in this case; (c) an expedited preliminary injunction hearing on the merits of the Verified Complaint requiring Respondent to show cause at this hearing why the Child should

1 Petitioner cites ICARA at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11610. This statute was transferred to 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011. not be returned to Peru by Petitioner, and why such other relief requested in the Verified Complaint should not be granted; and (d) an order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, that the trial of the action on the merits be advanced and

consolidated with the hearing on the Verified Complaint. (Doc. No. 4). The Court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.

A TRO or preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief” and may never be awarded “as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 24 (2008). The Fourth Circuit has similarly recognized that the grant of such a remedy involves “the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in [the] limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v.

Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013). In order to receive an injunction prior to a final decision on the merits, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the preliminary injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Western Pocahontas Properties Limited Partnership, 918 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2019). “In adopting the Hague Convention, the signatory nations sought ‘to protect

children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access.’” Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hague Convention, pmbl., T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1501). Thus, the primary purpose of the Hague Convention is to preserve the status quo. Id. (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993)).

To prove Respondent’s retention was wrongful under the applicable law, Petitioner must establish: (1) the Child was a habitual resident of Peru at the time of wrongful retention; (2) the wrongful retention breached Petitioner’s custody rights under Peruvian law; and (3) Petitioner had been exercising his custodial rights at the time of wrongful retention. See Velasquez v. Velasquez, No. 1:14CV1688 JCC/TRJ, 2014 WL 7272934, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2014) (first citing Miller, 240 F.3d at 398;

and then citing 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1)(A)). Under ICARA, “any court exercising jurisdiction of an action brought under section 9003(b) of this title may take or cause to be taken measures under Federal or State law, as appropriate, to protect the well-being of the child involved or to prevent the child’s further removal or concealment before the final disposition of the petition.” 22 U.S.C. § 9004(a).

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Related

Doris Miller v. William Miller
240 F.3d 392 (Fourth Circuit, 2001)
Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County
722 F.3d 184 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
Guzman v. Brazon, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guzman-v-brazon-ncwd-2024.