Guzman Rivera v. Rivera Cruz

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                                     
                                 ____________________

No. 93-2164
                            HECTOR GUZMAN-RIVERA, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                             HECTOR RIVERA-CRUZ, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Gilberto Gierbolini, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

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Before

                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                      _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

____________________

Victoria A. Ferrer-Kerber,  with whom Alvaro R. Calder n, Jr. and
             _________________________             _______________________
        Law Offices of Alvaro R. Calder n, Jr. were on brief for appellants.
        ______________________________________
             Jos  R.  Gaztambide-A eses, with  whom Benito  I. Rodr guez-Mass 
             __________________________             __________________________
        and Law Offices of Gaztambide & Plaza were on brief for appellees.
            _________________________________

____________________

                                    July 13, 1994
                                                     
                                 ____________________

CYR, Circuit  Judge.   Plaintiffs Hector  Guzman Rivera
                    CYR, Circuit  Judge.
                         ______________

          ("Guzman") and  family members  appeal a district  court judgment

          dismissing Guzman's civil  rights action against various  present

          and  former officials of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as time-

          barred.  We vacate  the summary judgment entered by  the district

          court and remand for further proceedings.

I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

On Christmas Eve, 1987, the manager of a Domino's Pizza

          establishment  in  Carolina, Puerto  Rico,  was  shot and  killed

          during an armed  robbery.  Eyewitnesses identified Guzman  as the

          perpetrator.  Guzman, who was living in New York at the time, was

          extradited, tried, convicted, and sentenced to 119 years' impris-

          onment.  In the  wake of the conviction, Guzman's  father, Hector

          Guzman Fernandez,  instigated an independent  investigation which

          yielded an "informant"  who claimed to  have provided the  weapon

          used in the robbery and to know the identity of the real culprit.

          Guzman's  father, proof in  hand, set out on  August 21, 1989, to

          secure his son's exoneration.

                    During  the fall of 1989  and the spring  of 1990, Guz-

          man's  father repeatedly  corresponded  and met  with defendants-

          appellees Hector  Rivera Cruz,  Secretary of Justice,  and either

          Luis Feliciano Carreras, Director  of the Prosecutor's Office, or

          his  successor, Pedro  Geronimo Goyco  (collectively, the  defen-

          dants).  During  an investigation conducted  by the Civil  Rights

                                          2

Division  of the Puerto Rico Justice Department in March 1990, an

          eyewitness  recanted her identification;  the informant confirmed

          that  Guzman was not the killer and identified the real perpetra-

          tor; and Guzman's mother attested that her son was in New York at

          the time of the murder. 

                    The  mounting evidence  of Guzman's  innocence notwith-

          standing, even after  the Civil  Rights Division  issued its  own

          investigative report concluding that Guzman had not committed the

          murder,  the  Director  of  the Prosecutor's  Office  refused  to

          authorize Guzman's release.   Indeed, at a meeting in  April 1990

          Guzman's father  was informed that the  Prosecutor's Office would

          take  no  corrective action  regarding  Guzman  until the  actual

          perpetrator had been taken into custody.

                    At  or about June 15,  1990, Guzman filed  a motion for

          new  trial with the San Juan Superior Court and served the Secre-

          tary of Justice with a motion  for release.  Before the Secretary

          of  Justice  acted on  the motion  for  release, the  Governor of

          Puerto  Rico, in  response  to a  request  from Guzman's  father,

          directed Guzman's release on June 15, 1990. 

                    Guzman instituted the present  action on June 14, 1991.

          Defendants countered with a  motion to dismiss, see Fed.  R. Civ.
                                                          ___

          P. 12(b)(6), asserting prosecutorial  immunity and the statute of

          limitations.   The district court later  entered summary judgment

          for all defendants-appellees, see  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b),  56, on
                                        ___

          the ground that the  action was time-barred under  the applicable

          one-year statute of  limitations.  On appeal, Guzman  argues that

3

summary  judgment was  improvidently granted  on the  limitations

          defense because a  trialworthy issue  existed as to  the date  on

          which the section 1983 claim accrued.  We agree.

II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

We review a grant of summary judgment de  novo, employ-
                                                          __  ____

          ing  the same criteria incumbent  upon the district  court in the

          first  instance.  Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873,
                            ___________    ___________________

          874-75 (1st  Cir. 1993).   Summary judgment is  appropriate where

          the record, viewed in  the light most favorable to  the nonmoving

          party, reveals  no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the

          moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.
                                                                    ___

                    Although it is clear  that the one-year personal injury

          limitation  applies to  the  present action,  see, e.g.,  Lafont-
                                                        ___  ____   _______

          Rivera v. Soler-Zapata, 984  F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1993);  see also
          ______    ____________                                   ___ ____

          P.R. Laws Ann. tit.  31,   5298 (1991), federal law  controls the

          accrual  of section 1983 claims.   Lafont-Rivera, 984  F.2d at 3.
                                             _____________

          The first step in fixing accrual is to identify the actual injury

          of  which the plaintiff complains.  Heck v. Humphrey, 62 U.S.L.W.
                                              ____    ________

          4594,  4598 (U.S.  June  24, 1994)  (prescribing federal  accrual

          analysis  in  section  1983  actions predicated  on  the  alleged

          invalidity  of  an  underlying  criminal  conviction);  see  also
                                                                  ___  ____

          LaFont-Rivera, 984 F.2d  at 3.  Guzman  essentially contends that
          _____________

          the defendant officials owed him a constitutionally-based duty to

          investigate substantial post-conviction allegations  of innocence

                                          4

and  to  release him  from  confinement upon  presentation  of an

          unspecified quantum of exculpatory  evidence.  The district court

          indulged Guzman's theory for  purposes of its limitations ruling.

          Although we note  scant authority  for the theory,1  we need  not

          determine  its  viability at  this  juncture  because the  actual

          injury implicitly alleged is that Guzman was wrongfully convicted
          ______

          and/or wrongfully detained after  defendants were apprised of the

          exculpatory  evidence.   We consider  the  accrual issue  in this

          light.

                    The  Supreme Court recently clarified the circumstances

          in  which section 1983 can  be used to  redress alleged constitu-

          tional  deprivations  sounding  in malicious  prosecution,  false

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               1Guzman  relies on  a fragment  of dicta from  Maslauskas v.
                                                              __________
          United States, 583 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1984)    a Federal Tort
          _____________
          Claims  Act  case wherein  the  court observed  that  "in certain
          circumstances the government owes  prisoners a continuing duty to
          uncover  'the absence  of a  constitutionally adequate  basis for
          confinement,'" id. at 351 (citing Steubig v. Hammel, 446 F. Supp.
                         ___                _______    ______
          31, 33  (M.D. Pa. 1977))     but ignores the very  next clause in
          the district  court opinion which emphasizes  that the government
          generally  "does not owe the prisoner a continuing duty to review
          and re-review" the basis for confinement, id.  Moreover, Steubig,
                                                    ___            _______
          like  O'Connor v.  Donaldson, 422  U.S. 563  (1975), involved  an
                ________     _________
          attempt  to use  section  1983 to  redress excessive  confinement
          arising from  an  inaccurate  assessment  of the  progress  of  a
          patient  involuntarily committed to a mental health facility.  Of
          course, as  the district court itself  suggested, see Maslauskas,
                                                            ___ __________
          583  F. Supp. at 351, the government's "continuing duty to review
          and re-review" the basis  for confinement is more clear  in those
          circumstances.   Other cases  relied  on by  Guzman are  likewise
          inapposite. See Lewis v.  O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366 (7th  Cir. 1988)
                      ___ _____     _______
          (section 1983 used to  redress excessive confinement arising from
          mistaken  incarceration of plaintiff after judicial exoneration);
          Haygood  v.  Younger, 769  F.2d 1350  (9th  Cir. 1985)  (en banc)
          _______      _______                                     __ ____
          (section 1983 used to  redress excessive confinement arising from
          miscalculation of sentence), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986).
                                       _____ ______

                                          5

imprisonment, and false arrest,  by outlining the federal accrual

          analysis applicable to claims akin to the present:

                    [I]n order to recover for  damages for alleg-
                    edly unconstitutional conviction or imprison-
                    ment, or  for  other harm  caused by  actions
                          __  ___  _____ ____  ______ __  _______
                    whose unlawfulness would render  a conviction
                    _____ ____________ _____ ______  _ __________
                    or sentence invalid, a   1983  plaintiff must
                    __ ________ _______
                    prove  that  the conviction  or  sentence has
                    been reversed  on direct appeal,  expunged by
                    executive order, declared invalid by  a state
                    tribunal authorized to  make such  determina-
                    tion,  or called into  question by  a federal
                    court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
                                        * * *
                         [Accordingly,] a   1983 cause  of action
                          ___________   _ _ ____ _____  __ ______
                    for  damages  attributable to  an unconstitu-
                    ___  _______  ____________ __  __ ___________
                    tional conviction or sentence does not accrue
                    ______ __________ __ ________ ____ ___ ______
                    until  the conviction  or  sentence has  been
                    _____  ___ __________  __  ________ ___  ____
                    invalidated.
                    ___________

          Heck,  62 U.S.L.W. at  4598 (emphasis added).   We now  apply the
          ____

          Heck analysis to the present action.  
          ____

                    It  is  clear from  the  summary  judgment record  that

          Guzman was released from  prison on June 15, 1990,  less than one

          year prior  to the filing of  the instant action.   Therefore, if

          the conviction  was "reversed[,] . .  . expunged . .  . [or] held

          invalid,"  id., by  competent executive  or judicial  action2 not
                     ___                                                ___

          earlier than June 14, 1990, an actionable section 1983 claim "for
          _______ ____

          harm  caused by  actions  whose unlawfulness  would render  [his]

          conviction or  sentence invalid," id., would  not be time-barred.
                                            ___

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               2Guzman's brief  on appeal  represents that his  release was
                         _____
          prompted by  the intervention  of  the Governor  of Puerto  Rico.
          However, the official record of the Puerto Rico Administration of
          Corrections indicates that  Guzman was released on  bond June 15,
          1990, after  his  motion for  new trial  had been  granted.   The
          record  does not  disclose  whether a  new  trial has  ever  been
          conducted,  nor whether any governmental action has been taken to
          expunge or invalidate the conviction.  

                                          6

The summary judgment proceedings included in the appellate record

          do not enable  a determination  as to whether,  and if so,  when,

          Guzman's  conviction was  undone.   Consequently, as  the accrual

          issue cannot be  resolved on the present record, summary judgment

          was premature.    See, e.g.,  Greenburg v.  Puerto Rico  Maritime
                            ___  ____   _________     _____________________

          Shipping  Auth., 835 F.2d 932,  934 (1st Cir.  1987) (if material
          _______________

          factual issues require resolution  before pivotal legal issue can

          be decided, summary judgment must be vacated).

III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

The  district court judgment must be vacated.  The case

          shall  be remanded  to  permit the  district  court to  determine

          whether Guzman's  conviction  was ever  invalidated  as  required

          under Heck.  See Heck, 62 U.S.L.W.  at 4598.  If not, the section
                ____   ___ ____

          1983 claims  against all  defendants shall be  dismissed, without

          prejudice, as premature.   Otherwise, any actionable section 1983

          claim  shall be deemed to have accrued  not earlier than the date

          on which Guzman's conviction  was reversed, expunged or otherwise

          determined invalid, see id. 
                              ___ ___

                    The  district court  judgment is  vacated; the  case is
                    ___  ________ _____  ________ __  _______  ___  ____ __

          remanded for  further proceedings consistent  with this  opinion;
          ________ ___  _______ ___________ __________  ____ ____  _______

          costs to appellants.
          _____ __ __________

7