Guzman-Corona v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 30, 2024
• Docket: 22-9582
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 22-9582 Document: 010110992011 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 30, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MARIO GUZMAN-CORONA,

Petitioner,

v. No. 22-9582 (Petition for Review) MERRICK B. GARLAND, Untied States Attorney General,

Respondent. _________________________________

ORDER* _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner Mario Guzman-Corona’s

application for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeal (“BIA”)

dismissed his appeal. Petitioner has filed a petition for review. We dismiss the petition

for lack of jurisdiction.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 22-9582 Document: 010110992011 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 2

I.

In 1997, Petitioner, a citizen and native of Mexico, entered the United States

without authorization. Twenty years later, the United States government began

removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for Cancellation of Removal for Certain

Nonpermanent Residents under § 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). During the proceedings, Petitioner

testified that he saw his children almost daily and paid child support. Petitioner

expressed concern that he would never see his children again as their mother, his ex-

wife, made no effort to have the children visit him while he was in detainment. And

he feared emotional and financial harm for his children upon his removal. The IJ

denied Petitioner’s application because he did not establish that his children would

suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon his removal.

Petitioner appealed the IJ’s denial and requested to remand the record for

additional consideration of his application. Petitioner presented new evidence that,

after his ex-wife moved to another city, his oldest child decided to live with him. He

also claimed that his oldest child cannot pay for his college and living expenses

alone, and thus will be unable to attend college. Despite the additional evidence, the

BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied Petitioner’s request for remand,

concluding that Petitioner’s children would not experience exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship. Petitioner appeals.

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II.

Because a single member of the BIA issued an order affirming the IJ's decision,

we review both the BIA's decision and any parts of the IJ's decision upon which the BIA

relied. Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Razkane v.

Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir.2009)). We lack jurisdiction to review the

BIA’s discretionary decision on whether a petitioner’s qualifying relative will suffer

an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d

1176, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2020) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). But under

Ҥ 1252(a)(2)(D), we retain jurisdiction over questions of law that arise from the

[BIA’s] hardship determination.” As such, “we have jurisdiction to review a claim

that the [BIA] departed from its own adopted hardship standard, by ignoring it or

favoring some other inapplicable standard.” Id. (citing Aburto-Rocha v. Mukasey,

535 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 2008)). We review questions of law de novo.

Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Sosa-

Valenzuela v. Holder, 692 F.3d 1103, 1109 (10th Cir. 2012)).

Petitioner argues that the BIA departed from its legal precedent when the BIA

and the IJ failed to account for the totality of the circumstances. Petitioner is

incorrect. The BIA did not depart from its legal precedent. For cancellation of

removal, the IJ must consider all hardship factors in the aggregate. Monreal-

Aguinaga, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 64 (2001). Here, the IJ determined that “none of

[Petitioner’s hardship] factors individually rise to the level of exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship. And in the aggregate, they do not meet that burden as

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well.” The BIA also asserted that the IJ “considered the aggregate effect of the

relevant factors.” We agree with the BIA and conclude that the IJ considered the

aggregate effect of the relevant factors. Thus, the IJ and the BIA did not depart from

legal precedent.

Petitioner also argues that his situation is indistinguishable from Recinas,

23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002), where the petitioner—a single mother of four children

with United States citizenship and who carried the family’s financial burden—was

entitled to cancellation of removal. But we lack jurisdiction if “the [IJ and BIA]

acknowledges its standard and exercises its discretion within the bounds of its

precedents’ cabining of such discretion.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1183. Here,

the IJ and BIA considered Recinas in their decision and exercised their discretion

within the bounds of said precedent. The IJ discussed how Petitioner’s situation was

more like Monreal-Aguinaga than Recinas. “That the [BIA] has announced a

standard to aid its hardship determination does not create jurisdiction for us to review

the [BIA’s] application of that standard.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1183.

Because the BIA and IJ did not depart from legal precedent, we find no legal error.

As such, we lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim and DISMISS his appeal.

Entered for the Court

Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge