Guyton v. State

912 S.E.2d 626, 321 Ga. 57

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: S25A0408
• Status: Published

Opinion

321 Ga. 57 FINAL COPY

S25A0408. GUYTON v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Appellant V’Daul Devontae Malik Guyton was convicted of

malice murder and other charges in connection with the shooting

death of Taurus Thurmond.1 On appeal, Guyton argues that the

evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction

and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective

assistance by failing to object to: (a) the State repeatedly showing

1 Thurmond died on May 11, 2021. On May 27, 2021, a Douglas County

grand jury indicted Guyton for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony murder (Counts 2-4), armed robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault (Count 6), aggravated battery (Count 7), hijacking a motor vehicle (Count 8), theft by taking (Count 9), tampering with the operation of an electronic monitoring device (Count 10), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 11). At a trial from February 27 through March 2, 2023, the jury found Guyton guilty of all counts. On March 7, 2023, the trial court sentenced Guyton to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, plus various consecutive sentences for Counts 5 and 8-11; the other counts were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Guyton filed a timely motion for new trial on March 9, 2023, which was amended by new counsel on June 5, 2024. Following a hearing on August 15, 2024, the trial court denied Guyton’s motion for new trial, as amended, on September 3, 2024. Guyton filed a timely notice of appeal on September 23, 2024, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2024 and thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. crime-scene photographs of Thurmond’s body without warning and

(b) certain testimony regarding Guyton’s criminal past. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

The evidence presented at trial showed the following.

Thurmond had a reputation for helping previously incarcerated

people. According to his roommate, who had been previously

incarcerated and helped by Thurmond, “[Thurmond] acquired a lot

of friends in custody. Cause he — he been incarcerated himself and

he done met a lot of people in and out of jail,” and “he help[ed] a lot

of people that’s incarcerated.” In late April 2021, Thurmond bailed

Guyton out of jail, the two began a romantic relationship, and

Thurmond allowed Guyton to live with him and share his room.

During their short relationship, the two took a trip together to

Florida to visit family and friends of Thurmond, and during that

trip, a family friend who was conversing with Guyton heard him

mutter that “he was going to kill [Thurmond].” About a week later,

on the evening of May 10, 2021, Thurmond told his sister over

Facetime that he “felt used,” was “tired of . . . being taken advantage

2 of,” and “was going to end the relationship with [Guyton].”

Thurmond’s sister testified that she could see Guyton within earshot

of Thurmond during their call.

The next morning, Thurmond’s roommate left the home

because the roommate learned that he had to go re-register as a sex

offender at the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office.2 When the

roommate returned home, he noticed that Thurmond’s vehicle was

gone, found Thurmond’s body in bed with blood on the sheets, and

called 911. No one else was at home. Law enforcement responded

and discovered that Thurmond was dead with three gunshot wounds

to his head; bullets were recovered from Thurmond’s pillow and his

body.

Officers discovered that Guyton was supposed to be wearing an

ankle monitor and that his monitor had been cut off at 10:43 a.m. on

the day that Thurmond was killed. Based on GPS data retrieved

2 In the course of this testimony, the roommate also testified that he had

first spoken to Guyton about two weeks before when Guyton had telephoned from jail and that he first met Guyton soon after when Guyton, having been bailed out by Thurmond, moved in. 3 from Guyton’s ankle monitor, it was at the home he shared with

Thurmond the morning of May 11, but left the home shortly after

10:00 a.m., transmitting again from a nearby Walmart at 10:36 a.m.

Officers obtained surveillance footage from the Walmart, which

showed Guyton there buying scissors. Thurmond’s vehicle was

equipped with a tracking system, and law enforcement found it in

Mississippi in Guyton’s possession later that day. Guyton was also

found in possession of scissors and the Walmart receipt for them;

Thurmond’s bank and credit cards; over $5,000 in cash, along with

ATM receipts from that day; and Thurmond’s gun, a Taurus 9mm.

A firearms examiner testified at trial that Thurmond’s firearm,

which was found in Guyton’s possession, fired the bullets recovered

from the crime scene. The DNA of Thurmond, Guyton, and an

unknown third person was also discovered on the firearm.

1. Guyton contends that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient to support that he shot Thurmond with malice.3

3 Because Guyton only argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction, we do not address the

4 Specifically, he argues that evidence that Thurmond shared his

room with Guyton, introduced Guyton to friends and family

members, and invited Guyton on an out-of-town trip showed that

Guyton and Thurmond had a close, loving, and devoted relationship,

not that Guyton had any malice toward Thurmond. We disagree.

When this Court evaluates the constitutional sufficiency of the

evidence, “we review whether the evidence presented at trial, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, enabled the

jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the

crimes of which [he] was convicted.” Fitts v. State, 312 Ga. 134, 141

(3) (859 SE2d 79) (2021) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). “This limited review

leaves to the jury the resolution of conflicts in the evidence, the

weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and reasonable

inferences to be made from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Muse v.

State, 316 Ga. 639, 647 (2) (889 SE2d 885) (2023) (citation and

sufficiency of the evidence of his other convictions. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (ending practice of sua sponte considering sufficiency of the evidence in non-death penalty cases). 5 punctuation omitted).

OCGA § 16-5-1 provides in relevant part:

(a) A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being. (b) Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another human being which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

“In other words, malice may be inferred from evidence of

conduct that demonstrates such a reckless disregard for human life

as to show an abandoned and malignant heart.” Allaben v. State,

315 Ga. 789, 792-93 (1) (885 SE2d 1) (2023) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “The malice necessary to establish malice

murder may be formed in an instant, as long as it is present at the

time of the killing,” Benton v. State, 305 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (a) (824

SE2d 322) (2019), and “[t]he issue of whether a killing is intentional

and malicious is for the jury to determine from all the facts and

circumstances,” Allaben, 315 Ga. at 793 (1) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

6 Guyton’s argument that the evidence showed only a loving

relationship and therefore failed to prove malice ignores that:

Guyton threatened to kill Thurmond; Guyton was able to hear

Thurmond telling his sister the night before his murder that he

planned to end his relationship with Guyton; Thurmond was shot

multiple times in the head while sleeping in his bed; Guyton cut off

his ankle monitor after Thurmond’s murder and was later found in

Mississippi; and Guyton was found in possession of Thurmond’s

vehicle, his firearm (which fired the fatal shots), and his debit and

credit cards and thousands in cash along with ATM receipts. This

evidence of Guyton’s conduct, motives, premeditation, and flight

after the murder was more than sufficient to authorize a rational

jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt not only that Guyton

intended to cause Thurmond’s death, but also that he did so with an

abandoned and malignant heart, thus satisfying the element of

malice. See, e.g., White v. State, 303 Ga. 533, 535 (1) (813 SE2d 592)

(2018) (where evidence showed that husband threatened to kill his

wife if she left him, struck her multiple times in the head with a

7 hammer, and tried to cover up her death, it was sufficient to prove

malice and supported husband’s conviction for malice murder);

Walden v. State, 289 Ga. 845, 846 (1) (717 SE2d 159) (2011)

(evidence sufficient to support malice murder conviction where it

showed “not only the nature of the gunshot wound, but also [the

wife’s] motive to harm [her husband], and her prolonged coverup”).

2. Guyton also asserts that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to: (a) the

prosecutor repeatedly showing gruesome photos of Thurmond’s body

without warning, and (b) certain testimony about Guyton’s criminal

past. For the reasons discussed below, these claims also fail.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

Guyton must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient

and that such deficiency prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984). To establish prejudice, Guyton “must prove that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency, the

result of the trial would have been different.” Bates v. State, 313 Ga.

8 57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022). And if Guyton fails to make a

sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the prejudice prong,

we need not address the other prong. See Washington v. State, 313

Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022).

(a) Photos of Thurmond. During Guyton’s trial, the court

asked counsel to approach the bench, where the court said the

following:

On multiple occasions the State’s Counsel has thrown pictures of the deceased on the screen without warning people in the audience that they are about to do so. These folks are gasping at the pictures, they’re jumping up, they’re leaving the room. They are conducting themselves appropriately, they are not yelling, screaming, or hollering. But they’re reacting to this. And I am going to instruct the State that the State will warn the members of the audience before it does that again. I am concerned for the emotional well- being of these family members. And I am also concerned about the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Maybe the members of the victim’s family could control their reactions if they had a warning. And it’s happened numerous times. So I am ordering the State not to do that again.

Guyton argues that the State’s “continuous showing of

gruesome photos of the decedent without warning, causing members

9 of the audience to emotionally react,” was unfairly prejudicial under

OCGA § 24-4-403,4 and violated Guyton’s right to a fair trial by an

impartial jury under the United States Constitution. Guyton

contends therefore, that by failing to object (presumably before the

trial court sua sponte instructed the State to provide warnings), trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Pretermitting whether trial counsel performed deficiently in

this respect and that, upon objection, the trial court would have

instructed the State sooner to provide warnings before showing the

otherwise admissible photographs, we conclude that Guyton has not

carried his burden of establishing a reasonable probability that had

trial counsel objected, the result of Guyton’s trial would have been

different. The evidence against Guyton—already discussed above—

4 OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) provides: “Relevant evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” See also State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 126 (3) (829 SE2d 367) (2019) (“The major function of Rule 403 is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

10 was strong. Guyton had recently been bailed out of jail by

Thurmond, with whom he had a romantic relationship, and Guyton

depended on Thurmond for a place to live and other assistance;

Guyton had threatened to kill Thurmond shortly before his murder;

Thurmond confided to his sister the night before his murder that he

was planning on ending his relationship with Guyton—a

conversation that took place while Guyton was within earshot; and

Guyton cut off his ankle monitor almost immediately after

Thurmond’s murder and fled to Mississippi, where he was found

with Thurmond’s bank cards and cash, vehicle, and, most notably,

the murder weapon.

Given this strong evidence of Guyton’s guilt and the relatively

low level of prejudice that may stem from the State showing

concededly admissible crime scene photos to the jury repeatedly

without warning—a practice that the trial judge addressed sua

sponte—Guyton has not established a reasonable probability that

but for his counsel’s failure to object, the result of his trial would

11 have been different.5 See Stuckey v. State, 301 Ga. 767, 772 (2) (d),

773 (2) (d) (804 SE2d 76) (2017) (“Pretermitting whether some or all

of these photos [of the victim in life] would have been excluded upon

objection . . . we conclude that Appellant cannot demonstrate

prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.”);

Sullivan v. State, 301 Ga. 37, 41 (2) (b) (799 SE2d 163) (2017)

(holding, where appellant argued counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to inflammatory photos of appellant holding a gun, that

“[appellant] cannot show that, had counsel objected, the

photographs would have been excluded, or that, but for counsel’s

alleged error, the outcome of his trial would have been different, as

the evidence against [appellant] was overwhelming”). Because

Guyton has not carried his burden of showing prejudice under

Strickland, this claim fails.

5 Guyton also states in his appellate brief that trial counsel did not move

for a mistrial or request a curative instruction, but he does not argue those points beyond that single mention of them. We conclude that any ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on those grounds, aside from lacking merit, have been abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1) (“Any enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error not supported by argument, citations to authority, and citations to the record shall be deemed abandoned.”). 12 (b) Guyton’s Criminal Past. During the State’s direct

examination of the roommate at trial, the following exchange

occurred:

Q: . . . When did you first meet the defendant? A: Uh — let me see, bout two weeks before the murder. Q: Okay. And did you know of him before he came to live there? A: Not personally. I just conversed with him over the phone. Q: Okay. And where was he when you were talking to him on the phone? A: In the county jail, in I think Dublin.

Later during the State’s direct examination of one of the

investigators, in explaining how police first identified Guyton as a

suspect, the investigator testified that Thurmond “had recently

bonded [Guyton] out of jail down in Houston County.”

Guyton argues that these mentions of his prior incarcerations

were impermissible negative character evidence that biased the jury

against him. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (“Evidence of a person’s

character or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the

purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular

occasion” except for circumstances not applicable here.). Guyton

13 contends therefore, that by failing to object, trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance.

Again, pretermitting whether trial counsel performed

deficiently, Guyton has not carried his burden of establishing a

reasonable probability that had his trial counsel objected, the result

of Guyton’s trial would have been different. The jury was already

aware that Guyton had been previously arrested and required to

wear an ankle monitor due to Count 10, and evidence of his cutting

off the monitor almost immediately after the murder to flee was

intrinsic to the murder and properly admitted. See Jenkins v. State,

313 Ga. 81, 88 (3) (868 SE2d 205) (2022) (evidence that appellant

evaded a police roadblock after crimes was “properly admitted as

flight evidence, which is generally intrinsic”).

Moreover, other witnesses testified without objection and

without argument on appeal that Guyton had been to jail.

Thurmond’s friend testified that Thurmond told her that he “got

[Guyton] out of the jail.” And Thurmond’s cousin testified that

Guyton had mentioned to her that he had been experiencing

14 “temptation after temptation” since getting “out of jail.” Later in his

testimony, the roommate also mentioned that Thurmond had

recently bailed out Guyton. Because the testimony mentioning

Guyton’s previous incarcerations on which he bases his

ineffectiveness claim was largely cumulative of other uncontested

evidence about him being previously incarcerated, Guyton has not

established a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to

object to the roommate’s testimony about Guyton talking to him on

the phone from jail in Dublin or the investigator’s testimony about

Guyton bonding out of the Houston County jail, the result of his trial

would have been different.6 See Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 330 (3)

(b) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (“[B]ecause the [complained-of] testimony

was cumulative of other evidence presented at trial and the

admission of which [appellant] does not contest, . . . its admission

6 Guyton also again notes, without argument, that his trial counsel never

moved for a mistrial or asked for a curative instruction. And he mentions in his appellate brief with no argument that trial counsel gave no strategic reason for not moving to sever Count 10 (tampering with his ankle monitor) from the rest of the counts. We conclude that any ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on those grounds, aside from lacking merit, have been abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1).

15 did not prejudice [appellant].”); Koonce v. State, 305 Ga. 671, 675 (2)

(c) (827 SE2d 633) (2019) (no prejudice from failure to object or move

for a mistrial based on certain testimony that was “largely

cumulative of other, unobjected-to evidence of the same facts”).

Accordingly, Guyton has not carried his burden of showing prejudice

under Strickland, and this ineffectiveness claim fails as well.7

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

7 Guyton does not argue that the deficiencies we have assumed for purposes of analysis and determined to individually lack prejudice cumulatively resulted in prejudice mandating a new trial, and in light of the other evidence in the case, and from our review of the record, we discern no cumulative prejudice warranting reversal. See Reed v. State, 314 Ga. 534, 554 (8) n.18 (878 SE2d 217) (2022); see also State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[A] defendant who wishes to take advantage of the [cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court just how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors.”). 16 Decided February 18, 2025.

Murder. Douglas Superior Court. Before Judge McClain.

J. Scott Key, Kayci N. Timmons, for appellant.

Dalia Racine, District Attorney, Kelsey Smith, Assistant

District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill,

Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Grace G. Griffith, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.