MODIFY and AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed January 8, 2014.
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-12-00696-CR
GUSTAVO RENE CASTILLO, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F09-58463-Y
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices O’Neill, Myers, and Brown Opinion by Justice O’Neill A jury convicted appellant Gustavo Renee Castillo of continuous sexual assault of a
child under the age of fourteen and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In three issues, he
argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a chart setting forth a timeline of the
sexual assault incidents, and the evidence is insufficient to support court-ordered reimbursement
of attorneys’ fees and court costs. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Appellant was complainant’s step-father. Complainant testified that appellant started
sexually abusing her when she was seven years old. She explained the abuse continued until her
thirteenth birthday. During those years, complainant suffered repeated vaginal penetration by
appellant’s penis, and he forced her to perform oral sex on him. Complainant eventually confessed the abuse to her babysitter, who told complainant’s
family. Complainant underwent a sexual abuse exam, in which the doctor found injuries
consistent with sexual abuse.
Although appellant testified in his own defense and tried to blame complainant’s uncles
for the abuse, the jury did not find his testimony credible. The jury found him guilty of
continuous sexual assault of a child under the age of fourteen. This appeal followed.
Admission of Chart into Evidence
In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a chart
made by the prosecutor setting forth a timeline of the sexual assault incidents testified to by the
complainant. While the State concedes admission of the chart was erroneous, it contends
appellant was not harmed. Appellant responds the error was not harmless because the exhibit
improperly bolstered the complainant’s testimony and “essentially allowed the jury to have that
testimony read back to them during deliberations in violation of the requirements of Article
36.28” of the code of criminal procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.28 (stating
that a jury must disagree as to the statement of a witness before asking the court to have the
statement read back).
During the complainant’s testimony, the prosecutor wrote down the dates, the types of
sexual abuse, and complainant’s age on a board. The State later moved to admit the chart into
evidence, and appellant objected. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the
document “as a summary under Rule 1006 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.”
The law is clear that while the trial court has discretion to permit the use of visual aids
and charts in the summarizing of evidence, such visual aids may only be admitted into evidence
if they are relevant. TEX. R. EVID. 402 (admission of relevant evidence); Markey v. State, 996
S.W.2d 226, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). “[A] mere summary of other
–2– evidence already before the jury constitutes no proof of any fact in issue.” Markey, 996 S.W.2d
at 231. It has no inherent probative value and can rarely provide any significant assistance to the
trier-of-fact. Id.; see also Melvin v. State, No. 10-09-00210-CR, 2010 WL 1611072, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Waco Apr. 21, 2010, pet. ref’d). This was not a “highly technical or complex case” in
which a summary of the evidence may be admissible to aid the jury in organizing the data. See,
e.g., Jarnigan v. State, 57 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)
(concluding court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a chart used by the State
in a case with five defendants, forty-four prosecution witnesses, and twenty-two volumes of trial
records spread over more than three weeks). Thus, we agree with appellant’s argument, and the
State’s concession, that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence.
The erroneous admission of evidence under rule 1006 is analyzed for harm as non-
constitutional error. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Markey, 996 S.W.2d at 232. Thus, the error will
not require reversal unless it affected appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
In conducting the harm analysis, we find Melvin v. State, No. 10-09-00210-CR, 2010 WL
1611072, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 21, 2010, pet. ref’d) instructive. In that case, the court
determined the appellant was not harmed by the erroneous admission of a chart with prior
convictions because the record contained other evidence of the prior convictions. Further, the
appellant did not contend the chart was in any way erroneous or misleading. Id. at *3. Here, the
jury heard testimony from complainant regarding the incidents of abuse summarized on the
chart. And similar to the defendant in Melvin, appellant has not argued the chart is inaccurate or
misleading. Accordingly, we cannot conclude appellant’s substantial rights were harmed by the
erroneous admission of evidence. Thus, appellant’s first issue is overruled.
–3– Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Court-Ordered Attorney’s Fees
In his second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support court-
ordered reimbursement of attorney’s fees. As the State correctly recognizes, a trial court may
order a defendant to repay the cost of court-appointed counsel if it is determined “a defendant
has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services
provided.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2012). However, a
defendant who is determined by the court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the
remainder of the proceedings unless a material change in the defendant’s financial circumstances
occurs. Id. art. 26.04(p).
The record shows the trial court determined appellant was indigent. The State does not
argue any material change in appellant’s financial circumstances, but rather asserts the itemized
bill of costs with the abbreviation “APAT” next to $200 is insufficient to support the assessment
of attorney’s fees as court costs because “it is impossible to verify whether ‘APAT’ is, indeed,
attorney’s fees.”
We ordered the Dallas County District Clerk to file a supplemental clerk’s record in
which it included a list of abbreviations with explanations. The list states “APAT” is an
abbreviation for “court appointed attorney fee.” Thus, the State’s argument is without merit.
When the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s assessment of attorney’s
fees, reformation of the judgment is the proper remedy. Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Bahle v. State, No. 05-10-01057-CR, 2012 WL 1382568, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Apr. 23, 2012, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Accordingly, we sustain
appellant’s second issue and modify the judgment to delete the $200 assessed as attorney’s fees.
–4– Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Court Costs
In his third issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support $256 in court
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MODIFY and AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed January 8, 2014.
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-12-00696-CR
GUSTAVO RENE CASTILLO, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F09-58463-Y
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices O’Neill, Myers, and Brown Opinion by Justice O’Neill A jury convicted appellant Gustavo Renee Castillo of continuous sexual assault of a
child under the age of fourteen and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In three issues, he
argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a chart setting forth a timeline of the
sexual assault incidents, and the evidence is insufficient to support court-ordered reimbursement
of attorneys’ fees and court costs. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Appellant was complainant’s step-father. Complainant testified that appellant started
sexually abusing her when she was seven years old. She explained the abuse continued until her
thirteenth birthday. During those years, complainant suffered repeated vaginal penetration by
appellant’s penis, and he forced her to perform oral sex on him. Complainant eventually confessed the abuse to her babysitter, who told complainant’s
family. Complainant underwent a sexual abuse exam, in which the doctor found injuries
consistent with sexual abuse.
Although appellant testified in his own defense and tried to blame complainant’s uncles
for the abuse, the jury did not find his testimony credible. The jury found him guilty of
continuous sexual assault of a child under the age of fourteen. This appeal followed.
Admission of Chart into Evidence
In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a chart
made by the prosecutor setting forth a timeline of the sexual assault incidents testified to by the
complainant. While the State concedes admission of the chart was erroneous, it contends
appellant was not harmed. Appellant responds the error was not harmless because the exhibit
improperly bolstered the complainant’s testimony and “essentially allowed the jury to have that
testimony read back to them during deliberations in violation of the requirements of Article
36.28” of the code of criminal procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.28 (stating
that a jury must disagree as to the statement of a witness before asking the court to have the
statement read back).
During the complainant’s testimony, the prosecutor wrote down the dates, the types of
sexual abuse, and complainant’s age on a board. The State later moved to admit the chart into
evidence, and appellant objected. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the
document “as a summary under Rule 1006 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.”
The law is clear that while the trial court has discretion to permit the use of visual aids
and charts in the summarizing of evidence, such visual aids may only be admitted into evidence
if they are relevant. TEX. R. EVID. 402 (admission of relevant evidence); Markey v. State, 996
S.W.2d 226, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). “[A] mere summary of other
–2– evidence already before the jury constitutes no proof of any fact in issue.” Markey, 996 S.W.2d
at 231. It has no inherent probative value and can rarely provide any significant assistance to the
trier-of-fact. Id.; see also Melvin v. State, No. 10-09-00210-CR, 2010 WL 1611072, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Waco Apr. 21, 2010, pet. ref’d). This was not a “highly technical or complex case” in
which a summary of the evidence may be admissible to aid the jury in organizing the data. See,
e.g., Jarnigan v. State, 57 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)
(concluding court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a chart used by the State
in a case with five defendants, forty-four prosecution witnesses, and twenty-two volumes of trial
records spread over more than three weeks). Thus, we agree with appellant’s argument, and the
State’s concession, that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence.
The erroneous admission of evidence under rule 1006 is analyzed for harm as non-
constitutional error. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Markey, 996 S.W.2d at 232. Thus, the error will
not require reversal unless it affected appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
In conducting the harm analysis, we find Melvin v. State, No. 10-09-00210-CR, 2010 WL
1611072, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 21, 2010, pet. ref’d) instructive. In that case, the court
determined the appellant was not harmed by the erroneous admission of a chart with prior
convictions because the record contained other evidence of the prior convictions. Further, the
appellant did not contend the chart was in any way erroneous or misleading. Id. at *3. Here, the
jury heard testimony from complainant regarding the incidents of abuse summarized on the
chart. And similar to the defendant in Melvin, appellant has not argued the chart is inaccurate or
misleading. Accordingly, we cannot conclude appellant’s substantial rights were harmed by the
erroneous admission of evidence. Thus, appellant’s first issue is overruled.
–3– Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Court-Ordered Attorney’s Fees
In his second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support court-
ordered reimbursement of attorney’s fees. As the State correctly recognizes, a trial court may
order a defendant to repay the cost of court-appointed counsel if it is determined “a defendant
has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services
provided.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2012). However, a
defendant who is determined by the court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the
remainder of the proceedings unless a material change in the defendant’s financial circumstances
occurs. Id. art. 26.04(p).
The record shows the trial court determined appellant was indigent. The State does not
argue any material change in appellant’s financial circumstances, but rather asserts the itemized
bill of costs with the abbreviation “APAT” next to $200 is insufficient to support the assessment
of attorney’s fees as court costs because “it is impossible to verify whether ‘APAT’ is, indeed,
attorney’s fees.”
We ordered the Dallas County District Clerk to file a supplemental clerk’s record in
which it included a list of abbreviations with explanations. The list states “APAT” is an
abbreviation for “court appointed attorney fee.” Thus, the State’s argument is without merit.
When the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s assessment of attorney’s
fees, reformation of the judgment is the proper remedy. Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Bahle v. State, No. 05-10-01057-CR, 2012 WL 1382568, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Apr. 23, 2012, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Accordingly, we sustain
appellant’s second issue and modify the judgment to delete the $200 assessed as attorney’s fees.
–4– Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Court Costs
In his third issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support $256 in court
costs because the record does not contain a bill of costs. We ordered the Dallas County District
Clerk to prepare and file an itemized bill of costs, and the clerk did so. See TEX. R. APP. P.
35.4(c)(1) (stating rules of appellate procedure allow supplementation of clerk’s record if
relevant items have been omitted). With the supplemental clerk’s record containing the bill of
costs now before us, appellant’s complaint that the evidence is insufficient to support imposition
of the costs is moot. See Franklin v. State, 402 S.W.3d 894, 894 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no
pet.). We overrule appellant’s third issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s issues, as modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Michael J. O'Neill/ MICHAEL J. O’NEILL JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47
120696F.U05
–5– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
GUSTAVO RENE CASTILLO, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-12-00696-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F09-58463-Y. Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neill. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Myers and Brown participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we MODIFY the judgment to delete the $200 assessed as attorney’s fees. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 8th day of January, 2014.
–6–