Gustavo Gonzalez v. Polymerica Limited Co. D/B/A Global Enterprises, Inc.

District Court, W.D. Texas·Decided May 29, 2026·No. 3:25-cv-00297·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO DIVISION

GUSTAVO GONZALEZ, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § EP- 25-cv-00297-LS-RFC POLYMERICA LIMITED CO. § D/B/A GLOBAL ENTERPRISES, INC. § § Defendant. §

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL Before the Court is Defendant Polymerica Limited Co. D/B/A Global Enterprises, Inc.’s Motion to Compel, ECF No. 13 [hereinafter “Mot.”]. In its Motion, Defendant asked that the Court (1) order Plaintiff to provide available dates for his deposition; (2) compel Plaintiff to supplement its deficient responses to Defendant’s interrogatories and requests for production; (3) award Defendant reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A); and (4) “[e]xtend[] the Court’s May 22, 2026 discovery deadline by thirty (30) days, to June 21, 2026, solely to allow Defendant to review Plaintiff’s late-produced and yet-to-be produced materials, take Plaintiff’s deposition, and conduct any necessary follow-up discovery.” Id. at 9. The Honorable District Judge Leon Schydlower referred the Motion for determination to the undersigned Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Court Rule CV-72. Order Ref’ing Mot., ECF No. 14. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART. I. DISCUSSION A. Defendant’s request that Plaintiff be compelled to provide available dates for his deposition is denied as moot. While Defendant initially complained that Plaintiff failed to advise Defendant of Plaintiff’s availability for a deposition, Mot. 3–4, subsequent briefing by both parties reflects that Plaintiff later supplied deposition dates, see Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Compel 1, ECF No. 16 [hereinafter “Mot. Resp.”]; Def. Polymerica Ltd. D/B/A Global Enters.’ Reply Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Compel 2, ECF No. 17. Accordingly, Defendant’s request that Plaintiff be compelled to provide deposition dates is DENIED AS MOOT. B. Defendant’s request to compel discovery is denied. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1) requires that a motion to compel discovery “must

include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the . . . party failing to make . . . discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Satisfaction of the conferral requirement involves the moving party engaging in, or at least attempting to engage in, a two-way dialogue to determine “precisely what the requesting party is actually seeking; what responsive documents or information the discovering party is reasonably capable of producing; and what specific, genuine objections or other issues, if any, cannot be resolved without judicial intervention.” Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 456, 459 (D. Kan. 1999). “[T]o do so in ‘good faith’ means that the parties must genuinely attempt to resolve the dispute without judicial intervention, and not to treat their negotiations simply as a formal prerequisite for judicial review.” Castillo v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, No. 3:23-CV-00467-

ATB, 2024 WL 4531080, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2024) (citing Perkins v. United States Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. EP-23-CV-258-KC, 2024 WL 1493808, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2024)). In the Motion, defense counsel certified that she “made multiple good faith attempts to confer with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the issues raised in this Motion without the necessity of court intervention,” but that despite these efforts, “the parties have been unable to resolve the issues regarding Plaintiff’s deficient discovery responses or scheduling of Plaintiff’s deposition.” Mot. 10. To support counsel’s certificate, Defendant submitted Exhibit C, copies of e-mails exchanged

by counsel for both parties from April 9, 2026 to April 22, 2026. Mot. Ex. C, ECF No. 13-4 [hereinafter “Ex. C”]; see Mot. 10. Despite defense counsel’s representations that she made multiple attempts to confer, Plaintiff argues – and the Court agrees – that the conferral requirement was not met. Mot. Resp. 1–3. Only counsel’s initial email suggests the possibility of future discussions concerning discovery. See Ex. C at 5–9. Even that message falls short of attempting conferral, as it neither proposes a date to confer nor affirmatively requests to arrange a meeting. See id. Instead, defense counsel merely indicates that Plaintiff’s counsel should “let [her] know if [Plaintiff’s counsel] would like to discuss” – leaving any ensuing discussion dependent on Plaintiff’s efforts. See id.

at 6. The Court does not find that such a statement, without more, can be said to demonstrate a genuine attempt by Defendant to resolve discovery disputes without court intervention. Compass Bank v. Shamgochian, 287 F.R.D. 397, 399–400 (S.D. Tex. 2012)) (collecting cases) (holding movant’s letter, which included assertion that letter was intended to “serve[] as [movant’s] attempt to confer,” was insufficient to meet conferral requirement). Accordingly, the Motion falls short of satisfying the conferral requirement and is thus DENIED as to the request to compel discovery. 1, 2 C. Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is denied. Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides for payment of “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion” where a motion to compel discovery is granted. Because the Court declines to grant

Defendant’s request to compel discovery, its request for attorney’s fees and costs is likewise DENIED. D. Defendant’s request to extend the discovery deadline is granted. Finally, Defendant asks that the May 22, 2026 discovery deadline be extended “by thirty (30) days, to June 21, 2026, solely to allow Defendant to review Plaintiff's late-produced and yet- to-be produced materials, take Plaintiff's deposition, and conduct any necessary follow-up discovery.” Mot. 9. A scheduling order may be modified “only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “The good cause standard requires the ‘party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.’” S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 6A

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Gustavo Gonzalez v. Polymerica Limited Co. D/B/A Global Enterprises, Inc., (W.D. Tex. 2026).

Gustavo Gonzalez v. Polymerica Limited Co. D/B/A Global Enterprises, Inc. (Gustavo Gonzalez v. Polymerica Limited Co. D/B/A Global Enterprises, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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