Guo Xin Zheng v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 27, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02483
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 GUO XIN ZHENG, 9 Petitioner, Case No. 2:25-cv-02483-TLF 10 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART THE AMENDED PETITION FOR A WRIT 11 IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS OF HABEAS CORPUS (DKT. 17) ENFORCEMENT FIELD OFFICE 12 DIRECTOR, et al., 13 Respondents. 14

15 Petitioner Guo Xin Zheng, a citizen and native of China, is currently detained by 16 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Northwest ICE Processing 17 Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington. Dkt. 17 at 2; Dkt. 21 at 1. He was re- 18 detained on December 4, 2024. Dkt. 21 at 5; Dkt. 23-6. On September 15, 2025, an 19 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied petitioner’s asylum claim, ordered him removed, but 20 granted withholding of removal to China. Dkt. 17 at 6, 45-46; Dkt. 21 at 5. 21 In December 2025, petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition. Dkts. 1, 3. The Court 22 appointed the Federal Public Defenders (“FPD”) to consult with petitioner on whether 23 their representation was appropriate for his case. Dkt. 10. 1 In February 2026, the Court granted petitioner’s unopposed motion to amend his 2 petition which he filed through his FPD counsel. Dkts. 12, 16. Petitioner’s amended 3 petition (Dkt. 17) is the operative petition for this matter. 4 Petitioner argues (1) his continued detention violates due process under

5 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); (2) his re-detention violated due process under 6 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); (3) respondents’ current efforts to remove 7 petitioner to a third country are unlawful; and (4) respondents’ third country removal 8 policy is punitive and unconstitutional. Dkt. 17 at 33, 36, 38, 39. 9 Petitioner requests the Court (1) order his immediate release; (2) enjoin his re- 10 detention absent notice, an opportunity to be heard, and valid travel documents among 11 other conditions; (3) enjoin his removal to a third country without notice and a 12 meaningful opportunity to respond; and (4) enjoin his removal to any country where he 13 is likely to face imprisonment or other punishment upon arrival. Dkt. 17 at 41-42. 14 The parties consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 18. For the

15 reasons below, the Court GRANTS the amended habeas petition (Dkt. 17) IN PART, 16 and ORDERS respondents to release petitioner as discussed below. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 In 2023, petitioner entered the United States and was detained. Dkt. 17 at 7; Dkt. 19 21 at 4. Soon after, petitioner was released under an Order of Release on 20 Recognizance (“OREC”). Dkt. 17 at 7; Dkt. 21 at 4; Dkt. 23-3 (OREC). 21 In June 2023, petitioner filed an asylum claim before the Immigration Court. Dkt. 22 17 at 7; Dkt. 21 at 5. Petitioner states he “endured persecution for practicing his 23 Christian religion in China.” Dkt. 17 at 7. 1 On December 3, 2024, petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit theft in 2 New Hampshire. Dkt. 17 at 7; Dkt. 21 at 5. On December 4, 2024, ICE re-detained 3 petitioner, citing this conviction. Dkt. 17 at 7; Dkt. 21 at 5; Dkt. 23-6 (Form I-213); Dkt. 4 23-7 (Administrative Warrant). Petitioner was then transferred to NWIPC. Dkt. 17 at 7;

5 Dkt. 21 at 5. 6 On September 15, 2025, an IJ denied petitioner’s asylum application, ordered his 7 removal, but granted withholding of removal to China. Dkt. 17 at 6, 45-46; Dkt. 21 at 5. 8 Petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s removal order. Dkt. 17 at 8, 45-46; Dkt. 21 at 5. 9 In October and November 2025, respondents met with petitioner about third 10 country removal. Respondents state that on “October 21, 2025, a Deportation Officer 11 (‘DO’) interviewed Petitioner and verbally informed him that DHS intended to seek his 12 removal to a third country.” Dkt. 21 at 5. “The DO presented Petitioner with a list of visa- 13 free countries Petitioner could go to if he had a valid Chinese passport and was willing 14 to buy a ticket.” Dkt. 21 at 5. On “November 4, 2025, another DO provided Petitioner

15 with a list of visa-free countries for China passport holders and informed him that he 16 could purchase tickets to those countries.” Dkt. 21 at 5-6. 17 Petitioner then filed a pro se habeas petition (Dkts. 1, 3) before amending his 18 petition through counsel. Dkts. 12, 16, 17. 19 In his amended petition, petitioner states that he “has minimal understanding of 20 English” which limited his ability to communicate with officials at NWIPC in the meetings 21 mentioned above and elsewhere. Dkt. 17 at 8. 22 23 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 A. Zadvydas 3 “[W]hen [a noncitizen] is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the 4 [noncitizen] from the United States within a period of 90 days” also known as “the

5 ‘removal period.’” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The removal period begins, among other 6 options, on the “date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” 8 U.S.C. § 7 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). 8 While a “special statute authorizes further detention if the Government fails to 9 remove the alien during those 90 days,” allowing the “indefinite detention” of noncitizens 10 “would raise serious constitutional concerns.” Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 682 (citing 8 U.S.C. 11 § 1231(a)(6)). “[T]o avoid a serious constitutional threat,” the Supreme Court held that 12 “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer 13 authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. 14 The Supreme Court found six-months was a “presumptively reasonable period of

15 detention”. Id. at 701. This period starts running “following the entry of the order of his 16 removal.” Tran v. Bondi, No. C25-01897-JLR, 2025 WL 3140462, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 17 Nov. 10, 2025) (citing Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 701). “At no point did the Zadvydas Court 18 preclude a noncitizen from challenging their detention before the end of the 19 presumptively reasonable six-month period.” Trinh v. Homan, 466 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 20 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2020). 21 Therefore, “[t]he habeas court must ask whether the detention in question 22 exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal,” or in other words, whether 23 1 there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 2 Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 699, 701. 3 Petitioner “bear[s] the initial burden of providing ‘good reason to believe that 4 there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’” Trinh,

5 466 F. Supp. 3d at 1082 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). “Once that initial showing 6 is made, the burden shifts to the Government to respond with evidence sufficient to 7 rebut it.” Id. 8 “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no 9 longer authorized by statute” and the noncitizen’s “release may and should be 10 conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the 11 circumstances.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700. 12 If Zadvydas is satisfied, release is warranted even if the petitioner has a criminal 13 record. Baltodano v. Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3484769, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 14 Dec. 4, 2025) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684) (explaining that while the “Court

15 does not take lightly respondents’ warning that petitioner is still ‘a danger to the 16 community’ . . . the Court is bound by the holding in Zadvydas, a case that notably 17 involved [an] individual with ‘a long criminal record’ and ‘a history of flight.’”); see also 18 Hamedani v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-02509-JNW, 2026 WL 452424, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. 19 Feb. 18, 2026) (noting that despite the petitioner’s “criminal history . . . [h]e must be 20 released” under Zadvydas). 21 Here, respondents assert petitioner’s six-month presumptively reasonable period 22 of detention began on October 15, 2025 (the date petitioner’s un-appealed removal 23 order became final), and will end on April 15, 2025. Dkt. 21 at 7. 1 Petitioner acknowledges these dates (e.g., Dkt. 17 at 34; Dkt. 24 at 5) but 2 nonetheless suggests in a footnote that “it may be more reasonable to calculate the 3 removal period with September 15, 2025, as the date the order became final.” Dkt. 17 at 4 34 n.47. And, petitioner urges he “made no earlier affirmative waiver of appeal through

5 no fault of his own” as his attorney did not consult him on the order and he only learned 6 of the order through his sister. Dkt. 17 at 34 n.47. The Court need not address this 7 allegation further as a petitioner can still challenge his detention within the 8 presumptively reasonable six-month period. Trinh, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 1092. 9 Petitioner asserts that he would overcome the presumption of reasonableness as 10 “[i]t appears ICE has taken no other concrete actions to attempt to lawfully remove Mr. 11 Zheng to a third country” other than “provid[ing] Mr. Zheng with English language 12 documents that he cannot read.” Dkt. 17 at 3. 13 The record shows, “[i]n October 2025, and again in November 2025, ICE officers 14 contacted Mr. Zheng about potential third-country removal.” Dkt. 17 at 8. At both

15 meetings, an officer “hand[ed] Mr. Zheng a list of ‘visa-free’ countries for people with 16 Chinese passports” and “t[old] him (apparently in English) that he could go to one of 17 these countries if he could purchase his own ticket there.” Dkt. 17 at 9-10. “Mr. Zheng 18 recalls no interpreter” and “[h]e did not have a good understanding of what was said.” 19 Dkt. 17 at 8. “[I]n any event, he lacks the financial means to” purchase a plane ticket. 20 Dkt. 17 at 9. 21 Petitioner asserts the respondents failed to comply with the process required 22 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) which “delineate[s] the proper procedures by which a country 23 may be designated for removal.” Dkt. 17 at 20. 1 Under this process, there are “four consecutive removal commands”. Jama v. 2 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005). First, the “Attorney General shall 3 remove [a noncitizen] to the country the [noncitizen] so designates.” 8 U.S.C. § 4 1231(2)(A)(ii). Second, “[i]f an alien is not removed to a country designated” under the

5 above provision, “the Attorney General shall remove the [noncitizen] to a country of 6 which the [noncitizen] is a subject, national, or citizen,” id. at (2)(D), which is unavailable 7 here because of the IJ’s withholding order. Dkt. 17 at 45-46. Third, “[i]f [the noncitizen] is 8 not removed to a country under the previous subparagraphs . . . the Attorney General 9 shall remove the [noncitizen] to any of” the various categories of countries listed in the 10 section. Id. at (2)(E). Finally, “[i]f impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible to remove the 11 [noncitizen] to each country described in” the above list, the government can choose 12 “another country whose government will accept the [noncitizen] into that country.” Id. at 13 (2)(E)(vii). 14 Petitioner argues respondents “seemingly tried to encourage him to voluntarily

15 depart (telling him he would have to buy his own plane ticket) to only a list of countries 16 Respondents identified as ‘visa-free.’” Dkt. 17 at 10. Petitioner contends respondents 17 have not properly started the required process for third country removal; and petitioner 18 asserts “[t]here is no evidence that Respondents will be able to lawfully remove Mr. 19 Zheng to a third country in the reasonably foreseeable future nor that any efforts to do 20 so lawfully are actually underway.” Dkt. 17 at 11; Dkt. 24 at 5 (“There is no evidence 21 that Mr. Zheng will be removed in the next month or so before April 15, 2026 (which 22 marks six months from the date his removal order became administratively final).”). 23 1 Respondents do not dispute petitioner’s factual allegations above — the format 2 of the two meetings in October and November (see Dkt. 21 at 5-6; Dkt. 22 at 3-4) or the 3 lack of any concrete travel documents, requests, or other efforts with any potential third 4 country. See Dkt. 21 at 7.

5 Even so, respondents urge that “DHS continues to pursue Petitioner’s removal 6 from the United States to a third country” and “[t]hese efforts remain ongoing . . .” Dkt. 7 22 at 4. 8 This Court has rejected reliance on similar generalized assertions. See, e.g., 9 Saadhom v. Bondi, No. 2:26-cv-00425-TL, 2026 WL 698786, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10 12, 2026) (rejecting more specific assertions that the government “submitted travel 11 document requests to Canada, Panama, and Costa Rica” as “they are silent as to 12 whether they have heard back from those countries” and can offer no timeline or 13 “specific date of anticipated removal.”). Respondents’ refer to a list of “visa-free” 14 countries, yet they do not specifically identify any potential third country as a candidate

15 for removal. Dkt. 21 at 5-6. 16 Respondents also argue the Supreme Court in Zadvydas “implicitly recognized 17 that six months is the earliest point at which a noncitizen’s detention could raise 18 constitutional issues.” Dkt. 21 at 7. But the Supreme Court in Zadvydas created only a 19 “presumptively reasonable,” benchmark of 6-months and not a legally unchallengeable 20 period of six months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (emphasis added); see also Trinh, 466 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1092. 22 Based on the respondents’ lack of any concrete action under the required 23 process for third party removal, the Court finds petitioner has established there is no 1 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See, e.g., 2 Elshourbagy v. Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3718993, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 2025) 3 (noting “[t]here is no evidence that steps have been taken to obtain a Ugandan travel 4 document for Petitioner, that Uganda has any interest in accepting Petitioner, or even

5 that there has been any communication with Uganda regarding Petitioner at all” and 6 “Respondents cannot overcome the meritorious arguments in Petitioner’s pending 7 habeas petition by simply handing Petitioner an application for travel documents . . .”). 8 The Court orders respondents to release petitioner within three days of this 9 Order. Respondents shall release petitioner from custody under reasonable and 10 appropriate conditions of release. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700. Respondents shall 11 promptly provide petitioner a hearing before release solely to determine what conditions 12 are appropriate. Immediately after this hearing, petitioner must be released. 13 Alternatively, if respondents cannot provide petitioner this hearing within three days, 14 respondents shall release petitioner under the conditions of his most recent order of

15 supervision.1 16 B. Third Country Removal

17 Petitioner also asks the Court to order that respondents “may not remove or seek 18 to remove Mr. Zheng to a third country without notice and meaningful opportunity to 19 respond in compliance with the statute and due process in reopened removal 20 proceedings.” Dkt. 17 at 42. He also asks the Court to enjoin respondents’ ability to 21 “remove him to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or other punishment 22 upon arrival.” Dkt. 17 at 42. 23 1 As the Court releases petitioner based on its review of his final order of removal under Zadvydas, it need not also address his claims under Mathews. See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1318 n.1 (W.D. Wash. 2025). 1 “A plaintiff or petitioner ‘seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate (1) 2 that he has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as 3 monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering 4 the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is

5 warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 6 injunction.’” Elshourbagy, 2025 WL 3718993, at *9 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 7 LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). 8 This Court granted injunctive relief regarding third country removal in similar 9 circumstances. Elshourbagy. Id. at *9 (requesting this Court “‘[o]rder that Respondents 10 may not remove or seek to remove Petitioner to a third country without notice and 11 meaningful opportunity to respond in compliance with the statute and due process in 12 reopened removal proceedings.’”). 13 For the first requirement, this Court noted “‘[i]t is well established that the 14 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Id.

15 (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). 16 For the second requirement, this Court held “[w]ere Petitioner to be ‘removed 17 from the United States to the custody of a foreign sovereign’ . . . the legal remedies by 18 which Petitioner might redress this harm would be substantially diminished, if not 19 extinguished entirely.” Id. (quoting A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 93 (2025)). The 20 Court noted respondents’ policies (such as the July 9, 2025, ICE Memorandum, which 21 respondents cite in the present case (Dkt. 21 at 8)), “fall far short of what court[s] in this 22 District and Circuit have held that due process requires.” Id. at 8. 23 1 For the third and fourth requirements, this Court held that “the balance of equities 2 tips steeply in [petitioner’s] favor, because his interest in avoiding the unlawful 3 deprivation of his liberty outweighs the minimal burden on Respondents” and “‘it is 4 always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights.’” Id.

5 at *9 (quoting Riley’s Am. Heritage Farms v. Elsasser, 32 F.4th 707, 731 (9th Cir. 6 2022)). 7 Under these circumstances, the Court finds injunctive relief is appropriate 8 regarding third country removal. The relief granted will also give petitioner the ability to 9 contest removal to a third country where he is likely to face imprisonment or other 10 harm.2 11 C. Punitive Policy Claim 12 Finally, petitioner urges this Court to hold that respondents’ third country removal 13 policy is unconstitutionally “punitive” under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. E.g. Dkt. 14 17 at 39-41.

15 In so arguing, petitioner asserts a November 24, 2025, article from the “New 16 Yorker” titled “Disappeared to a Foreign Prison” (Dkt. 17 at 78), in addition to emails and 17 declarations from other immigration proceedings. Dkt. 17 at 49, 53, 57, 60, 64, 68, 73, 18 100, 107. These declarations describe attempts to remove petitioners from separate 19 immigration proceedings to third countries, such as Mexico. E.g. Dkt. 17 at 49, 53, 56, 20 59, 67, 73. 21 22 23 2 Petitioner also requests additional injunctive relief, including numerous limits on any potential future re-detention. E.g. Dkt. 17 at 41-42. The Court declines to grant this relief and adopts the reasoning of Saadhom, 2026 WL 698786, at *10. 1 This Court has rejected reliance on similar references to separate immigration 2 proceedings as those are “specific to a particular population and particular destination 3 countries” which “do not extend to these circumstances” in the present matter. Arenado- 4 Borges v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-02193-JNW, 2025 WL 3687518, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec.

5 19, 2025); see also Saadhom, 2026 WL 698786, at *7 (rejecting reliance on similar 6 declarations). 7 Thus, on the present record, the Court declines to address petitioner’s punitive 8 claim which is DENIED without prejudice. 9 III. CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 17) is 11 GRANTED IN PART and the Court ORDERS: 12 1) Respondents SHALL release petitioner within three days (see Fed. 13 R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)) of this Order. 14 a. Prior to release, respondents must provide petitioner a hearing

15 solely to determine the appropriate conditions of his release. 16 Immediately following this hearing, petitioner must be 17 released. 18 b. Alternatively, if respondents cannot provide a hearing within 19 three days, they must release petitioner under his most recent 20 previous release conditions. 21 2) Within two days (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)) of petitioner’s release, 22 respondents SHALL submit to the Court a declaration confirming the 23 date and time petitioner was released from custody. 1 3) Respondents SHALL NOT remove or seek to remove petitioner to a 2 third country without notice and meaningful opportunity to respond in 3 conformity with due process. 4 4) Petitioner’s request for an order prohibiting third country removal as

5 unconstitutionally punitive is DENIED without prejudice. 6 Dated this 27th day of March, 2026. 7 A

8 Theresa L. Fricke United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23