[297]*297POPOVICH, Judge:
The Defendant/Appellant, Constitution State Service Company, appeals the order (reduced to judgment thereafter1) of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying its motion for post-trial relief. We affirm in a case of first impression.
The facts of record disclose that on the 17th day of November, 1988, the Plaintiff, Janine Gunter, walked across one-half of a light-controlled intersection at Old York Road and 66th Avenue in Philadelphia. She came to rest on an island separating the lanes of traffic. Before proceeding, she looked to her right and observed a van stopped at the red light. With the traffic at a standstill, the Plaintiff proceeded across the remaining portion of the roadway when “a car came from behind the van and hit” her. The Plaintiff was knocked to the ground and needed the assistance of some employees at a nearby business to remove her to a safe location.
The striking vehicle left the scene and could not be identified by the Plaintiff. Shortly after the incident, the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad, consisting of two emergency medical technicians (EMT), was dispatched to the location and placed a flexible cast on the Plaintiffs leg before transporting her to the hospital. The Plaintiff spoke to no police officer either at the scene or at the hospital, from where she was released the same day.
The Plaintiff testified at trial, to which the Defendant objected on hearsay grounds, that once discharged from the hospital she did not file a report with the police because, as she told it:
When I talked—when the guy in the ambulance was talking to me he took the report and he said he would take care of it.
[298]*298All parties agree that no report has been located as filed with the Philadelphia police department.
The Plaintiff was the sole witness to testify at the bench trial, after which the court entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the amount of $6,000.00 for pain and suffering and $3,948.25 for medical bills. Post-trial motions were denied and this appeal was perfected by the Defendant as the assignee (for statutory first party medical and uninsured motorist benefits) under the Assigned Claims Plan operated pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 et seq. Benefits were denied by the Appellant on the basis that the Appellee did not file a report of the accident with the police under the Appellant’s interpretation of the MVFRL.
On appeal, the Appellant raises two issues for our consideration; to-wit:
I. Whether an Assigned Claims Plan claimant who reports an accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle only to the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad has reported the accident to a “proper governmental authority” within the meaning of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702 so as to render the striking vehicle uninsured?
II. Whether the Plaintiff/Appellee’s testimony regarding a statement made to her by an Emergency Medical Technician, who she failed to call as a witness at trial,[2] should have been admitted into evidence?
Appellant’s Brief at 2. We respond to the last issue first, for if the Plaintiffs complained-of testimony referring to the EMT employee’s offer to report the accident to the police was excludable on hearsay grounds, the reporting requirement of the MVFRL was not satisfied and the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits.
It is well-established in this Commonwealth that “nothing is more adamantly established in American trial procedure [299]*299than that no one may testify to what somebody else told him[/her].” Johnson v. People Cab Co., 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720, 721 (1956). The hearsay nature of the evidence is rendered inadmissible unless it qualifies under one of the recognized exceptions to that rule. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1420 et seq. (Chadbourn Rev.1974); McCormick, Evidence § 249 (2d ed. 1972).
If the statement of the Plaintiff in refraining from filing a report with the police, on the strength of the EMT employee’s statement that he “would take care of it,” were offered to prove the truth of the content of the EMT employee’s remarks, the statement would be clearly hearsay. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 523 Pa. 577, 568 A.2d 600 (1989), wherein our Supreme Court responded to a similar evidentiary claim in a criminal setting, the applicability of which is just as germane to the civil case facing us; to-wit:
The predicate supporting the rejection of hearsay evidence is its assumed unreliability because the declarant from which the statement originates is not before the trier of fact and therefore cannot be challenged as to the accuracy of the information sought to be conveyed.
i-s if: sj: ?-s
The hearsay concern is not present where statements of an out-of-court declarant are not being offered for the truth of the content of those statements. For instance, a witness may testify to a statement made to him when the purpose of its introduction is the fact that the statement was, in fact, made.... Similarly, we have recognized that out-of-court statements which are offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind are not within the interdiction of the hearsay rule....
' In this instance the [Appellee] argues the testimonial value of these statements was the effect they had upon the listeners. The key to the admission of evidence for this purpose is that no assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of the content of the utterance.... The test for [300]*300relevancy is whether the proffered evidence tends to make a material fact more or less probable.
Id. at 593-94, 568 A.2d at 608-09 (Citations omitted).
At bar, the Appellee was not concerned with proving the truth of the statement made by the EMT employees, i.e., he would notify the police of the accident. Rather, she was preoccupied with establishing her state of mind at the time the conversation took place. She had just been struck and injured by a “hit and run” vehicle, and she reported the incident to an emergency medical technician en route to the hospital. She believed the incident would be reported to the police because of the technician’s remarks to that effect.
Viewed in such a light, we agree with the court that no evidentiary rules were violated in permitting the Appellee to testify to what she told the EMT employee and his response thereto. Id. The linchpin to admissibility is that the remarks were made and not whether the EMT employee carried out his statements to notify the police of the occurrence of the accident on behalf of the Appellee. Thus, we hold meritless the hearsay claim raised by the Appellant, concluding that the remarks testified to were both relevant (they increased the probability of a material fact at issue—whether the Appellee communicated to the EMT employee about the “hit and run”) and admissible. Id.
To obtain benefits through the Assigned Claims Plan, one must meet the eligibility requirements of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1752.
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[297]*297POPOVICH, Judge:
The Defendant/Appellant, Constitution State Service Company, appeals the order (reduced to judgment thereafter1) of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying its motion for post-trial relief. We affirm in a case of first impression.
The facts of record disclose that on the 17th day of November, 1988, the Plaintiff, Janine Gunter, walked across one-half of a light-controlled intersection at Old York Road and 66th Avenue in Philadelphia. She came to rest on an island separating the lanes of traffic. Before proceeding, she looked to her right and observed a van stopped at the red light. With the traffic at a standstill, the Plaintiff proceeded across the remaining portion of the roadway when “a car came from behind the van and hit” her. The Plaintiff was knocked to the ground and needed the assistance of some employees at a nearby business to remove her to a safe location.
The striking vehicle left the scene and could not be identified by the Plaintiff. Shortly after the incident, the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad, consisting of two emergency medical technicians (EMT), was dispatched to the location and placed a flexible cast on the Plaintiffs leg before transporting her to the hospital. The Plaintiff spoke to no police officer either at the scene or at the hospital, from where she was released the same day.
The Plaintiff testified at trial, to which the Defendant objected on hearsay grounds, that once discharged from the hospital she did not file a report with the police because, as she told it:
When I talked—when the guy in the ambulance was talking to me he took the report and he said he would take care of it.
[298]*298All parties agree that no report has been located as filed with the Philadelphia police department.
The Plaintiff was the sole witness to testify at the bench trial, after which the court entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the amount of $6,000.00 for pain and suffering and $3,948.25 for medical bills. Post-trial motions were denied and this appeal was perfected by the Defendant as the assignee (for statutory first party medical and uninsured motorist benefits) under the Assigned Claims Plan operated pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 et seq. Benefits were denied by the Appellant on the basis that the Appellee did not file a report of the accident with the police under the Appellant’s interpretation of the MVFRL.
On appeal, the Appellant raises two issues for our consideration; to-wit:
I. Whether an Assigned Claims Plan claimant who reports an accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle only to the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad has reported the accident to a “proper governmental authority” within the meaning of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702 so as to render the striking vehicle uninsured?
II. Whether the Plaintiff/Appellee’s testimony regarding a statement made to her by an Emergency Medical Technician, who she failed to call as a witness at trial,[2] should have been admitted into evidence?
Appellant’s Brief at 2. We respond to the last issue first, for if the Plaintiffs complained-of testimony referring to the EMT employee’s offer to report the accident to the police was excludable on hearsay grounds, the reporting requirement of the MVFRL was not satisfied and the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits.
It is well-established in this Commonwealth that “nothing is more adamantly established in American trial procedure [299]*299than that no one may testify to what somebody else told him[/her].” Johnson v. People Cab Co., 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720, 721 (1956). The hearsay nature of the evidence is rendered inadmissible unless it qualifies under one of the recognized exceptions to that rule. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1420 et seq. (Chadbourn Rev.1974); McCormick, Evidence § 249 (2d ed. 1972).
If the statement of the Plaintiff in refraining from filing a report with the police, on the strength of the EMT employee’s statement that he “would take care of it,” were offered to prove the truth of the content of the EMT employee’s remarks, the statement would be clearly hearsay. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 523 Pa. 577, 568 A.2d 600 (1989), wherein our Supreme Court responded to a similar evidentiary claim in a criminal setting, the applicability of which is just as germane to the civil case facing us; to-wit:
The predicate supporting the rejection of hearsay evidence is its assumed unreliability because the declarant from which the statement originates is not before the trier of fact and therefore cannot be challenged as to the accuracy of the information sought to be conveyed.
i-s if: sj: ?-s
The hearsay concern is not present where statements of an out-of-court declarant are not being offered for the truth of the content of those statements. For instance, a witness may testify to a statement made to him when the purpose of its introduction is the fact that the statement was, in fact, made.... Similarly, we have recognized that out-of-court statements which are offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind are not within the interdiction of the hearsay rule....
' In this instance the [Appellee] argues the testimonial value of these statements was the effect they had upon the listeners. The key to the admission of evidence for this purpose is that no assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of the content of the utterance.... The test for [300]*300relevancy is whether the proffered evidence tends to make a material fact more or less probable.
Id. at 593-94, 568 A.2d at 608-09 (Citations omitted).
At bar, the Appellee was not concerned with proving the truth of the statement made by the EMT employees, i.e., he would notify the police of the accident. Rather, she was preoccupied with establishing her state of mind at the time the conversation took place. She had just been struck and injured by a “hit and run” vehicle, and she reported the incident to an emergency medical technician en route to the hospital. She believed the incident would be reported to the police because of the technician’s remarks to that effect.
Viewed in such a light, we agree with the court that no evidentiary rules were violated in permitting the Appellee to testify to what she told the EMT employee and his response thereto. Id. The linchpin to admissibility is that the remarks were made and not whether the EMT employee carried out his statements to notify the police of the occurrence of the accident on behalf of the Appellee. Thus, we hold meritless the hearsay claim raised by the Appellant, concluding that the remarks testified to were both relevant (they increased the probability of a material fact at issue—whether the Appellee communicated to the EMT employee about the “hit and run”) and admissible. Id.
To obtain benefits through the Assigned Claims Plan, one must meet the eligibility requirements of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1752. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 427 Pa.Super. 105, 628 A.2d 847 (Pa.Super., filed May 28, 1993). Section 1752 provides:
(a) General rule.—A person is eligible to recover benefits from the Assigned Claims Plan if the person meets the following requirements:
(1) Is a resident of this Commonwealth.
(2) Is injured as the result of a motor vehicle accident occurring in this Commonwealth.
[301]*301(3) Is not an owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered under Chapter 13 (relating to registration of vehicles).
(4) Is not the operator or occupant of a motor vehicle owned by the Federal Government or any of its agencies, departments or authorities.
(5) Is not the operator or occupant of a motor vehicle owned by a self-insurer or by an individual or entity who or which is immune from liability for, or is not required to provide, benefits or uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.
(6) Is otherwise not entitled to receive any first party benefits under section 1711 (relating to required benefits) or 1712 (relating to availability of benefits) applicable to the injury arising from the accident.
As amended, Act of February 12,1984, P.L. 53, No. 12, § 3, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1752. The Appellant concedes that if the Appellee is found to have complied with Section 1752(a)(3), she is an eligible claimant and entitled to benefits under the Assigned Claims Plan. See N.T. 10/15/92 at 20.
Because the Appellee was not covered under any source of motor vehicle insurance when she was struck while crossing a roadway, she had the burden of proving that the vehicle which struck her was uninsured. Section 1702 of the MVFRL defines “uninsured motor vehicle”, as is herein relevant:
(3) An unidentified motor vehicle that causes an accident resulting in injury provided the accident is reported to the police or proper governmental authority and the claimant notifies his insurer within 30 days, or as soon as practicable thereafter, that the claimant or his legal representative has a legal action arising out of the accident.
As amended, Act of February 7, 1990, P.L. 11, No. 6, § 7, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702 (Supp.1993) (Emphasis added).
All parties agree, and our research confirms the fact, that nowhere in the statute or case law (of this or other jurisdictions) has the language “proper governmental authority” been interpreted. Thus, resolution of whether the Appellee’s com[302]*302munication to an EMT employee of the accident satisfies the notice requirement under the MVFRL to a “proper governmental authority” requires us to construe Section 1702. When construing statutory provisions, this Court is guided by the Statutory Construction Act of 1972. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq. “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a); see also Frontini v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Trans., 527 Pa. 448, 593 A.2d 410, 411-12 (1991). On this same point, and in analyzing the same statutory provision under different facts, this Court has remarked:
... in interpreting the Uninsured Motorist Act, and the No-Fault Act (repealed and replaced by the MVFRL), the statutes are to be construed liberally. Brader v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 270 Pa.Super. 258, 264, 411 A.2d 516, 519 (1979). Our Supreme Court stated in Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 395, 241 A.2d 112, 115 (1968), that “[t]he purpose of the uninsured motorist law is to provide protection to innocent victims of irresponsible drivers.” The MVFRL’s chief policy goal is the establishment of a liberally compensatory scheme of uninsured and underinsured motorist protection. Ronca, Sloane and Mundy, Pennsylvania Motorist Vehicle Insurance: An Analysis of the Financial Responsibility Law, (1968), p. 96. The liberal compensatory intent of the Uninsured Motorist Act is preserved, if not strengthened, in the MVFRL, because the MVFRL has essentially adopted the language of the Uninsured Motorist Act as to the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. The MVFRL states, in pertinent part:
Uninsured motorist coverage shall provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages therefor from owners or operators of uninsured vehicles. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(b).
Hatcher v. Travelers Insurance Co., 421 Pa.Super. 225, 617 A.2d 808, 810 (1992).
[303]*303Lastly, we add the precept that “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); see also Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 501 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1985).
The phrase “proper governmental authority” in Section 1702 is not clear and unambiguous. Nor has the language under scrutiny been the subject of interpretation by case law. As such, we need to peruse other sources to supplement our research, being ever vigilant to achieve the legislature’s principal goal of establishing a liberally compensatory scheme. Hatcher, supra; Sturkie v. Erie Insurance Group, 407 Pa.Super. 117, 595 A.2d 152 (1991).
We commence with the case of Dixon v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 56 A.D.2d 650, 391 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1977), wherein the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York was confronted with an appeal from an order denying the Appellant/Dixon’s motion for leave to sue to recover monies claimed due from a governmental agency comparable to Pennsylvania’s Assigned Claims Plan, i.e., the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVA-IC).
The Appellant’s claim in Dixon was refused by MVAIC because the report of the hit-and-run accident was not made by the Appellant/vietim to the police within 24 hours of the accident. Rather, an eyewitness dialed “0” from a nearby phone and asked the operator to contact the police and an ambulance. The ambulance arrived and removed the victim to the hospital, where the eyewitness remained with the victim. It was conceded that the police never arrived at the scene or hospital and counsel for the Appellant admitted that, if the police were called, the authorities would state they had no record of the accident.
In reversing, the New York court made statements germane to the case at bar; to-wit:
[304]*304It must be noted that the statute does not require the injured party to make the report. Subdivision [b] of section 608 of the Insurance Law states that the protection provided by the MVAIC is available to “[a]ny qualified person having a cause * * * of action * * * arising out of a motor vehicle accident * * * reported within twenty-four hours” (see, also, Matter of Davis [MVAIC], 38 A.D.2d 663, 305 N.Y.S.2d 12). Moreover, the statute is silent regarding the type of report which is to be made to the police. In Gordon v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Ind. Corp. [90 Misc.2d 382, 394 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y.Sup.1976). (NYLJ, Aug. 4, 1976 p. 9 col. 3) petitioner, injured by a hit-and-run driver, calléd the police several hours after the accident through the police emergency number, “911”. Petitioner in Gordon was unable to discover if the police had in fact received the call. The insurer argued that it would be impossible to refute this type of testimony and that notice through the emergency telephone number, “911”, did not satisfy the statute.
The court in Gordon granted petitioner’s application, noting that the legislative purpose in establishing the MVAIC was to afford the injured person the same protection he would have if the tort-feasor were covered by insurance and that the statute should be liberally construed to serve rather than defeat those ends____ Moreover, it is evident that the Legislature provided for prompt notification to the police in order to prevent the filing of fraudulent claims ... In Matter of Casanova v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Ind. Corp, 36 Misc.2d 489, 490, 232 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714, the court stated that “[a] failure by the Police Authorities to record the report does not invalidate an otherwise proper claim.”
It is clear, therefore, that each application brought pursuant to this statute must depend upon the evidence adduced and the credibility of the witnesses.
In our view the testimony of the disinterested witness, that he saw the hit-and-run accident and thereupon called the telephone operator and advised her to call the police and an ambulance, could satisfy the notice requirement of the [305]*305statute, if the Special Term believed that the operator in fact called the police.
391 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (Citations omitted in part).
At bar, as in Dixon, the statute does not stipulate that only the injured party is permitted to make an accident report to police,3 nor does the statute detail the manner in which the report is to be made to the police, i.e., in writing or orally.4 See Hatcher, supra (No written report need be produced by claimant to establish communicating “hit and run” accident to police; question of fact for factfinder to decide).
Likewise, we do not subscribe to the view espoused by the Appellant that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation would be the only other “proper governmental authority” to whom an accident could be reported. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. We find most compelling the fact that in the definitional section of the MVFRL (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702) both terms appear: “Department”, which includes the Department of Transportation or Insurance Department, and “uninsured motor vehicle”, whereby the latter makes no reference to the term “department” as the optional governmental body (in addition to the police) to which a report could be made if an accident by an unidentified vehicle occurred. Rather, the Legislature inserted the phrase “proper governmental authority” as the alternative source with whom a report could be lodged involving an “uninsured motor vehicle.” We may not merely ignore such a fact.
Because of the liberal interpretation accorded the MVFRL, we read “governmental authority” to embrace, given its context and location in the statute regarding reporting requirements, the party receiving the information and (of necessity) equating him/her with an “agent” of the governmental body engaged in the performance of a governmental “function” at the time “reporting” transpires. As much can be garnered [306]*306from Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) at 695 & 696, which defines the preceding terminology thusly:
Governmental agents. Those performing services and duties of a public character for benefit of all citizens of community. The term includes firemen and policemen.
* * * * * Hi
Governmental functions. The functions of a municipality which are essential to its existence, in sense of serving public at large, and are to be distinguished from those which are private, which are not necessary to its existence, and which enure to advantage of its inhabitants. Activities which are carried on by city, pursuant to state requirement, in discharge of state’s obligation for health, safety or general welfare of public generally, or which are voluntarily assumed by city for benefit of public generally rather than for its own citizens, are performed in governmental capacity and as “governmental function”.
Governmental. Of, pertaining to, or proceeding from government. [Citations omitted]
Instantly, the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad is the byproduct of that first class City’s efforts to implement the Emergency Medical Services Act, 35 P.S. § 6921 et seq., which is a coordinated program to assure that the Commonwealth’s emergency medical services will be handled by communicative facilities which are accessible to the general public through a common telephone number (e.g., “911”). In particular, Section 12-102 of Philadelphia Traffic Code defines emergency vehicles to include police and fire departments. Section 12-310 provides that firemen may assist the police in directing traffic at the scene of a fire and that no person shall fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of a fireman assisting the police. Thus, it would appear, the two departments have some co-extensive functions.
Further, of interest to this Court is the fact that a volunteer fire company has been considered a “local agency” for purposes of being granted immunity from suit under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541. See Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 531 Pa. 500, 614 A.2d [307]*307218 (1992). Upon closer examination of the statute, we learn that “local agency” is defined as a “government unit other than the Commonwealth government.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8501. A “government unit” includes any government agency. Id. at § 102. A “government agency” includes any political subdivision, or any officer or agency of any such political subdivision. Id.
Therefore, we find that a fire rescue service created, maintained and governed by a city to benefit the health, safety or welfare of the public is a “unit” of ‘local government/agency.” Id.; Black’s Law Dictionary, supra; cf. Schulmeister v. Union Tp. Ambulance, 35 Pa.D. & C.3d 83 (1984) (An ambulance service which is an independent, nonprofit corporation that is neither a subordinate governmental activity of a township nor an agency of the municipality is not immune from suit under Municipal Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541). This translates into a determination that as a “unit” of local government, the employees of Philadelphia’s Fire Rescue Squad would be entitled to immunity from suit while in the performance of their duties as health care provider or involvement in charitable work on behalf of the “local agency.” Cf. Guinn, supra.
Based on the preceding, we find it appropriate to hold that members of Philadelphia’s Fire Rescue Squad (as representatives and/or agents of the City acting on its behalf for the public good) be considered an integral part of a “governmental authority.”
Having so found, our next subject of inquiry is whether the Appellee’s communication of her accident to the rescue squad should be equated with a “proper governmental authority” to whom such a report could be made. The qualifying adjective: “proper” circumscribes the list of governmental authorities to exclude some, but not all, agencies that exist as an extension of state, county and local government. However, we do not intend to embark on an analysis as to the breadth of the phrase “proper governmental authority”. This would be beyond the scope and necessity of the facts before us.
[308]*308We do find, nonetheless, that the appearance of the Fire Rescue Squad to provide medical aid and transportation to the Appellee, under the City of Philadelphia’s aegis as parens patriae, would cause that governmental agency (EMT employee) to appear to be a “proper” repository of “governmental authority” allowing for the Appellee to report the motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified/uninsured motor vehicle. It was for the trier-of-fact to weigh the credibility of the claimant/Appellee in regard to whether a report of the accident was communicated to the EMT employee. From the result, it is obvious that the court below believed the Appellee’s account of what transpired. See Dixon, supra. We see. no reason to disturb the finding of the court below in the absence of any indication that the purpose of MVFRL—to prevent fraud—is being compromised. Id.; Hatcher, supra.
No one denies that the Appellee was struck by a hit-and-run vehicle and sustained injuries requiring medical attention documented in the EMT employee’s “Fire Rescue Service Report”, as called for by the City of Philadelphia’s Fire Department forms. In particular, the form completed and signed by the attending EMT employee contained information as to the time the rescue service was dispatched, arrival time at the location of service, name of patient and injuries complained-of. The report also contained the medical services which were performed and that the Appellee was transported to the nearest hospital for follow-up treatment.
With the inability of the Appellee to identify her assailant or the vehicle driven in the assault, any type of subsequent investigation by the police is not guaranteed to have produced a suspect to determine if he/she had insurance allowing for payment to the victim for her injuries.
Consequently, under the particular facts sub judice, we fail to detect how holding that the Appellee’s failure to report the accident to a police officer, in contrast to an EMT employee, advances the preclusion of fraudulent claims. Cf. Calabrese v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 43 A.D.2d 970, 352 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1974) (Parole officer, as a matter of law, is a peace officer for purpose of insurance law requiring notice to [309]*309police within 24 hours of accident); Hanavan v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 33 A.D.2d 1100, 308 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1970) (Notification by claimant to State Police that she had been struck by hit-and-run vehicle satisfied reporting requirements of Insurance Law); Rodriques v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 54 Misc.2d 361, 282 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1967) (Victim telling hospital guard of accident, which was recorded in hospital records, was sufficient to met “notice to police” requirement under N.Y. Insurance Law).
Accordingly, after assiduously reviewing the facts against the applicable statutory and case law, we reject the claims proffered by the Appellant.
Order affirmed.
JOHNSON, J., files a dissenting opinion.