Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Association

12 S.E.2d 602, 191 Ga. 366, 132 A.L.R. 1165, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 663
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedDecember 5, 1940
Docket13424.
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 12 S.E.2d 602 (Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Association, 12 S.E.2d 602, 191 Ga. 366, 132 A.L.R. 1165, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 663 (Ga. 1940).

Opinion

The court did not err in refusing a temporary injunction restraining the Atlanta Bar Association and its members in their conduct of an alleged campaign against usurious moneylenders.

No. 13424. DECEMBER 5, 1940.
The superior court declined, at the instance of C. E. Gunnels trading as Acme Finance Company, to issue a temporary injunction against the Atlanta Bar Association, a corporation, the members of its executive committee, and V. K. Meador, a member of the association, restraining them "from mailing customers of salary buyers, including petitioner, any letters, cards, or other form of communication, suggesting, counseling, advising, inviting, soliciting, or urging such customers to violate their contracts or to file suit or to discontinue to do business with petitioner, or to come to any lawyer's office for free counsel, advice, or other legal service against petitioner or others similarly situated;" "from publishing in any manner, by themselves or through others, any counsel, advice, suggestion, or notice that defendants or any other lawyer will represent, counsel, advise, and furnish customers of salary buyers, including your petitioner, free legal services in the institution and prosecution of lawsuits, or otherwise, against salary buyers, including *Page 367 your petitioner, and from counseling or suggesting that any one else publish or send such notice;" "from seeking the cooperation of employers of customers of salary buyers, including your petitioner, in the conduct of their campaign against salary buyers, including your petitioner, herein complained of;" "from in any manner interfering with petitioner's conduct of his business, and from in any manner attempting to injure, damage, or destroy your petitioner's business, either by the attempt to create an unfavorable public opinion of your petitioner, or by any other means, either by themselves or through others."

In seeking this relief the plaintiff made substantially the following case: He is duly licensed by the State of Georgia and the City of Atlanta to carry on the business of salary buying, and he brings the present suit in behalf of himself "and others similarly situated." In February, 1940, Philip H. Alston, president of the defendant association, under authority of its executive committee, appointed approximately forty lawyers as a committee "for the alleged purpose of enforcement of usury laws." The defendant V. K. Meador was named and assumed the duties as chairman of this committee. The ostensible purpose of the association through this committee "is to find out whether there are small-loan companies in Atlanta lending money for interest running as high as two hundred and fifty per cent. per annum, . . to make an exhaustive study and then present the true facts to the public and to the legislature for appropriate action, and in co-operation with the public and particularly with employers of such borrowers to do what it can to defend the victims of the lenders from extortionate and usurious collection prohibited by law," but its real purpose is to put salary buyers in Atlanta, such as the plaintiff, out of business. In furtherance of this design the defendants have inaugurated, through the medium of "newspapers, radio, and possibly letters," a campaign against salary buyers, soliciting, encouraging, counseling, and advising customers of salary buyers "to . . repudiate their contracts," and to institute suits against salary buyers for the recovery of money, and informing them, as an inducement to institute such suits, that the lawyers on said committee will represent them free of charge. Employers of customers of salary buyers have been urged in the same manner to co-operate in said campaign by assuring such employees that they "will not be *Page 368 prejudiced in their employment by their violation of their contracts with salary buyers . . nor by their becoming involved in litigation with salary buyers," and by counseling, advising, and soliciting their employees dealing with salary buyers "to avail themselves of the free legal service of said bar association" in bringing suits in the courts of this State against salary buyers for the recovery of money. The defendants intend in this manner to stir up vexations suits and quarrels between salary buyers and the employers of their customers and between salary buyers and their customers. As a result of this campaign many of the customers of salary buyers, "including your petitioner," have been influenced to avail themselves of free representation by the lawyers on said committee, and have breached their contracts and instituted suits against salary buyers for "the recovery of alleged usury payments." The suits now pending and those the defendants seek to have filed "are not . . for the bona fide purpose of recovering any money, but for the unlawful purpose of harassing, vexing, injuring and damaging salary buyers and their business," in furtherance of their design to put salary buyers out of business.

Since the beginning of the present campaign the number of customers violating their contracts with salary buyers has doubled, but "it is impossible to tell which customers have since the commencement of said campaign . . violated their contracts on account of said campaign, and which ones have violated their contracts that would have done so without the commencement of said campaign," for the purpose of recovering damages against the defendants; and accordingly "unless defendants are restrained and enjoined from any further efforts to put salary buyers . . out of business by the methods herein complained of, petitioner will be irreparably injured and damaged." "Hundreds and possibly thousands of persons will be influenced" by the conduct of the defendants "to file suits in the courts of this county against salary buyers, at a large expense to taxpayers, to pay . . court officials to try such cases, and at a large expense to the salary buyers . . for attorney's fees, loss of time, . . other incidental expenses in defending such suits, and in the loss of court costs and all other expenses of litigation in cases lost by such customers as filed such suits and then go in bankruptcy to avoid the evil consequences of depending on said bar association to protect them against such *Page 369 risks;" and "innumerable lawsuits for injunction and for damages, actual and punitive, will be made necessary and will be filed against various employers and their employees for participating, aiding, abetting, and assisting said bar association in its unlawful conspiracy against salary buyers," unless the defendants are enjoined from the further prosecution of said campaign. The conduct of the defendants, in voluntarily advising and calling upon customers of salary buyers to breach their contracts and to institute suits in the courts of this State against salary buyers for the recovery of money, and in offering the services of the lawyers on said committee to them free of charge for such purposes, is "illegal, unethical, and contrary to the public policy of this State," and tends to directly and immediately "injure, damage, and destroy salary buyers, including petitioner," in violation of his rights "to be secure in his property and in the conduct of his business unmolested and uninterfered with by defendants except in accordance with the laws of this State." Such conduct tends to excite and stir up vexatious lawsuits against salary buyers, and is prohibited by the Code, §§ 9-405, 9-9902.

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Bluebook (online)
12 S.E.2d 602, 191 Ga. 366, 132 A.L.R. 1165, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gunnels-v-atlanta-bar-association-ga-1940.