Gunn v. Doe

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 6, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-10383·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DARRELL GUNN, Plaintiff, 19-CV-10383 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE JOHN DOE, et al., Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. By order datedJanuary 17, 2020,the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court directs Plaintiff to show cause within sixty days of the date of this order why the Court should not dismiss this matter as time-barred. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss aprisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007).The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action claiming that Defendants exposed him to radiation during an x-ray, in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. In his original complaint, he statedthat the incident occurred on May 5, 2016 (see ECF No. 2, at 7); in his amended complaint, he states that it occurred or September 22, 2016 (see ECF No. 8, at 4). Plaintiff signed and dated the original complaint on November 2, 2019. (ECF No. 2, at 21.) DISCUSSION The statute of limitations for §1983claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). A prisoner’spro se civil complaint is deemed “filed” at the moment the prisoner delivers

the complaint to prison authorities for mailing to the court. See Walter v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 562-64 (2d Cir. 2005). Plaintiff signed the complaint on November 2, 2019, and the Court received it on November 6, 2019.The events giving rise to this claim occurred either on May 5, 2016, or September 26, 2016. Plaintiff therefore filed this action after the three-year statute of limitations expired. Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading.

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Related

Owens v. Okure
488 U.S. 235 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Walters v. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA
651 F.3d 280 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Hogan v. Fischer
738 F.3d 509 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Pearl v. City of Long Beach
296 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2002)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)