Gunn v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 17, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-10383
StatusUnknown

This text of Gunn v. Doe (Gunn v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gunn v. Doe, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DARRELL GUNN, Plaintiff, 19-CV-10383 (CM) -against- ORDERTO AMEND JANE DOE, x-ray technicians, et al., Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action alleging that Defendants denied him adequatemedical treatment at Sing Sing. Because Plaintiff names employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), the Court construes the complaint as raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order dated December 11, 2019,the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b);see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007).The court must also dismiss a complaint ifthe court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the“special solicitude”in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro sepleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.”Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,”which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s claims arose at Sing SingCorrectional Facility where a Jane Doe x-ray technician and Defendant Nurse Andy Miller allegedly violated his rights during anx-ray examination. Plaintiffsues the Doe technician and Miller. The following facts are taken from the complaint: “[O]n May 5,2016, during x-ray

examination Andy Miller, RN #449 with deliberate indifference explained to x-ray technicians ‘do you know what’s he in prison for? He killed his ex-girlfriend.’” (ECF No. 2 at 7.) The Doe technician exclaimed twice, “‘TMI!’” (Id.) After taking the x-ray, theDoe technician indicated that the x-rayshowed an abnormality; boththe technician and Miller blamed Plaintiff for the abnormality, claiming he moved during the exam. Plaintiff disputes that he moved. Because of the abnormality, either Miller of the technician ordered another x-ray, and during this second x- ray, the technician failed to provide Plaintiff with a protective shield. As a result, Plaintiff has suffered “undue hardships, depression, paranoia personality disorder, nightmares, high levels of stress, unlawful discrimination and targeting, anxiety, low self-esteem, worrying, hopelessness and despair, fear, humiliation and needless degradation[.]”

He seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. Deliberate-Indifference-to-Medical-Needs Claim The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects convicted prisoners against deliberate indifference to any conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Deliberate indifference claims include an objective component and a subjective component. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). Prisoners alleging deliberate indifference to their medical needs must satisfy both components to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. The objective component requires that aprisoner “show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.”Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The deliberate indifferencestandard “contemplates a condition of urgency such as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.”Charles v. Orange Cty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir.

2019); seeHarrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that themedical need must be a “sufficiently serious”condition that “could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The subjective component requires a prisoner to show that the defendant officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”in deprivinghim of adequate medical treatment. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006)).That is, the prisonermust state facts showing that the medical professional possessed “a state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996); seeFarmer v.

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Bluebook (online)
Gunn v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gunn-v-doe-nysd-2020.