[Cite as Guitierrez v. Rodriguez, 2012-Ohio-1734.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 97048
ANDREA GUITIERREZ
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
LUIS RODRIGUEZ DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-724773
BEFORE: Sweeney, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 19, 2012 FOR APPELLANT
Luis Rodriguez, Pro Se 6811 Hague Avenue Cleveland, OH 44102
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey A. Crossman Law Office of Jeffrey A. Crossman, LLC P.O. Box 93913 Cleveland, OH 44101 JAMES J. SWEENEY, J.:
{¶1} When plaintiff-appellee Andrea Guitierrez bought her house, it came with an
easement on adjoining property owned by defendant-appellee Luis Rodriguez. The
easement, a narrow strip of land immediately next to Rodriguez’s house, connected to
Guitierrez’s property, but had been closed off by two fences, one at either end of the strip.
Wishing to use the easement as a driveway for access to her property, Guitierrez brought
this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of her right to use the easement and
a further declaration that Rodriguez had interfered with or otherwise obstructed access to
the easement. Rodriguez challenged the scope of the easement and claimed that he now
owned the land on which the easement existed by adverse possession. A magistrate ruled
that the easement was valid and continuing. Following a trial, the magistrate rejected
Rodriguez’s claim for adverse possession because Rodriguez failed to prove he possessed
the easement exclusively. The court overruled Rodriguez’s objections to the magistrate’s
decision and ordered Rodriguez to refrain from interfering with Guitierrez’s use of the
easement.
{¶2} Having abandoned any claim regarding the court’s rejection of his adverse
possession claim, Rodriguez’s sole assignment of error contests the scope of Guitierrez’s
use of the easement. He argues that the easement is so narrow in width that Guitierrez’s
use of it as a driveway would create noise and annoyance for him and any subsequent owners of his property. He further argues that the removal of a fence that currently
restricts access to the easement would be an invitation to trespassers and a risk to the
safety of his children.
{¶3} Rodriguez lives on Hague Avenue. Guitierrez lives directly behind him but
also has a Hague Avenue address. At one time these two properties were part of a single
parcel owned by Charles and Gladys Furlong. In 1985, the Furlongs divided their
property and in doing so reserved a ten-foot wide, 100-foot long easement over their
existing property. Guitierrez bought the newly created parcel; Rodriguez bought the
Furlongs’ existing parcel.
{¶4} The easement is described as:
10.00 feet wide by 100.00 feet long, parallel to east property line, and further described as follows: Beginning at the Northeast corner of Sublot No. 373 and Southerly line of Hague Ave.; Thence South 23 deg. 10’ 15” East at a distance of 100.00 ft. to a point; Thence South 66 deg. 45” West 10.00 ft. to a point; Thence North 23 deg. 10’ 15” West 100.00 ft. to a point in Southerly line of Hague Ave.; Thence with Southerly line of Hague Ave. North 66 deg. 49’ 45” East 10.00 feet to a place of beginning, be the same more or less but subject to all legal highways.
{¶5} In simpler terms, as referenced by the map attached to this opinion as an
appendix, the easement is essentially the space between Rodriguez’s house and that of the
neighboring house, and runs in a narrow strip from Hague Avenue back along the side of
Rodriguez’s house to Guitierrez’s property. This narrow strip is approximately 13 feet
wide, so the ten-foot width of the easement takes up most of the space. When the
Furlongs sold their land to Rodriguez, the deed made reference to the easement granted to
Guitierrez’s property. {¶6} An easement grants one party the legal right to enter onto the property of
another. Alban v. R.K. Co., 15 Ohio St.2d 229, 231-32, 239 N.E.2d 22 (1968). The
party granting the easement (the “servient” estate) can limit the scope of the easement to
the party receiving the estate (the “dominant” estate). In cases of express easements, the
dominant estate’s use of the land is governed by the language of the instrument granting
the easement. As with any written document, we interpret the terms of a written
easement under rules of contract construction to carry out the intent of the parties as
expressed by the language used in creating the easement. Skivolocki v. E. Ohio Gas Co.,
38 Ohio St.2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374 (1974), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶7} The easement language does not contain any limitations on its use. “The
unrestricted grant of an easement gives the grantee all such rights as are necessary to the
reasonable and proper enjoyment thereof.” Rueckel v. E. Texas Transm. Corp., 3 Ohio
App.3d 153, 159, 444 N.E.2d 77 (5th Dist.1981). But the absence of limitations in the
easement does not mean that Guitierrez could use the easement for any purpose. While
an easement grants one the right to enter upon the land of another, that right of entry is
merely an “interest” in the servient estate that provides “a limited use or enjoyment” of
the land in which the interest exists. Cincinnati Entertainment Assoc., Ltd. v. Hamilton
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 141 Ohio App.3d 803, 813, 753 N.E.2d 884 (1st Dist.2001). This
is because an easement is not itself either land or an estate in land. Smith v. Gilbraith, 75
Ohio App.3d 428, 434, 599 N.E.2d 798 (11th Dist.1991). {¶8} Section 4.10 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, states the
prevailing rule regarding the use of easements:
Except as limited by the terms of the servitude * * * the holder of an easement * * * is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the use may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefitted by the servitude. Unless authorized by the terms of the servitude, the holder is not entitled to cause unreasonable damage to the servient estate or interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment. Restatement of the Law 3d, Property: Servitudes, Section 4.10 (2000).
{¶9} The question before the court was whether Guitierrez’s use of the easement
as a driveway for motor vehicles is a use that is reasonably necessary and convenient to
serve the purposes for which the easement was granted. Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon
Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App.3d 57, 740 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist.2000).
{¶10} There is no question that the easement was intended to provide the
Guitierrez property with a means of access to Hague Avenue.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as Guitierrez v. Rodriguez, 2012-Ohio-1734.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 97048
ANDREA GUITIERREZ
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
LUIS RODRIGUEZ DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-724773
BEFORE: Sweeney, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 19, 2012 FOR APPELLANT
Luis Rodriguez, Pro Se 6811 Hague Avenue Cleveland, OH 44102
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey A. Crossman Law Office of Jeffrey A. Crossman, LLC P.O. Box 93913 Cleveland, OH 44101 JAMES J. SWEENEY, J.:
{¶1} When plaintiff-appellee Andrea Guitierrez bought her house, it came with an
easement on adjoining property owned by defendant-appellee Luis Rodriguez. The
easement, a narrow strip of land immediately next to Rodriguez’s house, connected to
Guitierrez’s property, but had been closed off by two fences, one at either end of the strip.
Wishing to use the easement as a driveway for access to her property, Guitierrez brought
this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of her right to use the easement and
a further declaration that Rodriguez had interfered with or otherwise obstructed access to
the easement. Rodriguez challenged the scope of the easement and claimed that he now
owned the land on which the easement existed by adverse possession. A magistrate ruled
that the easement was valid and continuing. Following a trial, the magistrate rejected
Rodriguez’s claim for adverse possession because Rodriguez failed to prove he possessed
the easement exclusively. The court overruled Rodriguez’s objections to the magistrate’s
decision and ordered Rodriguez to refrain from interfering with Guitierrez’s use of the
easement.
{¶2} Having abandoned any claim regarding the court’s rejection of his adverse
possession claim, Rodriguez’s sole assignment of error contests the scope of Guitierrez’s
use of the easement. He argues that the easement is so narrow in width that Guitierrez’s
use of it as a driveway would create noise and annoyance for him and any subsequent owners of his property. He further argues that the removal of a fence that currently
restricts access to the easement would be an invitation to trespassers and a risk to the
safety of his children.
{¶3} Rodriguez lives on Hague Avenue. Guitierrez lives directly behind him but
also has a Hague Avenue address. At one time these two properties were part of a single
parcel owned by Charles and Gladys Furlong. In 1985, the Furlongs divided their
property and in doing so reserved a ten-foot wide, 100-foot long easement over their
existing property. Guitierrez bought the newly created parcel; Rodriguez bought the
Furlongs’ existing parcel.
{¶4} The easement is described as:
10.00 feet wide by 100.00 feet long, parallel to east property line, and further described as follows: Beginning at the Northeast corner of Sublot No. 373 and Southerly line of Hague Ave.; Thence South 23 deg. 10’ 15” East at a distance of 100.00 ft. to a point; Thence South 66 deg. 45” West 10.00 ft. to a point; Thence North 23 deg. 10’ 15” West 100.00 ft. to a point in Southerly line of Hague Ave.; Thence with Southerly line of Hague Ave. North 66 deg. 49’ 45” East 10.00 feet to a place of beginning, be the same more or less but subject to all legal highways.
{¶5} In simpler terms, as referenced by the map attached to this opinion as an
appendix, the easement is essentially the space between Rodriguez’s house and that of the
neighboring house, and runs in a narrow strip from Hague Avenue back along the side of
Rodriguez’s house to Guitierrez’s property. This narrow strip is approximately 13 feet
wide, so the ten-foot width of the easement takes up most of the space. When the
Furlongs sold their land to Rodriguez, the deed made reference to the easement granted to
Guitierrez’s property. {¶6} An easement grants one party the legal right to enter onto the property of
another. Alban v. R.K. Co., 15 Ohio St.2d 229, 231-32, 239 N.E.2d 22 (1968). The
party granting the easement (the “servient” estate) can limit the scope of the easement to
the party receiving the estate (the “dominant” estate). In cases of express easements, the
dominant estate’s use of the land is governed by the language of the instrument granting
the easement. As with any written document, we interpret the terms of a written
easement under rules of contract construction to carry out the intent of the parties as
expressed by the language used in creating the easement. Skivolocki v. E. Ohio Gas Co.,
38 Ohio St.2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374 (1974), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶7} The easement language does not contain any limitations on its use. “The
unrestricted grant of an easement gives the grantee all such rights as are necessary to the
reasonable and proper enjoyment thereof.” Rueckel v. E. Texas Transm. Corp., 3 Ohio
App.3d 153, 159, 444 N.E.2d 77 (5th Dist.1981). But the absence of limitations in the
easement does not mean that Guitierrez could use the easement for any purpose. While
an easement grants one the right to enter upon the land of another, that right of entry is
merely an “interest” in the servient estate that provides “a limited use or enjoyment” of
the land in which the interest exists. Cincinnati Entertainment Assoc., Ltd. v. Hamilton
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 141 Ohio App.3d 803, 813, 753 N.E.2d 884 (1st Dist.2001). This
is because an easement is not itself either land or an estate in land. Smith v. Gilbraith, 75
Ohio App.3d 428, 434, 599 N.E.2d 798 (11th Dist.1991). {¶8} Section 4.10 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, states the
prevailing rule regarding the use of easements:
Except as limited by the terms of the servitude * * * the holder of an easement * * * is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the use may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefitted by the servitude. Unless authorized by the terms of the servitude, the holder is not entitled to cause unreasonable damage to the servient estate or interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment. Restatement of the Law 3d, Property: Servitudes, Section 4.10 (2000).
{¶9} The question before the court was whether Guitierrez’s use of the easement
as a driveway for motor vehicles is a use that is reasonably necessary and convenient to
serve the purposes for which the easement was granted. Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon
Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App.3d 57, 740 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist.2000).
{¶10} There is no question that the easement was intended to provide the
Guitierrez property with a means of access to Hague Avenue. And the ten-foot width of
the easement implied that it was intended to be more than a mere pedestrian crossing — a
simple foot path would not require that kind of width, whereas a ten-foot wide driveway
would easily accommodate most automobiles. Guitierrez’s use of the easement as a
driveway for motor vehicles was thus reasonably necessary and convenient to serve the
purposes for which the easement was granted. While vehicular traffic might cause some
annoyance to Rodriguez, the grant of an easement as a driveway necessarily assumed that
there would be some traffic. The impact on the servient estate associated with that use
was plainly implied by the grant of the easement. {¶11} Civ.R. 56(C) states that summary judgment may be rendered when the facts,
viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party, show that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. We find, as a matter of law, that the court correctly ruled
that the terms of the easement allowed Guitierrez to use it as a driveway. The assigned
error is overruled.1
{¶12} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
Rodriguez also argues that even if the easement is properly used as a driveway, he should 1
not be forced to remove the four fences that cross the easement because they serve to keep trespassers off his property. The court made no ruling relating to the removal of fences, so the issue of fence removal is not properly before us.