Guevara v. John Doe

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 6, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-09760
StatusUnknown

This text of Guevara v. John Doe (Guevara v. John Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guevara v. John Doe, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOSE GUEVARA, Plaintiff, 21-CV-9760 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND JOHN DOE; JOHN DOE; JANE DOE; N.Y. CITY DOCS RIKERS ISLAND, Defendant(s). LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated in the North Infirmary Command on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that corrections officials violated his constitutional rights. By order dated November 23, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The complaint sets forth the following facts. On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff was transported by bus from Downstate Correctional Facility to Rikers Island. When Plaintiff got off the bus, he realized that his property bag was missing. (ECF 2 ¶ V.) Plaintiff told the three correction officers who were present that his property bag was missing, and that it contained law books and legal research that he needed for an upcoming trial as well as “Christian” and “spiritual” books. (Id.) The officers “got on the radio or cell phone” and then told Plaintiff that officials at Downstate would send Plaintiff’s property to him, but to date he still has not received

it. (Id.) Plaintiff was in the Contagious Disease Unit for more than three weeks, and during that time no one would discuss his property with him, and he was unable to “see grievance.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. (Id. ¶ VI.) DISCUSSION To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). First Amendment Claims Access-to-Courts The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the loss of his legal materials as

asserting that Defendants violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts. To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendants’ conduct (1) “was deliberate and malicious,” and (2) “resulted in actual injury to the plaintiff such as the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious legal claim.” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-53 (1996). To demonstrate actual injury, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a valid underlying cause of action separate from the right-of-access claim; and (2) frustration or hindrance of the litigation caused by the defendant’s actions. See Harbury, 546 U.S. at 415. Plaintiff’s allegations that he needs his legal materials for an upcoming trial fail to state a claim that he was denied a constitutional right of access to the court. Plaintiff does not plead that Defendants’ conduct prevented him from litigating a meritorious claim or resulted in any actual injury.2 The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to provide facts supporting

this claim. Free Exercise Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the government may not “substantial[ly] burden” a prisoner’s religious exercise unless the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means. Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 2009). RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of

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Bluebook (online)
Guevara v. John Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guevara-v-john-doe-nysd-2021.