Guerrero v. Williams

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedNovember 24, 2021
Docket2:13-cv-00328
StatusUnknown

This text of Guerrero v. Williams (Guerrero v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guerrero v. Williams, (D. Nev. 2021).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Pablo Ramon Guerrero, Case No.: 2:13-cv-00328-JAD-DJA

5 Petitioner

6 v. Order Denying Motions and Reclosing Case 7 Brian E. Williams, et al., 8 Respondents [ECF Nos. 129, 138, 142, 143] 9 10 Petitioner Pablo Ramon Guerrero sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 11 based on claims that his trial counsel was ineffective.1 I denied Guerrero’s petition, denied a 12 certificate of appealability, and closed this case on April 9, 2020.2 Guerrero appealed, and the 13 United States Court of Appeals denied Guerrero’s request for a certificate of appealability on 14 October 28, 2020.3 Guerrero has since filed a handful of motions seeking various relief, and I 15 reopened this case for the limited purpose of considering these motions.4 But because these 16 motions are either meritless or moot, I deny them and again close this case. 17 Discussion 18 A. Motion for relief from the judgment and order 19 In his “Motion 60(b)((6)(1-3)”5 Guerrero challenges my dismissal of Grounds 12, 17, and 20 22.6 To recap, Guerrero argued in Grounds 12 and 17 that his trial counsel was ineffective for 21

22 1 ECF No. 26. 23 2 ECF No. 121. 24 3 ECF Nos. 123, 126. 25 4 ECF No. 134. 26 5 ECF No. 129. 27 6 ECF No. 129 at 8. 28 1 exercising nearly all his peremptory challenges on men in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,7 and 2 that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the same argument in his direct 3 appeal.8 The respondents argued that these grounds are noncognizable because Batson only 4 addresses the violation of a petitioner’s constitutional rights by the state, not by defense counsel.9 5 I agreed and dismissed Grounds 12 and 17 as noncognizable for failing to state claims for which 6 federal habeas relief may be granted.10 In Ground 22, Guerrero argued that he was innocent of 7 conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon.11 The 8 respondents argued that this ground was untimely because it was raised in a second-amended 9 petition and did not relate back to the timely-filed first-amended petition.12 The respondents also 10 noted that the United States Supreme Court has not held that a freestanding claim of actual 11 innocence is cognizable on federal habeas review.13 I agreed and dismissed Ground 22 as 12 noncognizable.14 13 In his instant motion, Guerrero argues, in relevant part, that Weaver v. Massachusetts and 14 Garza v. U.S. “shed a light on” Grounds 12 and 17.15 He explains that he is entitled to relief 15

16 7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 17 8 ECF No. 26 at 88–94, 129–31. 18 9 ECF No. 87 at 9. 19 10 ECF No. 98 at 4. 20 11 ECF No. 26 at 154–60. 21 12 ECF No. 87 at 4–5. 22 13 Id. at 10–11; see McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013) (“We have not resolved 23 whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”); Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Supreme Court has 24 never recognized ‘actual innocence’ as a constitutional error that would provide grounds for 25 relief without an independent constitutional violation.”). 26 14 ECF No. 98 at 4. 27 15 ECF No. 129 at 23 (citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), and Garza v. U.S., 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019)). Guerrero previously requested an extension of the page limit for 28 his reply to his motions, asking for “a (10) page extension, . . . not to exceed (20) pages.” ECF 1 under FRCP 60(b)(6) because “he is seeking to have a new legal rule applied” to Grounds 12 and 2 17 under Weaver and Garza: “if a petitioner cannot show ‘prejudice’ under Strickland [and] 3 Cronic, then he could instead show that he was denied fundamental fairness.”16 Guerrero further 4 explains that he did not know previously that this “novel” claim was an option.17 Regarding 5 Ground 22, Guerrero “seeks to re-introduce the affidavits [of his co-defendant] . . . based on the 6 cause and prejudice test, a proper excuse under 60(b)(1-3).”18 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) entitles the moving party to relief from judgment on several 8 grounds, including the catch-all category “any other reason that justifies relief.”19 A motion 9 under subsections (b)(1–3) must be brought “no more than a year after the entry of the 10 judgment,” and a motion under subsections (b)(4–6) must be brought “within a reasonable 11 time.”20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) applies in habeas corpus proceedings only to the extent that it is 12 not inconsistent with the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 13 (AEDPA).21 14 AEDPA generally precludes “second or successive habeas corpus applications” unless 15 the petitioner meets certain narrow requirements.22 The statute provides that “[a] claim 16 presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not 17

18 No. 136 at 6. In denying that motion, I explained that LSR 3-2(b) provides that “motions, 19 responses to motions, and replies in support of motions are limited to 30 pages, excluding exhibits.” ECF No. 137. Guerrero now moves to extend the page limit for his reply brief to 25 20 pages. ECF No. 138. This request is denied as moot just as the last one was. 21 16 Id. 22 17 Id. at 23, 29. 23 18 Id. at 30. 24 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 25 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). 26 21 Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005). 27 22 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 28 1 presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless” it “relies on a new rule of 2 constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 3 previously unavailable” or on newly discovered facts that show a high probability of actual 4 innocence.23 Habeas corpus petitioners cannot utilize a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to 5 circumvent these restrictions.24 6 In Gonzalez v. Crosby, the Supreme Court held that a legitimate Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 7 motion in a habeas action “attacks . . . some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas 8 proceedings,” while a second or successive habeas corpus petition “is a filing that contains one 9 or more ‘claims,’” defined as “asserted federal bas[e]s for relief from a state court’s judgment of 10 conviction.”25 I dismissed Grounds 12, 17, and 22 because they failed to state a claim for which 11 federal habeas relief may be granted.26 This was, in essence, a merits ruling, not a preclusion to 12 a merits determination.27 Because Guerrero is attacking my previous resolution of Grounds 12, 13 17, and 22 on their merits, he is effectively making habeas corpus claims.28 This filing is 14 therefore not a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, but rather a second or successive habeas corpus 15 16 17 18

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Related

Batson v. Kentucky
476 U.S. 79 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Gonzalez v. Crosby
545 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 2005)
McQuiggin v. Perkins
133 S. Ct. 1924 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Alan Gimenez v. J. Ochoa
821 F.3d 1136 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Weaver v. Massachusetts
582 U.S. 286 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Garza v. Idaho
586 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 2019)

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Bluebook (online)
Guerrero v. Williams, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guerrero-v-williams-nvd-2021.