Guerra v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: August 28, 2024
• Docket: 4:23-cv-05845
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5

6 SONIA CASTANEDA GUERRA, Case No. 23-cv-05845-HSG 7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 8 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS v. 9 Re: Dkt. No. 15 OS RESTAURANT SERVICES, LLC, 10 Defendant. 11

12 Pending before the Court is Defendant OS Restaurant Services, LLC’s motion for 13 judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. No. 15. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition 14 without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons 15 detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 Plaintiff Sonia Castaneda Guerra initially filed this putative class action in Contra Costa 18 Superior Court against Defendant OS Restaurant Services, LLC and 50 unidentified “Doe” 19 defendants. See Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A (“Compl.”). Defendant OS Restaurant Services, LLC, removed 20 the action to federal court based on the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Dkt. No. 21 1. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of “all current and former non-exempt employees of 22 Defendants in the State of California at any time within the period beginning four (4) years prior 23 to the filing of this action and ending at the time this action settles or the class is certified.” 24 Compl. at ¶ 5. Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss or strike the 25 class allegations as insufficiently pled. Dkt. No. 15. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for 1 judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Granting a judgment on the pleadings is 2 proper when, “taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to 3 judgment as a matter of law.” Gregg v. Haw., Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 4 2017) (quoting Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Because a Rule 5 12(c) motion is functionally identical to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the same standard of review 6 applies to motions brought under either rule.” Id. (quoting Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 7 Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054, n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) ) (quotation omitted). 8 “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable 9 legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela 10 Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring that 11 a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 12 relief”). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to 13 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim 14 is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the 15 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 16 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual 17 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 18 nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 19 2008). Nonetheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 20 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 21 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 At bottom, the parties disagree on the level of detail required to plead plausible wage-and- 24 hour claims. Plaintiff urges that “[a] plaintiff alleging unpaid wages in violation of the Labor 25 Code need only plead that she was employed by the defendant and worked compensable time for 26 which she was not paid for.” Dkt. No. 21 at 7. The Court agrees with Defendant that such bare 27 assertions are insufficient. As this Court has previously explained, courts considering claims 1 Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Jan. 26, 2015). See, e.g., 2 Rubalcaba v. R&L Carriers Shared Servs., L.L.C., No. 23-CV-06581-HSG, 2024 WL 1772863, at 3 *9, n.6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2024). In Landers, the Ninth Circuit explained that although “detailed 4 factual allegations” are not necessary to state a plausible wage-and-hour claim, “conclusory 5 allegations that merely recite the statutory language” are insufficient. Landers, 771 F.3d at 644. 6 The Ninth Circuit held that to state plausible claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wages, a 7 plaintiff must “at minimum . . . allege at least one workweek when [she] worked in excess of forty 8 hours and was not paid for the excess hours in that workweek, or was not paid minimum wages.”1 9 Id. at 646. Plaintiff’s complaint currently only contains conclusory allegations that do not satisfy 10 Landers. 11 A. Meal and Rest Breaks (First and Second Causes of Action) 12 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to afford her and other members of the putative class 13 all earned meal and rest breaks in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512(a), 1194, and 14 1197, as well as the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Orders. See Compl. at ¶¶ 14– 15 22. “To state a claim for failure to provide required rest or meal periods, [a plaintiff] must at least 16 allege either a specific corporate policy prohibiting those breaks or a specific instance or instances 17 in which he was denied a required break.” See, e.g., Ramirez v. HV Glob. Mgmt. Corp., No. 21- 18 CV-09955-BLF, 2023 WL 322888, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2023); Guerrero v. Halliburton 19 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:16-CV-1300-LJO-JLT, 2016 WL 6494296, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 20 2016) (“The requirement in Landers that a plaintiff must plead a specific instance of alleged wage 21 and hour violations also applies to claims about missed meal and rest periods.”). 22 Plaintiff suggests that Defendant had “illegal payroll policies and practices,” but does not 23 offer any factual detail to support this assertion. Plaintiff offers no factual detail at all. Instead, 24 she simply concludes that Defendant failed to provide her and other class members the statutorily 25 required meal and rest breaks: 26 1 Although Landers involved claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, courts still 27 routinely apply the standard in Landers to claims brought under the California Labor Code. See 1 • “Defendants required, permitted or otherwise suffered Plaintiff and Class Members 2 to take less than the 30-minute meal period, or to work through them, and have 3 failed to otherwise provide the required meal periods to Plaintiff and Class 4 Members . . . .” Compl. at ¶ 15. 5 • “Defendants failed to provide rest periods to Plaintiff and Class Members.” Id. at 6 ¶ 20. 7 • Defendants failed to “compensate Plaintiff and Class Members who were not 8 provided with a meal period, in accordance with the applicable wage order . . . .” 9 Id. at ¶ 16. 10 The Court agrees with Defendant that these allegations are plainly insufficient, and fail to 11 plausibly allege a claim for failure to provide meal and rest breaks. Accord Rubalcaba, 2024 WL 12 1772863, at *11 (“Recapitulating the statutory standard – which is what Plaintiff does throughout 13 the complaint – is no substitute for pleading a specific instance of meal and rest break violations, 14 or a specific policy prohibiting appropriate meals and break times, which is his burden.”). 15 B. Minimum and Overtime Wages (Third and Fourth Causes of Action) 16 Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant failed to pay her and other members all minimum and 17 overtime wages in violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, 1197, and 1198, as well as the 18 IWC Wage Orders. See Compl. at ¶¶ 23–31. Under Landers, “[a]lthough plaintiffs . . . cannot be 19 expected to allege with mathematical precision[] the amount of overtime compensation owed by 20 the employer, they should be able to allege facts demonstrating there was at least one workweek in 21 which they worked in excess of forty hours and were not paid overtime wages,” or in which they 22 were “not paid minimum wages.” 771 F.3d at 646 (quotation omitted). A plaintiff “may establish 23 a plausible claim by estimating the length of her average workweek during the applicable period 24 and the average rate at which she was paid, the amount of overtime wages she believes she is 25 owed, or any other facts that will permit the court to find plausibility.” Id. 26 Plaintiff fails to do so. Once again, Plaintiff offers only generic and conclusory allegations 27 that “Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and Class Members for all overtime hours worked 1 Plaintiff and Class Members for all wages earned and all hours worked.” See Compl. at ¶¶ 25–26. 2 Plaintiff asserts, for example, that Defendants: 3 [F]ail[ed] to pay overtime at one and one-half (1 ½) or double the 4 regular rate of pay . . . ; permit[ed] or suffer[ed] Plaintiff and Class Members to work off the clock; requir[ed], permit[ed] or suffer[ed] 5 Plaintiff and Class Members to work through meal and rest breaks; illegally and inaccurately record[ed] time in which Plaintiff and Class 6 Members worked; fail[ed] to properly maintain Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ records; [and] fail[ed] to provide accurate itemized wage 7 statements to Plaintiff for each pay period. 8 9 Id. at ¶¶ 25, 30. Although Plaintiff suggests that such assertions render her claims plausible, see 10 Dkt. No. 21 at 13–14, these are just recitations of legal requirements. “While Plaintiff need not 11 identify a calendar week or particular instance where [s]he was denied wages, [s]he must plead 12 specific facts that raise a plausible inference that such an instance actually occurred.” Rubalcaba, 13 2024 WL 1772863, at *10 (quotation omitted). 14 C. Final Wages at Termination (Fifth Cause of Action) 15 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant willfully failed to timely pay her and other putative class 16 members their unpaid, earned wages upon termination in violation of California Labor Code 17 §§ 201, 202, and 203. See Compl. at ¶ 32–38. As Plaintiff appears to acknowledge, this claim is 18 derivative of her minimum wage, overtime, and meal and rest break claims. See Dkt. No. 21 at 19 15–16. The Court therefore finds that this claim is likewise insufficiently pled. The Court further 20 notes that Plaintiff has not even stated whether she is a current or former employee, so it is not 21 clear that she even has standing to bring this claim at all. 22 D. Accurate and Compliant Wage Statements (Sixth Cause of Action) 23 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide her with accurate and compliant wage 24 statements in violation of California Labor Code § 226(a), which requires “an accurate itemized 25 statement in writing” showing nine specific items. See Compl. at ¶¶ 39–42. “To establish liability 26 for a section 226(a) violation, an employee must demonstrate: (1) a failure to include in the wage 27 statement one or more of the required items from Section 226(a); (2) that failure was knowing and 1 Here, Plaintiff makes no effort to provide factual allegations to support any of these requirements. 2 She merely asserts that Defendant “knowingly and intentionally” failed to provide timely and 3 accurate wage statements. Compl. at ¶ 41. As explained above, merely parroting the statutory 4 requirements of a claim is insufficient. 5 E. Accurate and Compliant Payroll Records (Seventh Cause of Action) 6 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant knowingly and intentionally failed to maintain 7 accurate payroll records, in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226 and 1174, as well as the 8 IWC Wage Orders. See Compl. at ¶¶ 43–45. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not provided any 9 factual allegations that Defendant failed to maintain such records. It also urges that Plaintiff lacks 10 a private right of action to bring a claim directly under California Labor Code § 1174. See Dkt. 11 No. 15 at 18–19. Plaintiff may only pursue this claim as a private attorney general under 12 California Labor Code §§ 2698, et. seq. (“PAGA”). See Nicholas v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 19- 13 CV-08228-PJH, 2020 WL 7173249, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020) (citing Noe v. Superior Court, 14 237 Cal. App. 4th 316, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)). Plaintiff does not appear to respond to these 15 arguments at all, and the Court therefore finds that dismissal is warranted on this basis. 16 F. Indemnifying Necessary Business Expenses (Eighth Cause of Action) 17 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to indemnify her for necessary business expenses in 18 violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802. See Compl. at ¶¶ 46–49. As with the other 19 claims discussed above, this too falls short. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants knowingly and 20 willfully failed to indemnify Plaintiff and Class Members for all business expenses and/or losses 21 incurred in direct consequence of the discharge of their duties while working for Defendant, 22 including but not limited to expenses for personal cell phone use and other employment-related 23 expenses . . . .” Id. at ¶ 48. Plaintiff fails to include any factual detail, including under what 24 circumstances she needed to use her personal cell phone, what costs she incurred in doing so, or 25 how Defendant was notified. See, e.g., Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1078 (9th Cir. 26 2020) (rejecting claim for reimbursement of phone expenses where the plaintiff failed to provide 27 “specific, non-conclusory facts about how she made the calls or what costs she incurred”). 1 G. Unfair Competition Law (Ninth Cause of Action) 2 In addition to the California Labor Code violations discussed above, Plaintiff also alleges 3 that Defendant violated the “unlawful” prong of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). 4 See Compl. at ¶¶ 50–55. Because the Court concludes that each of Plaintiff’s other claims for 5 relief fail as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s UCL claim—which relies on the violations of the 6 California Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders—also fails on this basis. See Rubalcaba, No. 2024 7 WL 1772863, at *16. 8 H. PAGA Claim 9 The parties appear to agree that Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is similarly derivative of her other 10 causes of action. Compare Dkt. No. 15 at 23–24, with Dkt. No. 21 at 19; see also Compl. at 11 ¶¶ 56–60. Accordingly, the PAGA claim fails for the same reasons discussed above. 12 I. Class Allegations 13 In her opposition brief, Plaintiff also fails to address Defendant’s argument concerning the 14 sufficiency of her class allegations. See Dkt. No. 21. Plaintiff does not even allege her job title or 15 responsibilities as an employee of Defendant, let alone explain how her experiences are 16 representative of the experiences of other employees. These allegations therefore fall short and 17 this case is one of the rare instances in which it is appropriate to dismiss the class allegations. See, 18 e.g., Mish v. TForce Freight, Inc., No. 21-CV-04094-EMC, 2021 WL 4592124, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 19 Oct. 6, 2021) (“Generally compliance with Rule 23 is not to be tested by a motion to dismiss for 20 failure to state a claim,” but “district courts do dismiss class allegations on a 12(b)(6) motion, 21 applying the Twombly/Iqbal standard, where the complaint lacks any factual allegations and 22 reasonable inferences that establish the plausibility of class allegations.”) (emphasis in original) 23 (quotation omitted); Rubalcaba, 2024 WL 1772863, at *16. 24 * * * 25 In short, Plaintiff’s threadbare complaint does not state a claim that is plausible on its face. 26 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 27 IV. CONCLUSION 1 DISMISSES the class allegations. Dkt. No. 15. Despite the obvious deficiencies, Plaintiff 2 || nevertheless asserts that if given the opportunity she could allege additional facts to support her 3 claims. See Dkt. No. 21 at 1, 19-20. As with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court granting 4 || judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) should grant leave to amend even if no request for 5 leave to amend has been made, unless it is clear that amendment would be futile. See Pac. W. 6 || Grp., Inc. v. Real Time Solutions, Inc., 321 Fed. App’x 566, 569 (9th Cir. 2008). At this stage in 7 the litigation, the Court cannot say that amendment would be futile. Plaintiff may therefore file an 8 amended complaint within 21 days of the date of this order. 9 The Court further SETS case a case management conference on October 8, 2024, at 2:00 10 || p.m. The hearing will be held by Public Zoom Webinar. All counsel, members of the public, and 11 media may access the webinar information at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/hsg. All attorneys 12 and pro se litigants appearing for the case management conference are required to join at least 15 5 13 minutes before the hearing to check in with the courtroom deputy and test internet, video, and 14 audio capabilities. The parties are further DIRECTED to file a joint case management statement 3 15 by October 1, 2024. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: 8/28/2024 Abaiprerrl & Mb |p. HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28