Guembes v. Roberts

398 P.3d 507, 286 Or. App. 471, 2017 WL 2791710, 2017 Ore. App. LEXIS 819
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJune 28, 2017
Docket080203083; A163784
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 398 P.3d 507 (Guembes v. Roberts) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guembes v. Roberts, 398 P.3d 507, 286 Or. App. 471, 2017 WL 2791710, 2017 Ore. App. LEXIS 819 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

EGAN, P. J.

In an unpublished order, we dismissed defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction after determining that the notice of appeal had been filed prematurely—that is, after the signing of the judgment but before its entry—and that defendant had not filed a new or amended notice of appeal after the entry of judgment.1 Petitioner has filed a petition for reconsideration of that order. We allow reconsideration and write to address a recurring issue of appellate procedure: When a party files a notice of appeal after the trial court judgment is signed but before it is entered into the trial court register, must the appellant file a new or amended notice of appeal after the entry of judgment? We conclude that no new notice or amended notice of appeal is required. Accordingly, we conclude that we retain jurisdiction to decide defendant’s appeal, and we therefore withdraw the order dismissing the appeal.

Defendant, who was convicted of murdering his ex-wife, appeals from a judgment entered against him in a civil action by the personal representative of his ex-wife’s estate. Appearing pro se, defendant filed his notice of appeal after the trial judge had signed the judgment but before the trial court clerk had entered the judgment in the case register. Following entry of the judgment, defendant did not file a new or amended notice of appeal or a notice to proceed with the appeal. The Appellate Commissioner dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the failure to file a new or amended notice of appeal after the entry of judgment. Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Appellate Commissioner’s order.

As a general rule, a judgment becomes appeal-able when it is entered in the trial court register. See ORS 18.082(l)(c) (providing that, on entry, a judgment “[m]ay [473]*473be appealed in the manner provided by law”). A notice of appeal from a judgment that has not been entered in the register is jurisdictionally defective. State v. Ainsworth, 346 Or 524, 535, 213 P3d 1225 (2009) (citing ORS 18.082(1)(c) as an indication of “the legal significance that the legislature places on entry of the judgment in the register”); Welker v. TSPC, 332 Or 306, 312-13, 27 P3d 1038 (2001) (“A notice of appeal filed before the time to appeal begins to run is jurisdictionally defective.”); Garcia v. DMV, 195 Or App 604, 609, 99 P3d 316 (2004) (“[T]o be enforceable and appealable, a judgment has to be in writing, plainly labeled as a ‘judgment,’ and entered in the register with a notation that a ‘judgment’ has been filed.”).

In Baugh v. Bryant Limited Partnerships, 312 Or 635, 825 P2d 1383 (1992), and Gillespie v. Kononen, 310 Or 272, 797 P2d 361 (1990), the Supreme Court considered the jurisdictional ramifications of a prematurely filed notice of appeal under then-recently enacted former ORS 19.033(4) (1989), renumbered as ORS 19.270(4) (1997).2 Similar to [474]*474current ORS 19.270(4), former ORS 19.033(4) (1989) provided, in part:

“(4) Notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal, the trial court shall have jurisdiction, with leave of the appellate court, to enter an appealable judgment if the appellate court determines that:
“(a) At the time of the filing of the notice of appeal the trial court intended to enter an appealable judgment; and
“(b) The judgment from which the appeal is taken is defective in form * *

The Supreme Court held in Gillespie that, when an appeal is taken from a nonappealable order and we grant leave for entry of a final judgment but the trial court declines to enter such a judgment, we retain jurisdiction of the appeal under the original notice of appeal, even in the absence of an amended notice of appeal from the order denying entry of judgment. 310 Or at 279. Similarly, the court held in Baugh that, when an appeal is taken from a judgment that is defective in form, and we grant the trial court leave to enter an appealable judgment and it does so, there is no need for the appellant to file an amended notice of appeal. The court stated:

“We believe that the point of [former] ORS 19.033(4) [1989] was to do away with the need for all of the intervening steps to Court of Appeals jurisdiction. By this statutory change, the legislature intended to reduce the number of pitfalls for litigants and to reduce the number [475]*475of situations in which appeals would be dismissed on procedural grounds.”

312 Or at 641-42. The court explained further that the statute “presupposes that the Court of Appeals already has jurisdiction in the circumstances there stated and that it retains that jurisdiction when an inadvertently defective judgment is corrected.” Id. at 642. The court held that the failure to file an amended notice of appeal after the entry of a final judgment is not a jurisdictional defect: “In the absence of an express jurisdictional requirement in the statutes, we will not impose one.” Id. at 644.

More recently, in Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo. v. Warren, 242 Or App 425, 436-37, 256 P3d 146 (2011), aff'd on other grounds, 352 Or 583, 288 P3d 958 (2012) (Timbercrest), relying on Gillespie and Baugh, we held that an appellant who had filed a premature notice of appeal (after the entry of judgment but while a motion for a new trial was pending) was not required to file an amended notice of appeal after the trial court ruled on the motion for a new trial. We held, further, that the granting of leave to enter a final judgment was not a prerequisite to our jurisdiction, and that we have jurisdiction to decide the merits of an appeal from a trial court decision without first requiring the filing of a new notice of appeal, if

“(1) when the initial notice of appeal was filed, the trial court intended to enter an appealable judgment, but (2) the notice of appeal was premature, i.e., when the initial notice of appeal was filed, the judgment was defective in form, the filing of the notice of appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction under ORS 19.270(1) to enter the judgment, the trial court had not yet entered a judgment, or a party had timely filed a motion for new trial and the motion had not yet been disposed of under ORCP 64 F(2)

Timbercrest, 242 Or App at 436-37. As we understood Gillespie and Baugh in Timbercrest, the filing of an amended notice of appeal was not a prerequisite to this court’s jurisdiction of the appeal based on the original, prematurely filed notice of appeal.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
398 P.3d 507, 286 Or. App. 471, 2017 WL 2791710, 2017 Ore. App. LEXIS 819, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guembes-v-roberts-orctapp-2017.