1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 GUARDIA PIAZZA D’ORO, LLC, Case No.: 3:24-cv-00407-RBM-AHG
12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) REMANDING CASE TO STATE 14 OUDREE ELLIS-SANDERS, and COURT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT STORMI SANDERS, 15 MATTER JURISDICTION; Defendants. 16 (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 17 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS MOOT; AND 18
19 (3) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 20 AS MOOT 21 [Docs. 2–3] 22 23 24 On February 29, 2024, Defendants Oudree Ellis-Sanders and Stormi Sanders 25 (collectively, “Defendants”), proceeding pro se, filed a Notice of Removal of Case No. 37- 26 2023-00015923-CU-UD-CTL (“Notice of Removal”), which was initiated in the Superior 27 Court of the State of California, County of San Diego (“Superior Court”). (Doc. 1.) On 28 1 the same date, Defendants also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP 2 Motion”) (Doc. 2) and a motion to appoint counsel (“Appointment Motion”) (Doc. 3). 3 For the reasons discussed below, the Court REMANDS this action to the Superior 4 Court and DENIES Defendant’s IFP and Appointment Motions (Docs. 2–3) as moot. 6 Plaintiff Guardia Plazza D’Oro, LLC (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action by filing an 7 unlawful detainer action for residential real property against Defendants in the Superior 8 Court (“Underlying Action”) on April 17, 2023. (Doc. 1-2 at 2–5.)1 In the Underlying 9 Action, Plaintiff seeks possession of their property located in Oceanside, California (the 10 “Property”), unpaid rent from Defendants in the amount of $29,419.38, reasonable 11 attorney’s fees, and forfeiture of the agreement. (Id. at 5.)2 12 On February 29, 2024, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal. (Doc. 1.) In the 13 Notice of Removal, Defendants explain the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this 14 matter pursuant to federal question jurisdiction due to Defendants’ claims under: 15 42 U.S.C. 3601-19; The Fair Housing Act ("FHA"); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968; that law prohibits discrimination because of national origin, race, color, 16 sex, religion, disability or familial status in housing. Violation of Title 24 Code of 17 Federal Regulations 982.310(b); California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; 42 U.S. Code § 3604; 18 Federal Fair Housing Act; The Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code§ 51; California 19 Government Codes §§ 12921(b) and 12955(a)(d)(f)(g)(m)(p).
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23 1 The Court cites the CM/ECF pagination unless otherwise noted. 2 There appears to be a dispute as to whether Defendant Ellis-Sanders was properly served 24 a copy of the summons and complaint in the Underlying Action. (Doc. 1 at 2–3, 12–14.) 25 The Superior Court entered a default judgment against Defendant Ellis-Sanders on July 7, 2023, and later granted Defendant Ellis-Sanders’ subsequent motion to vacate default and 26 default judgment. (Doc. 1-2 at 37–38, 43–53, 101–102.) Defendant Ellis-Sanders 27 subsequently filed their Answer on November 6, 2023. (Id. at 105.) The Court need not address this dispute as it is not necessary to address Defendants’ removal of this unlawful 28 1 (Doc. 1 at 4, 5–10, 15.) In the Civil Cover Sheet, Defendants list their basis for jurisdiction 2 as federal question jurisdiction and that all parties reside in San Diego, California. (Doc. 3 1-1.) 5 Congress has authorized a defendant to remove a civil action from state court to 6 federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. However, the removing party “always has the burden of 7 establishing that removal was proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 8 1992). The district court must remand any case previously removed from a state court “if 9 at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 10 matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Allen v. Santa Clara Cnty. Corr. Peace 11 Officers Ass’n, 400 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1001 (E.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 38 F.4th 68 (9th Cir. 12 2022) (“Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may [] be raised by the district court sua 13 sponte.”) (italics added); Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019) 14 (“[C]hallenges to subject-matter jurisdiction may be . . . ‘at any point in the litigation,’ and 15 courts must consider them sua sponte.”) (quoting Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 16 (2012)). Here, the Court considers sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. 17 Moreover, there is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction. Gaus, 980 18 F.2d at 566 (“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the 19 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) (quoting 20 Nishimoto v. Federman–Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)). 21 Thus, doubts as to whether the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction must be 22 resolved in favor of remand. See Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 23 1996); see also Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any 24 doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). 26 Defendants do not assert diversity jurisdiction as their basis for this Court’s 27 jurisdiction. Thus, the Court solely addresses federal question jurisdiction. 28 1 District courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions that arise under the 2 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “A case ‘arises 3 under’ federal law either where federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the 4 vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal 5 law.’” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) 6 (modification in original) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 7 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). 8 The Court notes “[f]ederal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an actual or 9 anticipated defense . . . or rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.” Vaden v. 10 Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 49 (2009). Rather, “the federal question must ‘be disclosed 11 upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer.’” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque 12 v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. 13 v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1974)). 14 Here, the Court finds there is no federal question jurisdiction because the Underlying 15 Action invokes an unlawful detainer proceeding pursuant to California law. (See Doc. 1- 16 2); see also Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Montoya, No. 2:11-cv-2485-MCE-KJN-PS, 2011 17 WL 5508926, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011) (“[P]laintiff filed its Complaint in Superior 18 Court asserting a single claim for unlawful detainer premised solely on California law.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 GUARDIA PIAZZA D’ORO, LLC, Case No.: 3:24-cv-00407-RBM-AHG
12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) REMANDING CASE TO STATE 14 OUDREE ELLIS-SANDERS, and COURT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT STORMI SANDERS, 15 MATTER JURISDICTION; Defendants. 16 (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 17 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS MOOT; AND 18
19 (3) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 20 AS MOOT 21 [Docs. 2–3] 22 23 24 On February 29, 2024, Defendants Oudree Ellis-Sanders and Stormi Sanders 25 (collectively, “Defendants”), proceeding pro se, filed a Notice of Removal of Case No. 37- 26 2023-00015923-CU-UD-CTL (“Notice of Removal”), which was initiated in the Superior 27 Court of the State of California, County of San Diego (“Superior Court”). (Doc. 1.) On 28 1 the same date, Defendants also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP 2 Motion”) (Doc. 2) and a motion to appoint counsel (“Appointment Motion”) (Doc. 3). 3 For the reasons discussed below, the Court REMANDS this action to the Superior 4 Court and DENIES Defendant’s IFP and Appointment Motions (Docs. 2–3) as moot. 6 Plaintiff Guardia Plazza D’Oro, LLC (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action by filing an 7 unlawful detainer action for residential real property against Defendants in the Superior 8 Court (“Underlying Action”) on April 17, 2023. (Doc. 1-2 at 2–5.)1 In the Underlying 9 Action, Plaintiff seeks possession of their property located in Oceanside, California (the 10 “Property”), unpaid rent from Defendants in the amount of $29,419.38, reasonable 11 attorney’s fees, and forfeiture of the agreement. (Id. at 5.)2 12 On February 29, 2024, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal. (Doc. 1.) In the 13 Notice of Removal, Defendants explain the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this 14 matter pursuant to federal question jurisdiction due to Defendants’ claims under: 15 42 U.S.C. 3601-19; The Fair Housing Act ("FHA"); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968; that law prohibits discrimination because of national origin, race, color, 16 sex, religion, disability or familial status in housing. Violation of Title 24 Code of 17 Federal Regulations 982.310(b); California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; 42 U.S. Code § 3604; 18 Federal Fair Housing Act; The Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code§ 51; California 19 Government Codes §§ 12921(b) and 12955(a)(d)(f)(g)(m)(p).
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23 1 The Court cites the CM/ECF pagination unless otherwise noted. 2 There appears to be a dispute as to whether Defendant Ellis-Sanders was properly served 24 a copy of the summons and complaint in the Underlying Action. (Doc. 1 at 2–3, 12–14.) 25 The Superior Court entered a default judgment against Defendant Ellis-Sanders on July 7, 2023, and later granted Defendant Ellis-Sanders’ subsequent motion to vacate default and 26 default judgment. (Doc. 1-2 at 37–38, 43–53, 101–102.) Defendant Ellis-Sanders 27 subsequently filed their Answer on November 6, 2023. (Id. at 105.) The Court need not address this dispute as it is not necessary to address Defendants’ removal of this unlawful 28 1 (Doc. 1 at 4, 5–10, 15.) In the Civil Cover Sheet, Defendants list their basis for jurisdiction 2 as federal question jurisdiction and that all parties reside in San Diego, California. (Doc. 3 1-1.) 5 Congress has authorized a defendant to remove a civil action from state court to 6 federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. However, the removing party “always has the burden of 7 establishing that removal was proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 8 1992). The district court must remand any case previously removed from a state court “if 9 at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 10 matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Allen v. Santa Clara Cnty. Corr. Peace 11 Officers Ass’n, 400 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1001 (E.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 38 F.4th 68 (9th Cir. 12 2022) (“Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may [] be raised by the district court sua 13 sponte.”) (italics added); Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019) 14 (“[C]hallenges to subject-matter jurisdiction may be . . . ‘at any point in the litigation,’ and 15 courts must consider them sua sponte.”) (quoting Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 16 (2012)). Here, the Court considers sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. 17 Moreover, there is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction. Gaus, 980 18 F.2d at 566 (“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the 19 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) (quoting 20 Nishimoto v. Federman–Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)). 21 Thus, doubts as to whether the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction must be 22 resolved in favor of remand. See Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 23 1996); see also Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any 24 doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). 26 Defendants do not assert diversity jurisdiction as their basis for this Court’s 27 jurisdiction. Thus, the Court solely addresses federal question jurisdiction. 28 1 District courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions that arise under the 2 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “A case ‘arises 3 under’ federal law either where federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the 4 vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal 5 law.’” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) 6 (modification in original) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 7 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). 8 The Court notes “[f]ederal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an actual or 9 anticipated defense . . . or rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.” Vaden v. 10 Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 49 (2009). Rather, “the federal question must ‘be disclosed 11 upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer.’” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque 12 v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. 13 v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1974)). 14 Here, the Court finds there is no federal question jurisdiction because the Underlying 15 Action invokes an unlawful detainer proceeding pursuant to California law. (See Doc. 1- 16 2); see also Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Montoya, No. 2:11-cv-2485-MCE-KJN-PS, 2011 17 WL 5508926, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011) (“[P]laintiff filed its Complaint in Superior 18 Court asserting a single claim for unlawful detainer premised solely on California law. 19 Because a claim for unlawful detainer does not by itself present a federal question or 20 necessarily turn on the construction of federal law, no basis for federal question jurisdiction 21 appears on the face of the Complaint.”); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bilbaeno, No. 22 C–12–01707, 2012 WL 3987317, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012) (finding that an unlawful- 23 detainer claim not based upon any federal statute cannot establish federal-question 24 jurisdiction). While Defendants’ Notice of Removal lists various federal causes of action 25 (see Doc. 1 at 4), they are not asserted by Plaintiff in Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Am. 26 Vantage Companies v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 103 Cal. App. 4th 590, 595 (2002) 27 (“[F]ederal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the 28 1 plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”) Therefore, the Court lacks federal question 2 jurisdiction. 4 For the foregoing reasons, it appears the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 5 this action and removal was improper. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the 6 Court REMANDS this action to the Superior Court and DENIES Defendants’ IFP and 7 Appointment Motions as moot. 9 DATE: March 6, 2024 10 ____________________________________ 11 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28