Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Atlantic Coast Electric R.

132 F. 68, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4980
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey
DecidedAugust 22, 1904
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 132 F. 68 (Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Atlantic Coast Electric R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Atlantic Coast Electric R., 132 F. 68, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4980 (circtdnj 1904).

Opinion

LANNING, District Judge.

This suit is brought to foreclose a mortgage given by the defendant, the Atlantic Coast Electric Railroad Company, to the complainant, the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, as trustee for the holders of 500 of the bonds of the defendant company for $1,000 each.

The only questions to be now considered relate to the extent of the lien of the mortgage. Admittedly, the mortgage covers all the properties specifically described in it. But does it also extend to and embrace the following properties, acquired by the defendant company after the date of the mortgage: The leasehold interest in the West End & Long Branch Railroad, the leasehold interest in the Sea Shore Electric Railroad, the leasehold interest in the hotel property at Pleasure Park Bay, the capital stock of and the leasehold interest in the Asbury Park & Sea Girt Railroad, and the line of rail[69]*69■way extending through Belmar ? The defendant insists that none of these last-mentioned properties are subject to the lien of the mortgage; the complainant insists that all of them, except the capital stock of the Asbury Park & Sea Girt Railroad, which the complainant claims to hold in its individual capacity as collateral security for the payment of the defendant’s promissory note, are subject to its lien; and the bondholders, who are represented by special counsel, insist that all of the properties, including the stock of the Asbury Park & Sea Girt Railroad, are subject to its lien.

Although the authority for the execution of the bonds and mortgage was not given until October 7, 1896, and the mortgage was not recorded until October 13, 1896, the resolution authorizing their execution required them to be antedated July 1,1896. They were so antedated. As between mortgagor and mortgagee, therefore, the mortgage will be considered as a conveyance of property on July 1, 1896. This was the plain intention of the defendant company, and property acquired by that company between the date of the mortgage and the time of authorizing its execution, or of recording it, as well as that acquired after such authority or record, must be deemed to be future-acquired property. If. then, the mortgage covers any future-acquired property at all, the mere fact that two leasehold interests— one in the West End & Long Branch Railroad and the other in the Sea Shore Electric Railway — were acquired after the date of the mortgage, but before the authority for its execution was given, will not exclude them from the lien thereof.

The mortgage is inartistically drawn. Whether it was the intention of the defendant company to subject to the lien of its mortgage after-acquired properties like those above mentioned must be ascertained from an examination of the various clauses in the mortgage concerning after-acquired, properties. On such examination it appears that the mortgagor conveyed to the mortgagee “all the right, title, and interest of the railroad company (the mortgagor) now owned or hereafter in any wise acquired by it in and to all and singular the lines of railroad and railroad tracks and routes and other property, real and personal, hereinbelow described.” Then follows, first, a specific description of the lines of railroad owned by the defendant company on July 1, 1896; secondly, the description embraces “all lands and real estate, * * * buildings, improvements, tenements, and hereditaments now owned by the railroad company, or hereafter at any time or howsoever acquired by it, which are or may be connected with or appurtenant to the above described and hereby mortgaged railroad and routes”; thirdly, the description embraces “all and every franchise (including the franchise to be a corporation), right, privilege, and easement of whatsoever kind or nature now or hereafter at any time or howsoever owned, acquired, possessed, enjoyed, or exercised by the railroad company, either by virtue of any act of the Legislature of the state of New Jersey, or * * * of any contract or lease between the railroad company and any other railroad or other corporation * * * which are or may be connected with or appurtenant to the above described and hereby mortgaged railroad and routes.” The description further embraces [70]*70Tall and singular the liberties, privileges, and franchises connected with or relating to the said railroad, routes, and real and personal property hereto [hereby] mortgaged, * * * with all and singuHar the * * * hereditaments, easements, and appurtenances to the above described and hereby mortgaged railroad routes and real and personal property, franchises and premises, or any part thereof, now or hereafter belonging or in any wise appertaining.” The defendant insists that these clauses relating to future-acquired property are limited to the railways specifically described in the mortgage, and to properties appurtenant to such specifically described railways, and that they do not include subsequently acquired leases or stocks, or even the line of railroad constructed through Belmar. To determine the question, the meaning of the words “connected with or appurtenant to” must be ascertained. The phrases “connected with” and “appurtenant to” are not necessarily synonymous. The rail■:road of the West End & Eong Branch Railway Company is physically connected with that of the defendant company at the northerly end of the latter company’s main line, and the railroad of the Sea Shore Electric Railway Company is physically connected with that of the defendant company at the southerly end of the latter company’s main line. The defendant company secured leases upon these two lines of .-railroad, and has been operating them in connection with its own road. In Columbia Finance & Trust Co. v. Kentucky Union Railway Co., 60 Fed. 794, 9 C. C. A. 264, it appears that the defendant company in that case executed a mortgage upon its line of railroad, which is specifically described therein, and also upon “the lands, real estate, telegraph lines, railroad tracks, side tracks, bridges, * * * and all other things of whatever kind, belonging or in any wise appertaining, or which have been or may be acquired or provided for use upon or in connection with said railroad, * * * and also all (locomotives * * * and other chattels now or hereafter belong-.5ng to or appertaining to .said railroad, and all property, both real "Mid personal, of every kind and description, which shall hereafter be acquired for use on said railroad, and all the corporate rights, privileges, franchises and immunities, and all things in action, contracts, claims, and demands of the said party of the first part, whether now ¡owned or hereafter acquired, in connection or relating to the said -.railroad.” Here, it will be observed, the clauses relating to after-acquired property were also limited to the preceding specifically described line of railroad. Yet it was held that the lien of the mortgage covered a leasehold interest in another connecting railroad acquired by the defendant company-after the execution of the mortgage. In the mortgage now being foreclosed every “right” of the defendant company acquired after the date of the mortgage by lease isom any other railroad company was by express terms included in ';k lien of the mortgage, provided such “right” should be “concected with or appurtenant to” the railroad therein specifically described. As already stated, the defendant company has been operating the leased railroa*ds in connection with its own road. It bas been in possession of and has been exercising the rights acquired by the leases. These rights, if not appurtenant to, are, within [71]*71the fair meaning of the language of the mortgage, “connected with” the defendant’s railroad.

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Bluebook (online)
132 F. 68, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4980, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guaranty-trust-co-of-new-york-v-atlantic-coast-electric-r-circtdnj-1904.