GU v. WANG

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 28, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-04348
StatusUnknown

This text of GU v. WANG (GU v. WANG) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GU v. WANG, (D.N.J. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DING GU, Plaintift, Civil Action No. 24-4348 (MAS) (JBD) MEMORANDUM OPINION PETER ZUGUANG WANG, et al, Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge This matter comes before the Court on two separate Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff Ding Gu on behalf of Greenland Technologies Holding Corporation’s (“Plaintiff’ or “Gu”) Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4). The first motion is filed by Defendant Cenntro Holdings Ltd. (“Cenntro”) (ECF No. 24). The second is filed by Defendants Peter Zuguang Wang (“P. Wang”), Raymond Wang (“R. Wang”), Ming Zhao (“Zhao”), Charles Athle Nelson (“Nelson”), Everett Xiaolin Wang (“E. Wang”), and Frank Shen (“Shen”), and nominal Defendant Greenland Technologies Holding Corporation (“GTEC”) (ECF No. 25) (collectively, the “GTEC Defendants” and, together with Cenntro, the “Defendants”). Plaintiff opposed (ECF Nos. 30, 31), and Defendants replied, respectively (ECF Nos. 32, 33). The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND! Gu brings this case, on behalf of GTEC, as a shareholder derivative action against Defendants, alleging, among other things, breaches of fiduciary duty based on purported conflicts of interest and self-dealing. (See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 4.) A. The Parties Gu is a shareholder of GTEC. Ud. § 6.) GTEC is a corporation formed under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”), with its “principal executive office” in New Jersey. Ud. § 8.) Cenntro is a company incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong, and Plaintiff pleads, upon information and belief, that it also has its principal place of business in Hong Kong. (/d.) P. Wang is the Chairman of GTEC’s Board of Directors (the “Board”). (Ud. § 9.) P. Wang is also the sole director and shareholder of non-party Cenntro Enterprise Ltd. (“CEL”). Ud.) CEL is the sole director and shareholder of Cenntro. Ud.) Cenntro owns approximately 45.69% of GTEC’s outstanding stock and previously held as much as 59.44%. (Id. F§ 8, 23.) R. Wang is the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and President of GTEC. (/d. ¥ 10.) R. Wang is also the son of P. Wang. (/d.) Zhao, Nelson, X. Wang, and Shen? are all members of GTEC’s Board. Ud. J 11-14.) B. Cenntro’s Purchase of Equity Interest & the First Repayment Agreement In June 2017, GTEC’s subsidiary, Shanghai Hengyu Enterprise Management Consulting Company LTD (“Hengyu”), sold 16.23% of its equity interest in non-party Sinomachinery Group

' For the purpose of considering the instant motions, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). * Shen is also the Director of Research and Development at non-party Cenntro Electric Group Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of non-party Cenntro Automotive Corporation, for which P. Wang serves as CEO. (Am. Compl. { 11.)

Limited to Cenntro (the “Sale”). Ud. J 15.) Cenntro paid an unspecified amount of the Sale price upfront, with an additional payment of $38,060,365.00? to become due and owing on October 27, 2020 (the “Balance”). Ud. § 16.) Cenntro did not repay any of the Balance before or on the due date. (Ud. 9 17.) On November |, 2020, GTEC and Cenntro entered into a repayment agreement dated November 1, 2020 (“First Repayment Agreement”), which extended the deadline for repayment of the Balance to April 27, 2022, and outlined a plan for periodic payments of the Balance. (Jd. { 18.) The First Repayment Agreement was executed by P. Wang, on behalf of Cenntro, and R. Wang, on behalf of GTEC. (/d.) The First Repayment Agreement did not charge Cenntro interest on the Balance and was not secured by collateral. 29.) The First Repayment Agreement also did not indicate that GTEC’s Board reviewed, considered, voted on, or approved, the First Repayment Agreement. (/d. { 19.) Ultimately, Cenntro failed to make any payments to satisfy the Balance under the First Repayment Agreement. (/d. § 20.) During this two-year period of the First Repayment Agreement, between October 2020 and June 2021, Cenntro sold more than 750,000 shares of GTEC stock for more than $5.3 million. (/d. {| 21.) None of the cash received by Cenntro for selling its GTEC stock, however, was used to repay the Balance. (/d.) Additionally, between June 2021 and December 2023, Cenntro sold an additional 520,000 shares of GTEC stock but did not file any Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Form 4 to disclose the transaction. Ud. 22-23.) Cenntro received none of the cash from this additional transaction to repay GTEC for the Balance. (/d.)

3 The Sale price was paid in foreign currency, so the amount of the Balance in United States dollars fluctuates due to changes in conversion rates. (Am. Compl. ¥ 5 n.2.)

C. GTEC Extends Cenntro’s Payment Deadline for the Second Time On March 30, 2022, GTEC and Cenntro entered into a second repayment agreement (“Second Repayment Agreement” and, together with the First Repayment Agreement, the “Agreements”), which further extended the deadline of the Balance to June 30, 2024, in which the Balance was to be paid to GTEC in eight payments due on: September 30, 2022; December 31, 2022; March 31, 2023; June 30, 2023; September 30, 2023; December 31, 2023; March 31, 2024; and June 30, 2024. Ud. ¥ 24.) The Second Repayment Agreement, like the First Repayment Agreement, does not indicate that GTEC’s Board reviewed, considered, voted on, or approved the Second Repayment Agreement. Ud. § 27.) Also, the Second Repayment Agreement, like the First Repayment Agreement, was executed by P. Wang and R. Wang on behalf of Cenntro and GTEC, respectively. (id. {| 24.) Despite Cenntro’s non-payment of the Balance under the First Repayment Agreement, the Second Repayment Agreement also does not charge Cenntro any interest. (Id. § 29.) Cenntro, however, purported to “pledge” its common shares as collateral for repayment of the Balance under the Second Repayment Agreement. (/d. § 26.) In the end, Cenntro again failed to make any payments under the Second Repayment Agreement. (/d. { 28.) GTEC, through its Board, and under the control of Cenntro and P. Wang, failed to take any remedial action regarding Cenntro’s failure to pay under the Second Repayment Agreement, including seeking to foreclose on the common shares of Cenntro that were “pledged” as collateral. 7d. § 33.) D. Cenntro and P. Wang’s Purported Self-Dealing In April 2022, GTEC’s public shareholders learned, after reading GTEC’s 2021 SEC Form 10-K, of the Second Repayment Agreement. (U/d. { 30.) Subsequently, approximately 100 shareholders wrote to GTEC, demanding an explanation for the Second Repayment Agreement

and information about GTEC’s efforts to collect upon the Balance owed by Cenntro. (/d.) R. Wang responded and explained that Cenntro’s stock served as collateral against the Balance. (/d. ¥ 31.) But, as of December 2023, the collateralized shares have decreased in number, were now owned by CEL, and were worth a fraction of what they were worth when “pledged” in 2022 in connection with the Second Repayment Agreement. (Jd. § 32.) GTEC has not taken any action to collect upon the overdue Balance or to foreclose on the collateral shares that secured part of the Balance. (/d. { 33.) GTEC’s public SEC filings, however, indicate that the overdue Balance was written off.‘ (Ud. {J 33-38.) According to Plaintiff, GTEC’s provision in its SEC Form 10-K filing, concerning the inability to collect the Balance, effectively forgives Cenntro of any obligation to repay the Balance. (/d.

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