G.S. v. Clarksville Montgomery County School System

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedAugust 23, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-00364
StatusUnknown

This text of G.S. v. Clarksville Montgomery County School System (G.S. v. Clarksville Montgomery County School System) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
G.S. v. Clarksville Montgomery County School System, (M.D. Tenn. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

G.S., the Student, and K.S. and R.S., the ) Student’s Parents ) ) v. ) No. 3:21-0364 ) CLARKSVILLE MONTOMERY ) COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM )

To: The Honorable William L. Campbell, Jr., District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION G.S. is a teenaged girl. She brought this action, by and through her parents, K.S. and R.S. (“Plaintiffs”), under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq, appealing an adverse final order from a state administrative law judge (“ALJ”) with respect to her rights under the IDEA and whether the Clarksville Montgomery County School System (“Defendant” or “CMCSS”) had provided her with a free and appropriate public education as required by the IDEA for the 2018–2019 and 2019–2020 school years. Before the Court are the competing motions for judgment on the administrative record filed by Plaintiffs (Docket Entry No. 25) and Defendant (Docket Entry No. 28). After consideration of the parties’ arguments and of the administrative record as a whole, and for the reasons that follow, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion be denied, Defendant’s motion be granted, that the final order of the ALJ be upheld, and that this action be dismissed with no award of relief to Plaintiffs.1

1 The action has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for case management and for a Report and Recommendation. See Orders entered July 13, 2021 (Docket Entry No. 15), and December 21, 2021 (Docket Entry No. 27). I. BACKGROUND A. IDEA The IDEA offers federal funding to participating states, including Tennessee, for the purpose of providing a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) to school-aged

children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 1412. In general, the IDEA aims to ensure that every child has a meaningful opportunity to benefit from public education. S.B. v. Murfreesboro City Sch., 2016 WL 927441, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2016) (Campbell, J.). The IDEA mandates that children with disabilities, to “the maximum extent appropriate,” should be, educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). The “lynchpin” of the IDEA is a process referred to as the “individualized educational program” (“IEP”), which involves a meeting of the eligible student’s parents, teachers, and representatives of the local educational agency, at which the parties discuss the child’s progress and educational goals. Id. § 1414; Gibson v. Forest Hills Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 655 F. App’x 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988)). Based on discussions from this meeting, an IEP document is drafted, which “evaluates the child’s academic achievement and functional performance, as well as her short-term and long-term goals.” Gibson, 655 F. App’x at 426. Under the IDEA, parents who consider their child's placement and/or IEP inappropriate and who believe that their child has been denied a FAPE have a right to an impartial due process hearing by a state or local educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) and (g). In Tennessee, the “due process hearing” is conducted before an ALJ employed by the Secretary of State, Administrative Procedures Division, who is trained in special education law. Id. at 426-27; 20 U.S.C. § 1415; Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-10-606. Following exhaustion of this administrative remedy, the ALJ’s decision may be appealed in federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). The IDEA

empowers courts to “grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). B. Background Facts2 G.S. is a fourteen-year-old girl who has been diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety, Specific Learning Disorder with Impairment in Reading, Expressive Language Disorder, and Dyslexia. She is currently a student at the Currey Ingram Academy (“Currey Ingram”), a private school at which her parents placed her in February 2020 of her sixth grade year after she had attended public schools within CMCSS since the third grade. G.S.’s teachers throughout the years described her as a likable and outgoing child who was teachable and had a good and caring disposition toward other students and her teachers. She also has parents who are

actively involved in her education and care deeply about her well-being. In August 2016, G.S. transferred to CMCSS, specifically to the Sango Elementary School (“Sango Elementary”), from an out-of-state school. At the time, she was in the third grade and had previously been found eligible for special education services under the eligibility category of Specific Learning Disability (“SLD”) with a deficit in Basic Reading Skills. Shortly after entering CMCSS, she was evaluated by CMCSS staff and determined to be eligible for continued

2 Unless otherwise indicated, these facts are taken from the parties’ respective briefs and the sealed administrative record and are undisputed. special education services under the same eligibility category. See 9/2/2016 Eligibility Report (Docket Entry No. 19-1) at 931-956.3 On September 2, 2016, the IEP team4 met and an IEP was created for the 2016-2017 (3rd Grade) school year. See September 2, 2016 Notice, Docket Entry No. 19-1 at 957-56, and 3rd

Grade IEP, Docket Entry No. 19-1 at 959-975. The IEP noted in the Present Level of Performance (“PLOP”) section for reading skills that G.S. “reads at a level significantly behind her grade level peers” based upon reading assessments administered on August 26, 2016, and included goals in the area of Basic Reading Skills and Pre-vocational Skills. Id. The IEP provided for several classroom and standardized testing accommodations for G.S., including abbreviated assignments, extra cues/prompts, planned/preferential seating, oral testing, additional time for assignments and testing, no penalty for spelling/handwriting/sloppy, flexible scheduling and setting, and text-to-speech and/or human readers for standardized state testing. Id. The IEP provided G.S. with 30 minutes of reading intervention and instruction in a special education or “pull-out” setting away from non-IEP students, but she was otherwise to learn and participate in

school in the general education setting amongst her peers, with the provision of some in-class resources (55 minutes) for reading and pre-vocational areas. Id. G.S.’s parents signed and consented to the IEP. On August 14, 2017, an annual IEP team meeting occurred and an IEP was created for the 2017-2018 (4th Grade) school year at Sango Elementary. This IEP contained some revisions of the sections for PLOP and Goals, slightly revised the classroom and testing accommodations,

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Bluebook (online)
G.S. v. Clarksville Montgomery County School System, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gs-v-clarksville-montgomery-county-school-system-tnmd-2022.