GS Holistic LLC v. Xtreme Smoke LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedNovember 30, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00897
StatusUnknown

This text of GS Holistic LLC v. Xtreme Smoke LLC (GS Holistic LLC v. Xtreme Smoke LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GS Holistic LLC v. Xtreme Smoke LLC, (E.D. Wis. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

GS HOLISTIC, LLC,

Plaintiff, Case No. 23-cv-897-pp v.

XTREME SMOKE, LLC, d/b/a Xtreme Smoke and HASAN ABUASI,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 9), GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR STATUTORY DAMAGES AND COSTS, GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND DISMISSING CASE

On July 7, 2023, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting and false designation of origin and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Dkt. No. 1. The plaintiff served defendants Xtreme Smoke LLC d/b/a Extreme Smoke and Hasan Abuasi on July 18, 2023, dkt. nos. 5, 6, and, after the defendants failed to appear, asked the Clerk of Court to enter default, dkt. no. 7. The clerk entered default on August 28, 2023. The plaintiff has filed a motion for default judgment seeking an award of $150,000 plus costs of $892.00. Dkt. Nos. 9-1 at 2; 10 at 1. I. Entry of Default Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 requires a two-step process before the entry of default judgment. A party first must seek an entry of default based on the opposing party’s failure to plead. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). This means that the court must assure itself that the defendant was aware of the suit and still did not respond. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h), plaintiffs may serve a

corporate defendant “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). Rule 4(e)(1) allows the plaintiffs to serve an individual using the methods allowed by state law in the state where the federal district is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Wisconsin allows plaintiffs to personally serve an officer, director or managing agent of the limited liability company or by serving an agent authorized by appointment or law. Wis. Stat. §801.11(5)(a), (c). Under Wisconsin law, an LLC must maintain a registered agent under Wis. Stat. §§183.0115 and 183.0105.

In requesting the entry of default, the plaintiff said that it had served Xtreme Smoke LLC d/b/a Xtreme Smoke “via corporate service” and served defendant Abuasi via personal service on the same day (July 18, 2023). Dkt. No. 7 at ¶¶2, 4. The plaintiff filed the affidavit of process server William F. Frahm II from Cream City Process, who averred that he served the authenticated summons and complaint on Xtreme Smoke LLC d/b/a Xtreme Smoke by delivering to and leaving the documents with the owner (Abuasi) at

3877 S. 13th Street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on July 18, 2023 at 6:27 p.m. Dkt. No. 5. The plaintiff filed a separate affidavit from Frahm averring that he personally served Abuasi at the same time (6:27 p.m.). Dkt. No. 6. The Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions identifies Abuasi as the registered agent for Xtreme Smoke LLC. https://wdfi.org/apps/corpSearch/ Details.aspx?entityID=X002413&hash=885872562&searchFunctionID=40c2e2 8f-8932-4009-8aec-06cacdbb1204&type=Simple&q=xtreme+smoke+LLC.

Based on the information provided, the court concludes that the plaintiff has properly served both defendants. II. Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. No. 9) After the entry of default, the plaintiff may move for default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). When the court determines that a defendant is in default, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. e360 Insight v. The Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 2007). “A default judgment establishes, as a matter of law, that defendants are liable to

plaintiff on each cause of action in the complaint.” Id. However, “even when a default judgment is warranted based on a party’s failure to defend, the allegations in the complaint with respect to the amount of damages are not deemed true.” Id. (quoting In re Catt, 38 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2004)). A district court “must conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty. Id. Rule 55(b)(2) allows the district court to conduct this inquiry through hearings or referrals, if necessary, to determine

the amount of damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Hearings or referrals are unnecessary, however, if the “amount claimed is liquidated or capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in the documentary evidence or in detailed affidavits.” e360 Insight, 500 F.3d at 602 (quoting Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods., Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983)). A. Liability The plaintiff argues that it has established liability on willful trademark

infringement under 15 U.S.C. §1114, trademark counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. §1116(d) and false designation of origin and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. §1125(a). Dkt. No. 10 at 2. To succeed on a trademark infringement claim, the plaintiff must show that it owns a valid, protectable trademark and that there is a likelihood of confusion caused by the alleged infringer’s use of the disputed mark. Grubhub Inc. v. Relish Labs LLC, 80 F.4th 835, 844 (7th Cir. 2023); see 15 U.S.C. §1114. The elements are similar for a claim under 15 U.S.C. §1125(a). Uncommon, LLC v. Spigen, Inc., 926 F.3d 409, 419 (7th Cir.

2019). With respect to the likelihood of confusion, the Seventh Circuit has considered the following seven factors: (1) the similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (6) any evidence of actual confusion; and (7) the intent of the defendant to “palm off” his product as that of another. Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 726 (7th Cir. 2015).

The plaintiff has satisfied the first requirement by establishing that it owns a protectable mark. The Stündenglass marks are registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and owned by the plaintiff. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶9-11.

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GS Holistic LLC v. Xtreme Smoke LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gs-holistic-llc-v-xtreme-smoke-llc-wied-2023.